The income distribution problem in Latin America and the Caribbean by Morley, Samuel A.
THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM









Copyright © United Nations, May 2001. All rights reserved
Sales No. E.01.II.G.20
Printed in Chile
This book has been prepared by Samuel Morley, currently a visiting researcher at the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and fomerly a consultant of
ECLAC, and published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC).
This book has been published as part of a project funded by the Netherlands Ministry
for Development Cooperation and with contributions from the International
Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC), the Ford Foundation, and the
Swedish International Development Agency.
Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the Secretary
of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A. Member
States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this work without prior authorization,
but are requested to mention the source and inform the United Nations of such reproduction.
Cover illustration and design by Andrés Hannach.






A. Latin America: The Highest Inequality in the World ................... 17
B. A Closer Look at Region-wide Data for Latin
America and the Caribbean ............................................................. 18
C. Inequality within Latin America and the Caribbean .................... 21
D. Trends in Inequality Over Time within Latin
America and the Caribbean ............................................................. 23
Chapter II
DETERMINANTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME ......................... 27
A. A Schematic Model of the Distribution Process ............................ 27
B. The Impact of Growth on the Distribution of Income.................. 33
C. The Adoption of Reforms ................................................................. 36
D. The Impact of the Structural Reforms ............................................ 46
5
6 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
Chapter III
WHY IS THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN
LATIN AMERICA SO UNEQUAL? ................................................................. 51
A. Education ............................................................................................ 51
B. Physical Capital ................................................................................. 60
C. The Distribution of Land and Unskilled Labour .......................... 63
D. The Contribution of Inequality at the Top of the Distribution .... 65
Chapter IV
THE EFFECT OF REFORM AND GROWTH ON
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME .......................................................... 69
A. The Model for the Level of Distribution ........................................ 72
B. The Effect of Growth on the Distribution:
An Application of the Estimated Kuznets Curve ......................... 82
C. Subindexes of Reform ....................................................................... 84
D. Results for the Model of Changes in Inequality ............................ 87
E. Conclusions ........................................................................................ 91
Chapter V
EVIDENCE FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES ........................................... 93
A. Historical Evidence on Factor Prices and Relative
Factor Supplies ................................................................................... 99
B. Factor Shares and the Rate of Return to Capital ......................... 102
C. The Link between Labour Market Performance
and Inequality .................................................................................. 104
D. Patterns of Sectoral Growth in the 1970s and 1990s ................... 110
E. What Explains the Big Increases in Inequality
in Chile, Argentina and Mexico? ................................................... 112
Chapter VI
THE COMPONENTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY .................................... 115
A. Decompositions of Inequality ........................................................ 117
B. The Effect of Changes in Education and Skill Differentials ....... 123
C. Conclusions ...................................................................................... 129
Chapter VII
THE RICH AND THE POOR IN THE POST-REFORM PERIOD.............. 131
A. A Profile of the Rich ......................................................................... 132
B. Contribution of the Rich to Total Inequality ................................ 135
7ECLAC
C. The Role of University Graduates in Explaining Inequality ..... 140
D. The Poor ............................................................................................ 142
E. Reforms and Poverty Reduction ................................................... 147
Chapter VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ....................................... 149
A. Why is Inequality So High in Latin America and
the Caribbean?.................................................................................. 149
B. Inertia in the Distribution ............................................................... 150
C. The Impact of the Reforms ............................................................. 152





At the start of the new decade, the debate on economic policy centres on
the consequence of the reforms implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean
in the last two decades. Trade and financial liberalization and the privatization
of production activities have radically altered the rules of the game governing
labour and business. The macroeconomic policy changes that accompanied or
preceded the reforms sometimes strengthened the latter’s specific objectives,
especially the growth of exports, but on other occasions they had the opposite
effect. That combination of factors prompted the emergence of new market
structures and transformations in microeconomic behaviour.
Assessing the effects of the reforms on economic growth, employment
and income distribution is of more than academic interest. Governments,
political parties and social actors require a thorough evaluation of the results,
so as to devise or propose policies that complement the reforms or counter
their unwanted consequences. The Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) actively participates in this process.
This book is part of a project carried out by ECLAC, in conjunction
with researchers from nine countries, to study the impact of the reforms.
Directed by Dr. Barbara Stallings, the project has produced 14 books and 70
working papers. The summary appears in the first volume, entitled Growth,
Employment and Equity: The Impact of the Economic Reforms in Latin America and
the Caribbean. It is complemented by four issue-specific volumes analysing
investment, technological change, employment and equity. Additionally,
another nine country volumes examine the particular characteristics of the
reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
Mexico and Peru. The working papers are available at ECLAC’s web site
(www.cepal.cl).
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One feature of the project that distinguishes it from other comparative
studies of economic reform is that it specifically addresses the interaction
between macroeconomic and microeconomic processes. To understand the
impact of the reforms more fully, it is necessary to disaggregate the regional
level and to study the differences between countries and in the microeconomic
behaviour of firms according to sector, size and ownership. The globalization
of the economy and government policies such as structural reform affect
different countries and groups of firms in different ways. Some have been
able to exploit the new opportunities, while the situation of others has
deteriorated. The outcome of such developments gives rise to aggregate trends
that others have observed and measured, but to design economic policy
measures and improve future performance, it is essential to know what
underlies those aggregates.
This book by Samuel Morley, currently a visiting researcher at the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and formerly a consultant
of ECLAC, deals with a topic of growing concern in Latin American and
Caribbean countries: the distribution of income. Distribution in the region is
the most unequal in the entire world, a situation that has been true for as long
as the statistics have been kept. Since 1980, inequality has increased. No doubt
some of that is due to the recessions of the 1980s, but recent studies indicate
that the region’s economies saw very little improvement in the 1990s as they
recovered from their earlier recessions. The consensus is that distribution has
stayed about the same or even worsened slightly since 1990.
Morley identifies three contributing factors that help explain Latin
America’s high level of inequality. First, Latin America has a highly unequal
distribution of education and the highest skill differentials for university
graduates in the world. Second, the combination of a highly skewed
distribution of land and an increase in the growth rate of the labour force in
recent decades has driven down the relative wage of the unskilled. Third, the
rich in Latin America are much richer relative to the remainder of the
population than they are elsewhere.
Unfortunately it does not appear that growth will improve the
distribution very much, if at all. One reason is that growth is more skill
intensive now than it used to be. This may be simply a Latin American
phenomenon, but more likely it reflects changes in technology that are being
felt all over the world. Skill-intensive growth has favoured university
graduates. So far, this group contributes less to overall inequality than the
rich do because many in the group are not rich. Unlike the rich, however,
Morley shows that this group’s contribution to inequality rose sharply in the
post-reform period. In the nine-countries examined in the book, inequality
would have fallen in every case had it not been for the rising relative incomes
and size of the university group.
The evidence is mixed on the impact of the structural reforms on income
distribution, because it is difficult to separate the effect of the reforms from all
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the other changes that were happening at the same time. In the aggregate, the
reforms appear to have had a regressive effect on distribution, but the effect is
small and only marginally significant. The reason is that reforms in different
areas have offsetting effects on equity. Tax and trade reforms are
unambiguously regressive though not highly significant, but opening the
capital account is unambiguously progressive. Results for other reforms were
not consistent enough to give a clear answer.
ECLAC could not have carried out a project of this scale without the
cooperation of many individuals and institutions. We wish to thank the
researchers that participated in each of the nine countries, as well as the
coordinators of the thematic and national volumes. We are also indebted to
the members of the project’s External Advisory Committee: Nancy Birdsall,
Director of Economic Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace; René Cortázar, Executive Director of Chilean National Television;
Norman Hicks, senior economist at the World Bank; Juan Antonio Morales,
President of the Central Bank of Bolivia; Pitou van Dijck, Professor of
Economics at the University of Amsterdam; and Dorothea Werneck, Executive
Director of the Brazilian Agency for Export Promotion.
External financing came from a number of international donors. First,
we wish to recognize the central role of the Netherlands Ministry for
Development Cooperation, which provided the project’s basic donation. The
International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) also made a
substantial contribution that allowed us to expand the scope of the project
significantly. These two sources were supplemented with funds from the Ford
Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency. We offer
our deepest thanks to all the donors, without whose support this project would
not have been possible.
JOSÉ ANTONIO OCAMPO
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

PREFACE
This book is the result of my participation in the ECLAC project, “Growth,
Employment, and Equity: The Impact of the Economic Reforms in Latin America
and the Caribbean.” Early on, I decided that the questions I wanted to address
were broader than just the impact of the reforms, important as that is. Rather I
wanted to ask why the distribution is so unequal, how growth, reform and changes
in education structure affect the distribution and what distributional impact we
should expect from the new, post-reform mode of growth in the region.
To address some of these questions, ECLAC commissioned case studies
of income distribution in nine countries in the region. These equity case studies
formed part of the country component of the overall study of the impact of
the reforms, and they have all been published as part of the ECLAC working
paper series on Economic Reforms. I used the data from the nine studies to
examine how changes in income distribution before and after the reforms
were related to changes in wage differentials, education structure, labour
market conditions and the income share of the rich.
Comparison of the distribution of income before and after the reforms is
not a fully satisfactory way to determine the impact of the reforms because so
many other things changed at the same time. To address this problem I
augmented the nine-country sample with aggregate data from a much wider
sample of countries over a longer time period. That sample was used for an
econometric study in which measures of the distribution were related to
growth, reform, education structure and other variables. When combined with
the case study analysis, the results give a consistent view of the impact on
equity of the reforms, growth and other factors. They also highlight the
important role of increasing skill intensity as a factor inhibiting future
improvements in the distribution.
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This book reflects the inputs of ideas, suggestions, data and
encouragement of a great many people, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge
them. First, there were the authors of the nine case studies: Oscar Altimir and
Luis Beccaria for Argentina, Luis Carlos Jemio for Bolivia, Marcelo Neri for
Brazil, Osvaldo Larrañaga for Chile, Mauricio Cárdenas and Raquel Bernal
for Colombia, Juan Diego Trejos for Costa Rica, Damien King and Ashu Handa
for Jamaica, Rodolfo de la Torre for Mexico and Jaime Saavedra and Juan José
Díaz for Peru. They provided the data and the analysis upon which most of
the case study components on this book are based.
At ECLAC, I was fortunate, indeed, for the help of many colleagues.
First and foremost was Barbara Stallings, the coordinator of this project. I
could not have written this book without her encouragement, probing
questions and careful reading of every word I wrote. Graciela Moguillansky
pushed me hard on my assumptions and econometrics and, although we
generally disagreed, the book is better because of the attention she paid to it.
I also want to acknowledge Jürgen Weller for the help he gave me and for the
information and analysis of labour markets that he developed for the project.
His book on the impact of the reforms on labour markets is an important
complement to what I have done here. Among the many other colleagues at
ECLAC, I particularly want to thank Ricardo Bielschowsky, Beatriz David,
John Durston, Hubert Escaith, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Pascual Gerstenfeld,
André Hofman, Luis Felipe Jiménez, Jorge Katz, Arturo León, Pancho León,
José Antonio Ocampo and Osvaldo Rosales. They provided a stimulating
intellectual environment as well as a warm welcome for a temporary visitor.
I also wish to thank Albert Berry, Nancy Birdsall, François Bourguignon,
Eduardo Lora, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Enrique Ganuza, Richard Newfarmer,
Miguel Székely, Anthony Tillett, Rob Vos and the participants in seminars at
LACEA, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment, the Institute of
Social Studies, Oxford University and ECLAC for their comments on previous
drafts of the book. Many thanks also to Alejandra Tagle and María Eugenia
Johnson for their support and secretarial assistance, and to Ximena Sánchez
who performed many feats of computer magic in turning my raw manuscript
into a publishable format. Needless to say I alone am responsible for any




The clamour about income distribution in Latin America is increasing.
The region’s distribution is the most unequal in the entire world, which has
been true for as long as statistics have been kept. Too much of the fruits of
economic growth in the region has gone to those who already had a high
income, too little has trickled down to those who needed it. Many critics feel
that the new economic model now being followed in Latin America is making
the situation worse. Opening national borders to low-wage imports, freeing
capital flows from government control, privatizing State enterprises and
shifting away from progressive income tax systems to broad-based taxes on
consumption: all of these reforms might reasonably be expected to shift the
distribution of income toward the rich.
Empirically, the critics appear to have a point. Since 1980, the distribution
of income has worsened in Latin America. No doubt some of that is due to the
recessions of the 1980s. According to recent studies (for example, Londoño
and Székely, 1997), however, inequality diminished very little in the 1990s as
the Latin American economies recovered from their earlier recessions. The
consensus is that distribution stayed about the same or even worsened slightly
after 1990.
Both the factual basis and the implications for such aggregate statements
are questionable. Not every country has a distribution problem, and some
have made progress. Yet there clearly is a serious problem. Inequality rose
sharply in the biggest economies in the region –namely, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Mexico– and showed no tendency to decline after 1990. Indeed, it
rose still further in Argentina and Mexico. A large part of this book is devoted
to explaining why this happened, how much was due to the adoption of
reforms, and what can be done to improve the situation.
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The book proceeds on two tracks. The first uses all the available evidence
for all the countries in the region. That evidence is based on the distribution
of income across families or individuals, which is the distribution relevant for
welfare comparisons. The second track presents a clearer picture of the impact
of the reforms by focusing on a nine-country sample from the region. That
sample highlights the distribution of the income from production among those
who produce it (that is, the primary earnings distribution), because that is the
distribution most closely related to the forces of supply and demand in the
economy. One of the book’s main interests is the impact of the recent economic
reforms. If the reforms had any distributional impact, it should appear first in
factor returns, relative wages and factor markets. Therefore changes in the
primary earnings distribution should help explain what the impact of the
reforms has been. Generally, that distribution and the distribution of income
across families or individuals move together, which is why the smaller sample
of countries can be used to understand just how growth and the reforms
affected distribution.
The layout of the book is as follows. The next section of this first chapter
sets the stage with a short profile of inequality in the region and a summary
of recent trends by country. Chapter II discusses measurement issues, presents
a schematic model of the distribution process and then uses that schematic
model as a basis for a discussion of the impact of economic growth and the
reforms on the distribution. Chapter III addresses the question of why income
distribution in Latin America is so unequal. Chapter IV presents econometric
evidence on the determinants of the distribution, using a large pooled time
series cross section of observations of the family distribution from 16 countries
in the region. Chapter V summarizes the evidence from special studies
commissioned by ECLAC for the smaller sample of nine countries. This sample
features information on factor supplies and relative factor returns, as well as
conditions in the labour market before and after the adoption of reforms.
Comparisons of these indicators give a better understanding of how the
reforms affected factor markets and distribution, as well as the channels
through which that happened.
In chapter VI, special decompositions of the distribution data help
determine the sources of observed changes in the primary earnings
distribution, in order to learn more about the sources of changes in the
distribution and to find out why the distribution has not changed appreciably
in some countries despite changes in relative wages, educational structure
and economic growth. Chapter VII reports on special studies of the rich,
defined either as the top 10% of income earners or as university graduates.
This part of the study is a response to the finding that a very large part of
overall inequality is explained by differences between the rich and everyone
else (IDB, 1998). I wanted to find out to what extent changes in inequality
during the reform period could be coming from changes in the relative earnings
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of a small group at the top of the income pyramid. In other words, have the
reforms mainly benefited the rich? Finally, chapter VIII summarizes the
findings.
A. Latin America: The Highest Inequality in the World
A number of different measures are available for gaining an overview of
inequality in the region. The most direct and straightforward is a comparison
of household income per capita across the population, ordered by level of
income. One standard measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient, which
measures the percentage difference between the actual distribution and a
perfectly equal distribution in which each person receives exactly the same
income. The Gini coefficient varies between zero and one, with zero
representing perfect equality and one a hypothetical situation in which one
individual receives all the income.
Regardless of the method for measuring income inequality, Latin America
on average has the most unequal distribution in the world. Deininger and
Squire (1996) at the World Bank recently collected a set of comparable national
Gini coefficients for 108 countries around the world, going back over thirty
years. Table I-1 gives their estimates of the median Gini by region and decade.
Not only is the Latin American distribution the most unequal in the world,
but it has been that way at least since the 1960s.
Table I-1
MEDIAN GINI COEFFICIENTS BY REGION AND DECADE
REGION 1960S 1970S 1980S 1990S
Eastern Europe 25.1 24.6 25.0 28.9
South Asia 36.2 33.9 35.0 31.9
OECD and high income countries 35.0 34.8 33.2 33.7
Middle East and North Africa 41.4 41.9 40.5 38.0
East Asia and Pacific 37.4 39.9 38.7 38.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 49.9 48.2 43.5 46.9
Latin America 53.2 49.1 49.7 49.3
Source: Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A new data set measuring income inequality”, World
Bank Economic Review, vol. 10, No. 3, Washington, D.C., World Bank (1996).
Other than the very large differences between Latin America and the other
regions of the world, what is striking is the lack of convergence over time.
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Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case. Latin American inequality fell
slightly in the 1970s, but then it reversed in the 1980s. In contrast, inequality
fell substantially in the Middle East and Africa, the other two areas whose
inequality indexes were somewhat comparable to those in Latin America up
to the 1970s. Whatever the process that generates inequality, events since 1970
have had different effects in Latin America than anywhere else. In the
developed countries, inequality has remained roughly constant at a low level.
In the other developing regions where inequality was once high, it has fallen
quite sharply. Only in Latin America has inequality remained at its high initial
level.1
The differences between regional Gini coefficients translate into large
differences in the amounts or shares of income going to the rich and poor. In
the 1990s in Latin America, the top 5% of the population received 25% of total
income on average, while the bottom 30% got only 7.5%. In Southeast Asia
the top 5% received only 16% of income while the bottom 30% got 12.2%; the
comparable figures for Africa are 24% and 10.1%, respectively. In the developed
countries the top 5% got only 13% of total income while the poorest 30% got
12.7% (IDB, 1998). These shares imply that in Latin America the average income
of the richest 5% is 20 times that of the poorest 30%. In Southeast Asia the
richest 5% have average incomes only 8 times those of the poorest 30%.
B. A Closer Look at Region-wide Data for Latin America
and the Caribbean
Londoño and Székely (1997) recently calculated both the Gini coefficients
and quintile shares for 13 countries in the region for the period from 1970 to
1995. Their data considerably expand on the Deininger and Squire data set,
particularly for the 1990s. For the region as a whole, they made their
calculations both by averaging individual country-level distribution estimates
and by combining all the countries together into a single distribution from
which aggregate Ginis were calculated. The differences between the two
methods do not affect the overall trends, though they do affect the magnitude
of the changes. Table I-2 summarizes some of their results.
1 Clearly Eastern Europe is a special case in which the shift to a private-enterprise market economy
resulted in a one-time upward shift in inequality, but the higher level is still the lowest in the world.
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Table I-2
DISTRIBUTION DATA FOR LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1970-1995
GINI COEFFICIENT
GROUP 1970 1980 1990 1995
Total Latin America and the Caribbeana .580 .550 .583 .577
Weighted average .552 .525 .557 .558
Simple average .512 .494 .516 .515
Share of top quintileb .553 .534 .553 .556
Share of bottom quintileb .039 .040 .035 .036
Source: Juan Luis Londoño and Miguel Székely, “Persistent Poverty and Excess Inequality: Latin
America, 1970-1995”, OCE Working Paper Series, No. 357, Washington, D.C., Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) (1997).
aAggregate of 13 countries.
b Shares in top and bottom quintiles are non-weighted averages.
All the series in the table give the same message. Inequality fell in the
1970s, which was the last period of steady, widespread growth in the region.
Those favourable trends reversed in the 1980s due partly to recession, partly
to structural adjustment and partly to sharp increases in inflation in a number
of countries. This reversal eliminated all the progress made in reducing
inequality in the 1970s. By 1990 the income shares of the top and bottom
quintiles were back to their 1970 values and so was the Gini.
Inequality rises during recessions for a number of reasons, particularly
when the recession is accompanied by rising inflation, as was the case in Latin
America in the 1980s. Recessions bring rising unemployment. In countries
where there is little or no unemployment insurance, rising unemployment is
sure to pull down income at the bottom. When countries are attempting to
control inflation, they typically delay minimum wage adjustments. In the 1980s
the average real purchasing power of the minimum wage fell by a fourth
(Edwards, 1991). That, too, tends to reduce real income at the bottom of the
income pyramid and widen income inequality. Those are two reasons that
Londoño and Székely find that real income of the bottom decile fell by over
15% during the 1980s.2
2 They show the income share of the bottom decile falling by 15%. However, that means that real income
must have fallen by a greater percentage, because overall real income in the region was itself declining.
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What is more worrisome and more surprising is that rising inequality
has not been reversed significantly during the recovery in Latin America since
1990. If inequality went up in the 1980s because of recession, it should have
gone down as the region recovered and grew in the 1990s. Something more
than cyclic influences seems to be at work since what was lost by the poor in
the recessions of the 1980s was not recovered in the 1990s.
The Londoño-Székely study is the broadest and most careful investigation
of inequality trends that exists in the region. They synthesize a great deal of
information and make a real effort to build a consistent database for the region.
Yet several limitations of their study could have a bearing on both the level of
inequality and the changes over time. The most important is the exclusion of
countries with urban-only surveys, which meant excluding Argentina, Bolivia,
El Salvador, Paraguay and Uruguay. Of these, Argentina, Uruguay and to a
lesser extent El Salvador have low levels of urban inequality, while Bolivia,
Uruguay and El Salvador had declining inequality in the 1990s. Thus the
exclusion could have affected the estimates.
Another thing to keep in mind is the meaning of any estimate at the
aggregate level. Obviously, it is not difficult to calculate an aggregate
distribution index, but the region is anything but uniform, with respect to
growth or trends in inequality. Some countries are growing strongly, but Brazil
and Mexico –the two largest economies in the region– are still caught in stop-
and-go cycles.3  In any weighted average of distribution statistics, what
happens in those two countries is going to have a big influence on aggregate
outcomes. In a purely definitional sense, one might say that despite recovery,
inequality did not decline in the 1990s, but that is misleading because neither
Brazil nor Mexico recovered. What needs to be clarified is whether inequality
declined in those countries that recovered or –more to the point for this study–
that carried out reforms and reached some sort of a steady growth path.
Another issue also affects the interpretation of the region-wide data in
the Londoño-Székely paper. For a number of their statistics, they combine all
the available national distributions into one region-wide distribution and then
calculate the Gini coefficients and average incomes of the top and bottom
centiles (see table I-2). This is equivalent to treating Latin America as if it were
a single country. Since there are very large differences in average incomes
across countries, however, it is likely that most of those at the bottom of the
region-wide distribution will come from the poorest countries. Therefore a
statistic such as the changes in the real income of the top or bottom centile is
more likely to reflect the different growth rate of incomes across countries
than the differences in income growth between the rich and the poor within










countries. If each country represents a separate experiment, so to speak, which
shows the effect of growth and reform on the distribution, then the simple
average of the national Ginis is a better indicator than either the region-wide
or the weighted average Gini.
In table I-2 the trends in all three Ginis are similar, but there are quite
large differences in the size of the movements, particularly during the 1980s.
Both the region-wide and weighted average Ginis show nearly a 10% increase
in inequality between 1980 and 1990, but the simple average rises by less than
5% between those same two years. Indeed over the entire period from 1970 to
1995, the simple average of the Ginis for the 13 countries in the Londoño-
Székely sample varies between a high of .517 in 1994 and a low of .488 in 1979.
For all intents and purposes, this implies that the average level of inequality
in the region has remained virtually constant over the last 25 years.
C. Inequality within Latin America and the Caribbean
The discussion of aggregation problems points to the need to take a closer
look at differences in inequality between countries and differences in intra-
country trends in inequality over time. Figure I-1 displays the most recent
estimates available for the Gini coefficients for 20 countries in the region. Five
of the countries have observations for 1996 and nine for 1995. For Guatemala
the most recent is 1989. Thus the estimates are relatively recent, and cover
more than 90% of the population of the region.
Figure I-1
RECENT GINI COEFFICIENTS FOR 20 COUNTRIES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
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Figure I-2
THE RELATION BETWEEN INEQUALITY AND INCOME
Source: Gini coefficients from appendix table A-1 (this volume); income from Robert Summers




The first thing the data show is the extent of high inequality in the
region. With the possible exception of Jamaica, whose survey is based on
expenditure rather than income, no country in the region reaches even the
median level of the Gini for Sub-Saharan Africa, the most inequitable region
in the world after Latin America. Latin America’s high average inequality
is not due to one or two outlying countries. No less than 12 of the 20
countries in the figure have Ginis over .50, which is higher than the
maximum Gini in all but 14 of the 88 non-Latin American countries in the
Deininger and Squire data set.
Classifying the countries by the degree and persistence of inequality
shows that Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Panama have
the highest inequality in the region, while Costa Rica, Jamaica, Uruguay,
Venezuela and, surprisingly, Peru are the most equal. For some countries
such as Bolivia and Paraguay, the national surveys are too recent to indicate
the persistence of their inequality.
An interesting question that the book explores later is the relation
between inequality and the level of development. Figure I-2 plots the level
of per capita income measured in constant purchasing power dollars
against the recent Gini coefficients for the 20 countries shown in figure I-
1. Disregarding the Bahamas, which is an outlier in the income dimension,
23ECLAC
and Jamaica, which is an outlier in the Gini dimension, the two variables
do not demonstrate any relation at all. Some of the higher income countries
such as Uruguay and Argentina have low levels of inequality, but others
such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico have high levels. By the same token there
is an equally wide dispersion of inequality among the low-income
countries, with Jamaica and Peru at the bottom of the scale and Guatemala,
Paraguay and Panama at the top.
D. Trends in Inequality Over Time within Latin
America and the Caribbean
As mentioned above, the evidence on distribution trends in the region
indicates that distribution improved in the 1970s, worsened in the 1980s and
was roughly constant in the 1990s. While that description may fit the aggregate
data, however, it hides as much as it reveals. Some very significant differences
among countries or within the same country over time are not represented by
the aggregate data. Examining the impact of the reforms requires some idea
of how the level of inequality differs between reformers and non-reformers,
and how it may change over time in response to reform in any given country.
Table I-3 estimates trends in distribution as measured by the Gini coefficient
over the last three decades.
First a word of explanation about the table. In no country is there a
consistent set of data going all the way back to 1970. The table therefore reflects
the most consistent observations available over the relevant decades. Because
many changes are small, any decadal movement that was less than 5% of the
initial value of the Gini was arbitrarily labelled constant. This means that for
a Gini around .50, anything falling in the band .475-.525 is considered constant.
In each constant case, an increase or decrease in inequality over the decade is
indicated by a plus or minus. No surveys are available Guatemala and
Nicaragua. For Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay, the only information available
is for the urban sector; since the rural population is large in all three of these
countries, the urban distribution does not accurately reflect the national
distribution. All three of these countries now have national-level surveys, but
they only start in 1995 or 1996. In the case of Argentina and Uruguay (the
other two countries for which only urban surveys are available), trends are
estimated on the basis of the urban data. The justification for this difference in
treatment is the large proportion of the total population residing in urban
areas in these two countries. Given its small size, it is highly unlikely that the
rural sector could reverse the trends observed in the urban sector.
The countries with data at the beginning and end of the 1970s demonstrate
big differences in inequality trends. The assertion that the distribution
improved seems to depend on Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. In Brazil,
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Table I-3
TRENDS IN DISTRIBUTIONAL INEQUALITY SINCE 1970
1970S 1980S 1990S
Argentina rose rose rose
Bahamas constant- constant+ constant+
Bolivia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Brazil constant rose constant-
Chile rose rose constant-
Colombia constant+ rose constant-
Costa Rica constant+ constant- constant+
Dominican Republic n.a. rose n.a.
Ecuador n.a. n.a. n.a.
El Salvador n.a. n.a. fell
Guatemala n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras n.a. n.a. fell
Jamaica rose? fell fell
Mexico fell rose constant+
Nicaragua n.a. n.a. n.a.
Panama n.a. rose n.a.
Paraguay n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru constant+ n.a. fell
Uruguay constant+ fell fell
Venezuela fell rose rose
Source: Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A new data set measuring income inequality”, World
Bank Economic Review, vol. 10, No. 3, Washington, D.C., World Bank (1996); IDB, Economic and
Social Progress in Latin America, 1997 Report, Washington, D.C. (1997); Damien King and Sudhanshu
Handa, “Changes in the distribution of income and the new economic model in Jamaica”, Reformas
económicas series, No. 57 (LC/L.1353), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (March 2000); Jaime Saavedra and Juan José Díaz, “Desigualdad de
ingreso y del gasto en el Perú antes y después de las reformas estructurales”, Reformas económicas
series, No. 34 (LC/L.1225), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) (July 1999); Osvaldo J. Larrañaga, “Distribución de ingresos y crecimiento
económico en Chile”, Reformas económicas series, No. 35 (LC/L.1226), Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (July 1999); and José Antonio Ocampo
and others “Macroeconomía, ajuste estructural y equidad en Colombia: 1978-1996”, Política
macroeconómica y pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe, Enrique Ganuza, Lance Taylor and Samuel
Morley (eds.), Madrid, Grupo Mundi-Prensa, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
(1998).
Note: Constant refers to Gini coefficients that stayed within a 5% band; increases or decreases
within this band are indicated by a plus or minus.
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Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay, distributional inequality was
either constant or rising. The two countries that made the most significant
structural reforms in the 1970s –namely, Chile and Uruguay– both experienced
quite a large increase in inequality.
Very little difference is seen between the aggregate trends and individual
country experience in the 1980s. Inequality rose in all but three countries in
the sample, and in eight of them the rise was greater than 5%. This similarity
between the country and aggregate trends disappears again in the 1990s.
Overall, inequality does not change much because of offsetting trends (many
of them significant) going in opposite directions in individual countries. Only
two countries (Argentina and Venezuela) experienced a clear and significant
rise in inequality in the 1990s. The Gini coefficient also rose in the Bahamas,
Costa Rica and Mexico but the increase was less than 5%. In contrast, five
countries demonstrate a significant decline in inequality and another three
(all large) saw inequality fall, though not by a significant amount. Thus the
aggregate distribution data give a misleading picture of the 1990s. There was
apparently a good deal of change, but it was positive in some countries and
negative in others. Those differences are important for investigating the impact
of reforms, growth and technical change in the region.
In short, there is great heterogeneity in the region. One subgroup of
countries has high levels of inequality (El Salvador, Honduras, and Peru), but
they made progress in the 1990s. In another group (Costa Rica and Uruguay),
inequality fell to a low level, but it is unlikely to fall much further simply
because there are lower limits to inequality in any society. These two countries
have reached levels of inequality associated with developed countries. In the
third group, however, inequality rose sharply in the past and now seems stuck
at a high level. This group consists of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. I
would put Colombia and Venezuela in this problem group as well, because
although their inequality fell earlier, it rose throughout the 1990s, particularly
in the urban sector (ECLAC, 1999). A fourth group of countries (Bolivia,
Ecuador and Paraguay) is only now beginning to report on inequality at the
national level, because they have only recently begun to carry out rural surveys.
In all three of these countries, the recent data show a high level of national
inequality. Unfortunately, the nine countries in these last two groups together
contain over 75% of the total population of the region. Thus, most of the people
in the region are living in countries with very high levels of inequality –higher
in most cases than in the past. And what is worse, there are few if any
encouraging signs of improvements. This is the reality and the problem
addressed in this book.

CHAPTER II
DETERMINANTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION
OF INCOME
The discussion now turns to the determinants of the distribution of
income. First, a schematic view of the process helps to clarify the channels
whereby important economic factors affect the primary earnings distribution
and by which demographic factors affect the family or per capita distribution.
This is followed by an analysis of the relation between economic growth and
distribution, and a discussion of the impact of the structural reforms on factor
markets, relative returns and equity.
A. A Schematic Model of the Distribution Process
Figure II-1 presents a schematic overview of the main features of the
process by which the primary distribution of income is determined at a point
in time and over time. The key component of the model is an abstraction,
called the factor markets. These so-called markets are not a physical location,
but rather a network of contracts, pricing arrangements and understandings
that determine the prices of each of the factors of production. For simplicity
only four factors are considered: physical capital, human capital or skilled
labour, unskilled labour and land. In reality, of course, there are many different
kinds of physical capital, each with a different return, and many gradations
of skilled labour.
As in other economic markets, prices are determined in factor markets
by the interaction of the supply of each factor and the demand for factor
services. Markets clear at a price at which someone is willing to use the
available supply of each of the factors. That set of market clearing factor prices
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determines the relative price of skilled and unskilled labour and the rate of
return on capital and land. In the labour market, demand may well be so low
that many are forced to work part time in the informal sector or are completely
unemployed because the legally prescribed minimum wage in the formal
sector exceeds the marginal product of a fully employed labour force.
On the demand side, economic growth and expansionary macroeconomic
policy increase the demand for each of the factors, which tends to raise each
of their prices (arrow from box 3 to box 2 in figure II-1). What happens to
relative factor prices depends on the nature of the growth process. If it is skill
intensive, skill differentials widen. If it is led by sectors such as agriculture,
which use mainly unskilled labour, the reverse should occur. Structural reforms
change the composition of output by shifting output toward certain sectors
and away from others. That is, the demand side determines the position of
factor demand curves, which should depend negatively on own prices and
the prices of complements and positively on the prices of substitutes.
The supply side is critical to understanding the dynamics of the process.
In the short run, the supply of factors is fixed because each of the factors is a
stock which produces a flow of services. That stock can change, but it takes
time. This analysis artificially cuts time into periods short enough to consider
the stocks as constant. In each of these time periods, a fixed stock of factors is
determined by past investment decisions and a set of factor demand curves.
The two together produce the short-run set of factor prices shown in the
diagram (arrows from boxes 1 and 3 to box 2 and from box 2 to box 5).
While this process sets the valuation of the factors of production, the
distribution of ownership of the factors of production determines the primary
earnings distribution, since it is the owner who receives the payment for the factor
services. In the short run, the primary distribution is thus determined jointly by
the relative factor prices that come from the factor market and by the pattern of
ownership of the factors of production (arrows from boxes 4 and 5 to box 8).
The dynamics of the process come from the supply-side factors (box 7 on
the left side of the figure). Investment increases the stock of physical capital,
while the education system produces graduates who enter the labour force
and change the supply of both skilled and unskilled labour. Training and
experience also increase the stock of skilled labour (i.e., human capital).
Migration changes the position of factor supply curves, and it could affect
either unskilled or skilled labour.
It is important to remember not only that investment takes time, but also
that the amount that can be added to the stock of any of the factors is relatively
small over any short-run time period. Thus, in any period as short as, say, a
year, it is impossible to shift the factor supply curves out by more than 3-5%.
This means that in the short run, changes coming from the demand side are
most likely to explain observed changes in the primary distribution. Over
time, however, the stocks change because of additions to the physical capital
stock, education, retirements and so on (represented by arrow from box 7 to
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Figure II-1
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box 10). At the same time, factors on the demand side are likely to be changing
as well. Thus the relative prices over time reflect changes in both supply and
demand, such that it may not be possible to detect any apparent historical
relation between changes in the stock of human capital and relative wages.
Another important feature of the distribution process is the dynamic
feedback between factor prices and changes in factor supplies through
investment. The arrow between factor prices (box 5) and the changes in supply
(box 7) represents that feedback. That arrow represents the idea that relative
prices or returns on physical capital determined in the factor market affect
investment and education decisions. If the rate of return on capital rises,
investment in physical capital increases. Similarly, an increase in the wage
differential between skilled and unskilled labour, or between university and
high school graduates, tends to increase the demand for university education.
Fewer people enter the labour force immediately after high school, and more
continue on to earn a university degree. Over time, those decisions increase
the supply of educated labour. If the demand side does not change, this increase
in the supply of skilled or educated labour should reduce the skill differential.
The initial rise in the skill differential or the return to capital thus serves as a
dynamic signal that sets in motion an investment process that eventually
adjusts factor supplies and relative factor prices to a long-run equilibrium. By
definition that equilibrium is one in which additions to supply are just
sufficient to offset changes in the demand for factor services coming from
economic growth and technological change.
From the point of view of the primary earnings distribution, a rising skill
differential that tends to increase inequality in the short run is also a signal
that expands the supply of educated labour or physical capital in the long
run. These long-run changes on the supply side may well reverse the short-
run rise in inequality that induced them, since they tend to drive down the
rate of return to capital, both human and non-human. For human capital, in
addition the expansion in the supply of well-educated workers implies a rise
in upward mobility for youth, more of whom will enter the labour market
with a university education instead of just secondary or primary schooling.
A rise in the skill differential or the rate of return to capital thus has
different effects in the short and long runs. In the short run an increase in
either of these two is almost surely regressive. In the long run, however, so
long as the supply side reacts positively to these changes in the rate of return,
the change could be progressive, either because of upward mobility or because
the increase in physical capital drives down the rate of return and raises the
productivity and the average wage of workers.
This ambiguous situation results from the dual function of income in a
market system. On the one hand, relative income determines the distribution
at each point in time. Any relative increase in the income of the rich is
regressive. But on the other hand, income is the signal or incentive by which
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economic agents are encouraged to change their behaviour. A rise in the skill
differential induces socially desirable investment in education. Similarly, a
rise in profits induces investment and a shift of productive resources from
less desirable to more desirable uses. It would be a serious error of
interpretation to concentrate only on the short-run regressive effect of changing
factor returns without taking into account progressive long-run supply
responses.
There are important caveats to this optimistic picture, however. Most
important, the ability of students to continue their education rather than
entering the labour market depends on whether they or their families are able
to finance the cost of that education as well as the foregone income they would
have earned in the labour market. These financial constraints are strongly
affected by the level and distribution of family income; in figure II-1, this is
represented by an arrow between family distribution (box 9) and the change
in factor supplies (box 7). The positive signal for more education given by
rising returns to education could be partially or completely offset by a rise in
inequality in the family distribution coming from the same signal. In that
case, the progressive long-run adjustment of factor supplies to a rise in the
rate of return will be slowed down or stopped.
The government plays an important part in the distribution process. To
begin with, it directly provides education services at both the secondary and
university levels. Expanding the capacity of these systems should raise the
skill level of the young when they enter the labour market. At the same time
the government sets the price of publicly provided education. All of this is
represented by an arrow from government (box 6) to factor supply (box 7).
A contentious debate has taken place in recent years over how much the
beneficiaries should pay for public education, particularly at the university
level. Since the bulk of public university students come from higher-income
families, any government subsidy that reduces the cost of university education
to students is highly regressive. By the same token, however, if those subsidies
are removed without any complementary actions being taken, an important
channel of upward mobility will be closed. More to the point, the progressive
factor supply responses that reduce long-run earnings inequality will be either
damped or stopped altogether. Removing subsidies to public education on
the grounds that they are inequitable is thus likely to raise the skill differential
and increase earnings inequality relative to what it would have been had the
subsidy remained in place. The obvious policy solution to this paradox is to
couple the elimination of subsidies to public education with a system of means-
tested student loans or grants. This should enable students from poor families
to continue their education in spite of their personal financial constraints.
Many other government actions also have important effects on
distribution. For example, the government sets the minimum wage, which
affects relative factor prices and employment (arrow from box 6 to box 5). It
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also operates transfer programmes such as nutrition programmes, retirement
pensions, unemployment subsidies and the like. All of these affect the relation
between the primary earnings distribution and the family or personal
distribution. Most are intended to transfer income or goods to the poorest
members of society, thereby limiting the regressive outcome that would
otherwise be observed in the pure market solution. All this is represented by
the arrow between government (box 6) and family distribution (box 9).
Macroeconomic policy is another critically important area through which
the government affects the distribution of earnings and income (arrow from
box 6 to box 3). Experience shows that economic cycles and volatility have
large and significant effects. In the short run, the supply of factors is fixed.
The impact of cyclic changes in income is felt through their effect on the
demand for factors. Here the key question is whether recessions reduce the
demand more for skilled or for unskilled labour, and whether the profit share
rises or falls. All of these are empirical questions that must be settled by an
examination of different countries over their economic cycles, because there
is no compelling theoretical reason to expect one result or the other.
Theoretically, recessions and recoveries could be either progressive or
regressive.
Recessions reduce the demand for all factors of production. What happens
to the skill differential should depend on which falls more: demand for skilled
or unskilled labour. Two issues complicate the picture, however. First,
institutional or other restrictions may limit wage flexibility. At the bottom of
the labour pyramid, the rigidity could come from either the minimum or the
subsistence wage, and further up it could come from union contracts. In
developed countries the minimum wage puts a floor under unskilled wages.
The minimum wage has never been reduced during a recession.4  In very poor
countries, the subsistence wage or the reservation wage in subsistence
agriculture may play the same role that the minimum wage plays in more
developed countries. In either case, if a recession drives down the wages for
skilled labour, the skill differential could narrow and wage inequality could
be reduced for those with earned income. Latin American and Caribbean
countries are probably intermediate between these two extreme cases. The
region’s wages for unskilled labour are above the subsistence level and fall in
recessions, particularly in real terms. In the 1980s reductions of 25-30% in the
real value of the minimum wage were common, and they were caused in
every case by rising rates of inflation or delays in inflation adjustments. Wages
for skilled labour fell less sharply, which is why the skill differential widened
in the 1980s in most countries (Edwards, 1991).
4 There are many cases in which it went down in real terms because of inflation, however.
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Second, since recessions reduce the total number of jobs, they generally
lead to some bumping downward, that is, the displacement of the less skilled
by the better qualified. During recessions, skilled workers typically do not
become unemployed, but rather take over jobs previously held by the less
skilled or less experienced. Ph.D.s drive taxicabs or teach in primary school;
engineers take jobs as draftsmen; blue-collar workers with experience replace
younger workers with fewer years on the job. This sort of bumping has two
effects, both of which are regressive: it is likely to widen the skill differential,
and it increases unemployment, particularly for the young and less skilled.
Wages for skilled labour fall because these workers take lower-paying jobs
previously held by the less skilled, but the less skilled also move down the job
ladder or lose their jobs altogether. They face falling real wages and rising
unemployment, as well.
Inflation is another factor with important implications for equity. High
inflation was a strongly regressive factor in many countries during the 1980s.
At the time, economists hypothesized that this was because the poor were
unable to protect their savings from inflation. A more significant factor now
seems to be that the real wages for the unskilled were closely related to the
real value of the minimum wage, which was controlled by the government
through its policy on nominal wage adjustments. In each country that faced
hyperinflation, the government policy of only periodically adjusting the
nominal value of the minimum wage resulted in sharp reductions in the real
value of the wage simply because of adjustment lags. To the extent that skilled
workers were able to get more frequent wage adjustments, they were able to
avoid the contraction in the real purchasing power of their wages, and the
skill differential widened. Government macroeconomic management that
avoids hyperinflation and reduces the size and number of economic cycles
thus has favourable effects on distribution.
B. The Impact of Growth on the Distribution of Income
In a classic article, Simon Kuznets empirically analysed the relation
between growth and equity, using the historical experience of England and
the United States (Kuznets, 1955). He found that over the course of the
nineteenth century, inequality rose as both countries grew, but somewhere
around the beginning of the twentieth century the trend reversed and
inequality began to decline. This non-linear, inverted U-shaped relation
between output per capita and inequality has been labelled the Kuznets Curve;
it has been the subject of a vast literature that has looked for similar relations
in other countries and in international cross sections between countries.
Kuznets’ rationale for the relation is based essentially on the idea that the
growth process is specific rather than universal. It starts somewhere specific,
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in either a sector, a region or a city. From that starting point, its effects spread
through a variety of linkages to the rest of the economy. In the first stages of
this process, inequality rises. Later, as the effect of the growth stimulus spreads
in the population, inequality begins to decline.
In the Kuznets study, the growth process was the industrial revolution.
Industrialization started in the urban centres of essentially agricultural
economies. Incomes in the industrial nuclei were much higher than those in
the agricultural sector. As the nascent industrial part of the economy expanded,
inequality increased at first because the profits and wages of industry and
other urban activities benefited only a small proportion of the population.
That is, inequality rose because the growth process increased the small number
of those in the high income sector. Relative to the rest of the population, growth
increased the proportion of the rich.
This is the phase of growth when the Kuznets curve has a positive slope:
when growth increases inequality. But that is not the end of the story. Industrial
expansion created a wide variety of urban jobs, most of which paid more than
rural wages and most of which had to be filled by rural migrants. Gradually,
the relative size of the urban sector expanded and the rural sector contracted.
When the urban sector got big enough, its further growth reduced inequality
rather than increasing it. Once the majority of people had joined the high-
income sector, the number left behind in the low-income rural sector mainly
determined inequality. After that point, further growth reduced inequality
because it reduced the proportion of the poor or those in the low-income sector.
Kuznets offers a hypothetical explanation which may or may not account
for the trends in inequality in the United States and Great Britain. However, it
illustrates two points that are crucial for investigating inequality and growth
in Latin America. First, growth is specific, not universal. Second is the idea of
linkages. Linkages are the connections between other sectors or economic
actors and the sector in which growth is occurring. In the Kuznets account of
industrialization, the linkage was rural to urban migration. Urban jobs were
created and then filled by rural migrants who moved to the cities to take
advantage of industrial urban expansion.
Another example of a Kuznets process can be seen in the relation between
education and growth. Growth creates jobs for educated labour. Returns to
education rise, and the proportion of university and secondary graduates in
the labour force gradually expands. At first, inequality rises because the
variance of education in the labour force increases. When the proportion of
poorly educated workers has fallen far enough, however, further expansion
in the proportion of the labour force with university and secondary education
will begin to reduce educational variance. This is analogous to the rural-urban
migration case developed by Kuznets, although in this case there is no physical
migration. Rather, those who would have gone into the labour force with low
levels of education obtain higher levels to take advantage of the job
opportunities created by growth.
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These Kuznets-type linkages are not the only ones that are relevant in
considering the relation between growth and inequality. Hirschman-type
linkages are also important channels by which the benefits of growth in
dynamic or leading sectors reach the rest of the economy. In the Hirschman
case, the benefits of growth do not come from migration; they come from the
expanded demand for inputs to the dynamic sector (backward linkages) or
from cost reductions and expanded production possibilities downstream
(forward linkages). The stronger these linkages are, the broader or wider are
the impacts of the initial growth stimulus. Yet another type of linkage comes
from the consumer demands of the initial beneficiaries of growth. As those in
the dynamic sector increase their consumption, a multiplier effect increases
the demand for housing, urban services and consumer products. All of this
helps spread the income from the initiating, dynamic sector throughout the
rest of the economy.
Linkages are a key determinant of the relation between growth and
inequality, for they determine the “spread effect” of growth in the economy.
The stronger they are, the faster and further the benefits of growth will spread,
and the more equitable growth will be. This notion can be applied in a variety
of important ways in Latin America. Some economies feature large regions or
indigenous populations that are only weakly or marginally connected to the
modern, dynamic sector where growth is occurring. The north-east and north
of Brazil, the Andean region of Peru and the indigenous areas of southern
Mexico are powerful and tragic examples. In these three cases, and many
more besides, linkages are weak. The areas themselves have a significant
proportion of the nation’s population, which means that their relative income
levels will have a noticeable effect on inequality, but for reasons that are not
entirely understood, growth in the dynamic sectors does not induce much
forward or backward linkage activity. As a result, when these countries grow,
the spread effect to their backward or poor regions is quite limited. Growth
under these conditions tends to be inequitable. One could say that in these
countries inequality is high because of growth, in the sense that if the entire
country had remained in the same conditions as its backward regions,
inequality would be lower. Growth always leaves some people behind. The
key point here is that if the linkages are weak and the areas left behind are
large, then the economy will experience little movement toward the Kuznets
turning point, and the interval in which growth is inequitable is likely to be a
long one.
For the same reason, inequality is likely to rise with growth in counties
that have large indigenous populations. Typically the links between indigenous
people and the rest of the economy are weak. When growth occurs, it provides
little stimulus to the incomes of the indigenous population. Conversely,
inequality is likely to be lower in smaller, more homogeneous economies.
Small countries with homogeneous populations are unlikely to have backward
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regions or groups that are disconnected from the modern economy. Examples
include Argentina and Uruguay, where the bulk of the population lives in a
small number of interconnected urban areas. When this sort of country grows,
a greater share of the population benefits, because most people are directly or
indirectly linked to the sector where the growth stimulus began. Heterogeneity
is a key issue in comparisons of the distribution statistics of small, urban
economies like Hong Kong or Singapore with those of big, diverse economies
like Brazil or Mexico.
If linkages and relative homogeneity are important, urban income
distributions should have a lower level of inequality than nationwide
distributions, and so they do. In a cross-sectional study discussed below, the
urban Ginis are systematically three to five points lower than the national
Ginis, and these differences are highly significant. Furthermore, the relation
between changes in income and changes in distribution is also different in the
urban sector. Because linkages are higher across a greater fraction of the urban
than the national population, the spread effects of growth are larger in the
urban sector. Growth tends to benefit more of the population of the cities. To
put it another way, the Kuznets curve should be flatter in the urban sector
because the economy is more homogeneous and the trickle-down effect of
growth is stronger in the cities. It is not that growth does not create wide
income differentials between the dynamic leading sector and the rest of the
urban economy, but rather that the leading sector has a lot of backward and
forward linkages within the remainder of the urban economy.5
C. The Adoption of Reforms
Over the last 25 years a dramatic change in development policy has
occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean. As countries came to accept
that the old model of State-directed import substitution industrialization was
not sustainable, profound structural reforms were implemented in tariffs, taxes,
the control of the international and external financial system and, to a lesser
extent, the role of State enterprises and labour regulation. All of these reforms
aim to open up the internal economy to foreign competition, reduce the role
of the government in directing the allocation of resources and production in
the economy and limit the distorting effect of the tax system on private
decision-making. (For an overview of the reforms and their impact, see
Stallings and Peres, 2000.)
5 For the poor, these feedbacks may be nothing more than an increased demand for guards, drivers,
gardeners and domestics, all of which will be provided by urban unskilled labour. This is a trickle-
down effect of growth that helps to reduce urban poverty.
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This book measures the impact of these various reforms on the distribution
of income. This requires some sort of quantifiable index with which to compare
the extent of reforms between countries or the progress of reforms over time
in a single country. Morley, Machado and Pettinato (1999), building on the
work of Eduardo Lora at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provide
a set of reform indexes that are useful for econometric analysis (see Lora,
1997). These indexes give a good idea of what was reformed in each country,
when the change occurred and how far the process has proceeded to date.
They are a useful benchmark for both econometric analysis and simple
comparisons of distributions before and after the reforms.
To the extent possible, the indexes measure government efforts to
implement the reform package. The aggregate index is a simple average of
reform indexes in five areas: trade, finance, tax, privatization and capital
account. Each area incorporates indicators such as tariff or tax rates which
reflect government policy, rather than proxies for those policies such as
openness to trade or the government deficit. Each index is normalized to fall
between zero and one, with one representing the country and year in which
the sector was the most reformed or free from distortion or government
intervention, and zero the country and year with the greatest degree of
intervention.6 This procedure does not imply that a high value for an index is
necessarily better than a low one, but only that the sector is closer to a pure,
non-government market solution.
The trade reform index is the average of two subcomponents, the average
level and the dispersion of tariffs. One of the weaknesses of the index is the
lack of a satisfactory measure of non-tariff restrictions; in some cases, such as
Brazil, it significantly affected the timing of trade reform. Domestic financial
reform is the average of three subindexes: the control of bank borrowing and
lending rates and the reserves-to-deposit ratio. Tax reform has four
subcomponents: the maximum marginal tax rate on corporate income, the
maximum marginal tax rate on personal income, the value added tax (VAT)
rate and the efficiency of the VAT. The index for privatization is one minus
the percentage of value added in State-owned enterprise to non-agricultural
GDP. Capital account reform is the average of four subcomponents reflecting
the extent of government control of foreign investment, limits on profit and
interest repatriation, controls on external borrowing and capital outflows.
Unlike the other indexes, this one is based on a subjective interpretation of
the descriptions in the annual Balance-of-Payments Arrangements published
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
6 Formally each sub index is defined as Iit = (IRit – Min)/(Max – Min), where IR is the raw value of the
index in country I, year t, and Max and Min are the Maximum and Minimum values of the raw index
for all countries over the period 1970-1995.
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This definition of reform makes a clear distinction between structural
reforms and macroeconomic policy changes such as government deficit
reduction, inflation control and exchange rate management. In many countries
the reforms and macroeconomic policy changes were adopted together in the
face of balance-of-payments or hyperinflation crises. This book explicitly
studies the structural reforms only. The impact of macroeconomic policies is
captured through their effect on inflation and the level of income.
To some extent, the choice of what to include in the measurement of
structural reform is arbitrary. Arguably, the most important exclusion is labour
market reform. It is excluded because in Lora’s work, the labour reform index
by country changed so little between 1985 and 1995, and because his measure
does not capture the important changes that occurred in the Southern Cone
countries in the 1970s. Elimination of price subsidies is another excluded
reform that probably had important effects in some countries.
1. Reforms by Component
Figure II-2 presents the region-wide averages for each of the reform
indexes. It gives a quick picture of what has been reformed most and when
the process occurred. The figure shows that the reform process has been
anything but uniform. It started in the 1970s in three of the five areas –trade,
financial liberalization and tax reform– and was confined primarily to
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay. These early reformers were
responsible for virtually all of the rise in the trade and financial reform indexes
during the 1970s. This period also saw a rise in the tax reform index, reflecting
the adoption of value added tax systems in quite a large number of countries.
Furthermore, capital account controls were tightened significantly in the early
1970s, due principally to policy changes under the Perón government in
Argentina and the military government in Peru. Subsequently, however, there
was significant liberalization under the military governments in Argentina
and Chile. In this early period, the only privatization was the sale of a large
number of relatively small government enterprises in Chile.
After 1982, the Latin American debt crisis not only stalled the reform
process but even reversed it in several of the early reformers. Chile, Bolivia
and Argentina responded to the debt crisis by imposing temporary controls
on capital account transactions. Many countries, including Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Peru, also increased tariff and non-tariff restrictions on
imports. The process of financial liberalization was either reversed or stalled
during this period, and no further progress was made in either tax reform or
the opening of the capital account.
Around 1985 a far more general and widespread adoption of the structural




Source: Samuel A. Morley, Roberto Machado and Stefano Pettinato, “Indexes of Structural Reform
in Latin America”, Reformas económicas series, No. 12 (LC/L.1166), Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (January 1999).
aSample includes the nine project countries plus Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, which had been leaders in the first
round, continued to extend their reforms by further tariff reductions, financial
and capital account liberalization and tax reform.7  Most of the other countries
in the region followed the early reformers by lowering tariffs, eliminating
credit and interest rate controls and reforming their tax systems. The
government’s relation to both internal and external financial markets clearly
underwent a major change in this period. Internally, almost all countries
decontrolled their interest rates. Externally, there was a quite massive and
widespread move to integrate domestic and international capital markets more
closely.
7 Chile liberalized the capital account substantially after 1985. However, thanks to the encaje (i.e.,
compulsory reserve requirements) and other restrictions, even as late as 1995 Chile’s capital account
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(i) Trade reform. The reform process started in the 1970s with significant
trade, tax and financial reforms in the Southern Cone countries. The biggest
and earliest changes were in tariffs and trade regimes. Argentina, Chile and
Uruguay were the leaders. For example, Chile went from having the second
highest level of tariff protection in the region in 1970 to the lowest in 1982.
Uruguay lowered its tariff rates by an even greater percentage. These were
not the only countries opening their internal markets, however. For the
seventeen countries for which data are available, average tariffs were cut in
half over the 1970s. Tariff dispersion and non-tariff barriers such as import
quotas were similarly reduced.
After the debt crisis in 1982, trade liberalization suffered a temporary
reversal as did other areas of reform, particularly in Chile and Argentina.
Quantitative import restrictions were increased until the crisis passed after
the middle of the decade. Subsequently, the trade reform process started again
and spread to all the remaining countries of the region. The average tariff in
the region, which was 46% in 1985, fell to only 12% ten years later. By 1995 no
country in the region was using its tariff system to protect domestic industry
or to promote particular sectors, except for the Brazilian automobile industry.
The highest average tariff rate was 18% in the Dominican Republic, and the
average variance of tariff rates between products within countries was reduced
from 20% in 1986 to 6.4% in 1995.
(ii) Domestic financial liberalization. At the beginning of the 1970s
government ceilings on interest rates, particularly on loans, were present in
most countries in the region. A good deal of credit was allocated by government
decision rather than by supply and demand. In an effort to maintain the
financial soundness of the banking system, central banks typically imposed
high reserve requirements. The net result of all this was what the development
literature called financial repression: that is, a system in which savings and
financial intermediation were discouraged. Not only was the resulting volume
of investment funds likely to be smaller than it would have been in a reformed
system, but it was also likely to be misallocated because of credit controls.
As in the area of trade, financial reforms started first in the 1970s in a few
countries (Chile, Colombia and Uruguay). There was then a pause, or even a
reversal, for several years after 1982, with the process starting again in most
of the countries of the region in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During this
period, two reforms were widely accepted: decontrolling interest rates and
abandoning directed credit. By 1995 only Venezuela had controls on loan rates,
and no country in the sample controlled deposit rates. Information on credit
controls is less precise, but clearly the private market, not the government, is
now the primary allocator of credit.
(iii) International financial liberalization. Opening the internal financial
market to external capital is more recent, more controversial and less
widespread than the two reforms considered above. The literature features
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an ongoing debate over the proper sequencing and role of opening economies
to trade and foreign capital. Latin American policy makers have reached a
clear consensus on the advisability of trade liberalization, but less consensus
has been formed on how to treat restrictions or controls on external capital
transactions. This is partly due to the risks and increased volatility that come
with greater integration of domestic and foreign capital markets. No one
doubts that foreign capital can play a positive role in investment and
development, but the rapid inflow of foreign capital, particularly in the 1990s,
not only increased the exposure to volatility but also tended to drive up the
value of the local currency, with adverse effects on the domestic production
of tradable goods (see Rodrik, 1998; Ffrench-Davis and Reisen, 1998).
In 1970, all but a couple of Latin American countries maintained a high
degree of control over external capital transactions, both for their citizens and
for foreigners wishing to invest. Many countries limited the sectors that were
open to foreign investors and placed ceilings on the repatriation of interest
and dividends. Domestic banks were limited in their ability to borrow abroad,
and in most countries capital outflows required previous authorization of the
central bank.
Unlike trade and domestic financial reform, opening external capital
transactions did not start in a general way in the 1970s. Argentina, Costa Rica,
Honduras, Peru and Venezuela had relatively open systems in 1970. Other
than Uruguay, however, no country made a major opening in its system prior
to the 1982 debt crisis. Indeed, Argentina and Peru significantly increased
governmental control over external financial transactions. Only in the late
1980s did capital account liberalization start in earnest, and even then in only
a handful of countries, including Argentina, Costa Rica and Guatemala. In
the 1990s many more countries adopted this reform. Most of these were smaller
economies such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Jamaica. The
bigger economies –namely, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico– all continued
to maintain significant controls over foreign capital transactions.
(iv) Tax reform. The fourth component of the reform package is tax reform.
Two major elements have been widely adopted. The first was the value added
tax (VAT). Reformers argued that while all taxes have distorting effects on
private decisions, these are less serious with an across-the-board VAT than
with either tariffs or high marginal income tax rates. In addition, tax evasion
should be less pervasive with the VAT than with a tax system based on income.
The VAT was introduced in the 1970s in nine of the 17 countries for which
data are available. In the 1980s all the remaining countries in the region adopted
the VAT, and its coverage or efficiency increased in most countries.
A second element of tax reform was the reduction of marginal tax rates
on corporate and personal income, which significantly reduced the
progressivity of the income tax. Every country in the region reduced its top
marginal tax rate after 1970. Not all have gone as far as Uruguay, which
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eliminated personal income tax altogether, but overall the average marginal
rate on personal income fell from around 50% in 1970 to about 25% in 1995.
The average corporate rate fell from 37% in 1970 to 29% in 1995. Almost all
these changes took place after 1985.
(v) Privatization. The next reform component considered here is
privatization. State enterprises were an important part of the old development
model, which depended critically not only on tariff protection and directed
credit allocation, but also on ownership of key elements of the production
structure, especially basic industries such as mining and petroleum companies
and infrastructure. Many of these companies performed badly. They often
ran significant deficits, which added to the government fiscal problem.8  They
were chronically short of capital for expansion, depending as they did on the
central government for funding. In addition, the level and quality of public
utility services failed to keep abreast of either public expectations or demand.
Increased demand for accountability and objective standards of resource
allocation led governments to turn these companies into private enterprises,
thus subjecting them to the discipline of private capital and product markets.
While privatization may make sense to reformers on objective economic
grounds, it has often sparked acrimonious political battles in practice.
Privatization has therefore been less widespread across countries or across
public entities within countries than the other reforms considered above. Chile
started the process in the 1970s. Between 1974 and 1978, it privatized more
than 500 firms, most of which had been nationalized during the Allende regime
(1970-1973). A short reversal of the process occurred after the 1982 banking
crisis, but by 1992 96% of all Chilean State enterprises had been sold (Edwards,
1995, pp. 171, 186).
The second country to embark on a significant privatization campaign
was Mexico under Salinas. By the end of his presidency in 1993, the number
of State-owned enterprises had been reduced from 1155 to less than 80
(Edwards, 1995, p. 191). In neither country did the government privatize the
biggest natural resource companies (CODELCO in Chile and PEMEX in
Mexico). As a result, the change in the share of government enterprises is far
smaller with regard to the value of production than for the number of such
enterprises. In terms of the volume of transactions between 1985 and 1994,
Argentina, Bolivia, Jamaica and Peru were other countries that embarked on
significant privatization programmes in the 1990s. In terms of the volume of
sales, Argentina and Mexico were the largest reformers, with sales representing
between 1% and 2% of GDP.
8 Operating losses by government enterprise did not necessarily indicate inefficiency. Some resulted
from government price controls on the goods or services these enterprises provided to the public.
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Not all countries undertook privatization. For some, like the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala, government enterprise was never a
significant component in the economy, while others, such as Ecuador, Jamaica
and Venezuela, resisted privatizing important oil or mining enterprises, as
well as other government companies.
(vi) Labour market reform. The labour market is the area which has had the
least reform in terms of laws and institutional arrangements, with the very
important exception of changes under the Southern Cone military regimes in
the 1960s and 1970s. According to Lora (1997) only five countries made any
significant changes in the 1985-1995 period: Argentina, 1991; Colombia, 1990;
Guatemala, 1990; Panama, 1995; and Peru, 1991.
The basic idea behind labour market reform is to increase flexibility and
reduce distortions. By flexibility, reformers mean making labour more
responsive to changes in demand and production technology. All countries
have regulations stipulating how much a firm has to pay a permanent
employee whom they want to fire. After one year Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico
require a payment of from 3 to 5.5 months of salary (Lora, 1997). After ten
years, the majority of countries in the region require at least 6 months, and
eight countries require more than 12 months. Complementary regulations limit
the ability to hire temporary labour in 14 countries, and only four (Argentina,
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) have introduced partial liberalizations.
Whether this sort of regulation looks good or bad depends on the
perspective of the observer. For workers in permanent jobs, the regulations
clearly increase job security and reduce competition from temporary
employees. At the same time, the regulations have two costly side effects (see
Burki and Perry, 1997). First, they are likely to induce a substitution of capital
for labour. They turn labour into a semi-fixed factor of production, which is
risky in an uncertain world: unlike capital, workers have to be paid whether
or not product demand justifies their presence. The second effect, which is
regressive, is that the regulations create a distorted or segmented labour
market. A privileged subgroup of workers hold permanent, well-paid jobs,
and the rest of the labour force works in unprotected, temporary jobs, many
in the informal sector. The reforms sought to reduce the cost of firing, increase
the use of temporary labour contracts and set up some sort of unemployment
insurance scheme for workers. Except for the sub-group of countries
mentioned above, little progress has been made in carrying out this project.
In distribution terms, labour reform should help capital, since it increases
flexibility and lowers the cost of labour. It should also help those at the bottom
of the labour pyramid relative to those in protected, permanent jobs.
A second component of the labour reforms was to reduce the fixed charges
or taxes that are based on worker salaries and levied on firms, particularly
those charges in which the benefits bear little relation to the contribution.
Examples include social security contributions, family allowances, and
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disability, death, sickness and maternity benefits. If these contributions were
linked to benefits, they could be regarded as worker compensation that could
reasonably be taken into account in determining pay packages. When they
are not linked to benefits, they are essentially a tax on labour, which again
tends to make production more capital-intensive than it should be, given that
labour is an abundant factor in the region. In general, these wage surcharges
are high in Latin America, and they were not significantly reduced in the
1985-1995 period (Lora, 1997).
In Chile, the military government reduced the coverage of the minimum
wage, relaxed conditions for the dismissal of workers, suspended labour
unions, closed the labour courts, limited the permissible activities of labour
unions and encouraged the organization of competitive labour unions within
enterprises (Ffrench-Davis and Raczynski, 1990, p.8). In Argentina under the
military regimes between 1976 and 1983, union activities were prohibited and
wage increases were set by the government. This new labour environment,
coupled with inflation and the drastic recession after 1982, led to a sharp decline
in real wages between 1976 and 1983 (see Beccaria, 1991; Altimir and Beccaria,
1999a). Some of these changes are similar to the labour reform package, but
most are not. Rather, what took place in Chile and Argentina in the 1970s was
a change of regime, which drastically curtailed the power of independent
labour unions vis-à-vis either management or the government and reduced
the influence of labour in setting wages. To some extent the latter effect, which
also took place in Brazil in the 1960s and Uruguay in the early 1970s, was part
of an anti-inflation stabilization programme rather than labour reform as
described here. This change of regime had dramatic and regressive effects on
distribution in each of the four countries where it occurred.
2. The Reform Process by Country
This section disaggregates the overall reform index by country to show
more explicitly the timing and degree of reforms (see figure II-3). This average
is based only on the five subindexes shown in figure II-2, such that it excludes
labour market reforms and the lifting of price controls. The figure shows the
level of each country’s general reform index at five points of time: 1970, 1982,
1985, 1990 and 1995. The figure is ordered by the level of the indexes for the
most recent period, and it holds some surprises. In particular, Uruguay appears
as the most reformed country in the region, followed by Argentina and El
Salvador. Chile, the quintessential early reformer, is only seventh by 1995.
There are several reasons for these results. One is convergence. Countries
such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay and Peru were
relatively late in adopting reforms. Once they did, however, they adopted
reforms wholesale and across the board. In Chile, reforms were more selective:
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Chile has low tariffs and a reformed tax system, but it is below the average in
capital account liberalization and only slightly above the average in
privatization.
Who were the major reformers in different periods? If “major” is defined
arbitrarily as changes in the reform index of more than 50% over a period,
only Chile and Uruguay qualify during 1970-1982. Between 1985 and 1990,
the significant reformers were Bolivia, Costa Rica and Paraguay. After 1990,
Brazil, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Peru all raised their reform
index by over 50%. Among the remaining countries, either the process of
reform was more gradual, as in the case of Guatemala, Jamaica and Mexico,
or, like Honduras, the economy was already fairly liberalized at the beginning
of the 1970s.9
Figure II-3
REFORM INDEXES BY COUNTRY, 1970-1995
Source: Samuel A. Morley, Roberto Machado and Stefano Pettinato, “Indexes of Structural Reform
in Latin America”, Reformas económicas series, No. 12 (LC/L.1166), Santiago, Chile, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (January 1999).
























9 Honduras had the highest reform index of .597 in 1970, and it made very little change over the
subsequent decades.
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D. The Impact of the Structural Reforms
The previous section described the massive structural policy changes
implemented over the last two decades in Latin America. How have these
changes affected equity? The broad thrust of the reform package as a whole
was to remove any sort of insulation from market-determined resource
allocation. Trade reforms removed tariff protection for domestic production;
financial reforms and privatization reduced government influence over the
allocation of resources. Balance-of-payment reform integrated foreign and
domestic capital markets and reduced the capacity of governments to control
capital movements. Similarly, labour market reform increased labour flexibility
or, to put it another way, reduced labour’s ability to defend itself against
market-driven fluctuations in demand or wage reductions. Altogether this
adds up to quite a breathtaking leap into a new world, justified by expected
increases in efficiency, income and growth. Regardless of whether the reforms
have had these expected positive benefits, little attention has been paid to the
winners and losers in the process or to its distributional implications. Note
that the emphasis here is on the structural economic reforms only, not on the
impact of the macroeconomic policy changes that led to lower inflation and
smaller fiscal deficits.
Several recent studies examine the relation between reforms and
distribution. Albert Berry (1998) presents a set of case studies on nine countries
in the region. He finds that in every case but Costa Rica, and possibly also
Colombia, the period of reforms coincided with a very sharp increase in
inequality. The expectation that trade reform would lead to a narrowing in
wage differentials has not been borne out in practice, indicating either that
Latin America’s comparative advantage does not lie in unskilled-labour-
intensive products or that the opening has forced a shift in technology in favour
of more capital- and skill-intensive production. The data for Berry’s study
end fairly early in the decade of the reforms, so it is unclear whether the rises
in inequality that he observes are part of a short-run adjustment or an
unfavourable long-run trend.
Victor Bulmer-Thomas’ book (1996) comes to equally pessimistic
conclusions, though for somewhat different reasons. A theoretical analysis of
each of the different reforms leads the contributors to this volume to conclude
that, taking all the reforms together, real wages will fall, unemployment will
go up, real interest rates will rise, informalization will increase and wealth
will become more concentrated, all of which are regressive. However, these
predictions are made on the basis of data only through 1992. The book’s main
conclusion, therefore, is that the problem with the new economic model had
less to do with equity than with whether or not the new dependence on markets
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and the private sector would be capable of producing steady and sustainable
growth rates in per capita income.
Londoño and Székely (1997) of the IDB come to quite a different
conclusion. Using cross-country regressions as opposed to country case
studies, they find that equity is positively related to both growth and
investment. These, in turn, are positively related to the structural reforms of
the new economic model, leading to the conclusion that the reforms are in
fact progressive. This is confirmed by a direct correlation of the income shares
of different quintiles of the population with indexes of the different reforms.
While no significant relation was found between income shares and most of
the indexes, trade liberalization was positively related to the income share of
the bottom quintile and negatively related to the share of the top quintile.
Unlike many other researchers, then, these authors conclude that trade reform
helped the poor and unskilled.
A growing literature addresses the effects of trade reform on wage
inequality (Robbins, 1995 and 1996; Wood, 1994 and 1997; Edwards, 1997;
Ocampo and Taylor, 1998). All these studies conclude that wage inequality
has generally risen in countries that opened their internal markets to external
competition. While an increase in wage inequality does not necessarily
translate into an increase in inequality of total income, these results suggest
caution in accepting the Heckscher-Ohlin assertion that trade should help
countries with large supplies of unskilled labour. Wood (1994) argues that the
experience of East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s supports the theory that greater
openness to trade tends to narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers in developing countries. In Latin American since the mid-1980s,
however, increased openness has widened wage differentials. Wood (1997)
considers that this conflict of evidence probably does not result from
differences between East Asia and Latin America, but rather from differences
between the 1960s and the 1980s, especially the entry of China into the world
market and perhaps the advent of new technology that is biased against
unskilled workers.
Spilimbergo, Londoño and Székely (1997) point out that what really
matters is each country’s factor endowment, including land, relative to the
average world effective supply of each factor. They, too, find that trade
openness is associated with higher inequality, for given factor endowments,
but the effect depends on the relative abundance of each type of factor.
Inequality increases in countries that are relatively well endowed with skills,
but it declines in countries that are well endowed with physical capital and
land. Since, in their sample, factor endowments in Latin America are relatively
close to world averages, the effect of opening on inequality is modest: a rise
of 10% in their openness index only raises the average Gini coefficient by .63
of a point. Latin America, in their empirical specification, does not have a
high level of unskilled labour relative to the weighted average of the factor
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endowments of the rest of the world, which is consistent with the entry of
China and other large Asian countries into the world trading system. If true,
this would explain why, even in a Heckscher-Ohlin world, openness has not
reduced the wage differential.
The purpose of trade reform is to switch the production of tradables away
from inefficient import substitutes to exportables in which countries have a
comparative advantage. The connection with income distribution comes from
the differences in factor demand between these two types of products: it is a
question of relative factor intensity. However, the demand side must also be
taken into account. The success of the old import-substitution, inward-looking
development strategy depended to a large extent on a growing internal market.
For that sort of strategy to generate satisfactory growth, there has to be a
growing middle class with growing purchasing power. Growing real wages
are an integral part of that strategy. The mature capitalist economies long ago
discovered that both the owners of capital and their workers could profit from
a strategy in which rising wages simultaneously increased both costs and
profits, because of increases in the size of the internal market induced by rising
wage payments.
The export-led growth strategy is completely different. Its success depends
on controlling costs, such that the internal market is irrelevant. Rising real
wages are a clear threat to growth in the export model. They do not have the
positive indirect effect through demand that they have in the inward-looking
growth strategy. Countries embarking on the outward-looking growth path
are making their wage levels hostage to the wage levels and labour costs in
other countries. The advantages of greater efficiency in export production in
comparison to that of import substitution may well outweigh the
disadvantages of this wage competition, so that in the end workers are better
off. That is not immediately obvious, however, particularly in the large
economies.
What is the likely effect of liberalizing the capital account? This reform
integrates the local and international capital markets more closely, bringing
local interest and profit rates (adjusted for risk) closer to rates in the rest of the
world. Whether or not this is progressive depends on the reactions of foreign
and domestic owners of capital. If foreign investors have been deterred from
entering a country because of controls on capital and profit repatriation, the
reforms should induce an inflow of foreign capital. The distributional effect is
ambiguous. Wage-to-profit ratios should rise because of the rise in the capital-
to-labour ratio, which is progressive. At the same time if capital and skilled
labour are complementary, the skill differential will rise, which is regressive.
A similar ambiguity results from the actions of domestic owners of capital.
Part of the liberalization of the capital account involves the removal of
restrictions on capital outflows by domestic savers and investors. If the demand
for foreign exchange was excessive under capital controls, the reforms should
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cause a capital outflow, with results just the opposite of those described for
foreign capital inflows.
Aside from the effect of these reforms on factor supplies and factor
demand, removing barriers to capital movements increases the bargaining
power of capital in its negotiations with both labour and the government.
That is likely to be regressive, for if investors are free to move from one country
to another, governments will find it far more difficult to tax capital or to pass
regulations that force businesses to shoulder more of the cost of infrastructure
or labour regulation. Indeed, in a world of perfect capital mobility, countries
would be forced to compete in offering generous tax holidays, subsidized
credits and other costly assistance as a way of attracting foreign capital. The
same argument is valid for domestic capital. Both government and labour
would be forced to accept arrangements that are generous enough to induce
domestic entrepreneurs and holders of wealth to leave their money invested
in their home country. In this way, opening up the capital account shifts the
balance of power in favour of the holders of capital. This is one of the reasons
that most Latin American countries have shifted away from the taxation of
corporate profits and significantly reduced the top marginal income tax rate
in recent years.
Financial reforms eliminated controls on interest rates, lowered the
compulsory reserve requirements of banks and reduced the use of directed or
subsidized credit. The direct effect of this on the distribution is probably small,
but to the extent that these reforms increased private saving and investment,
they should be progressive.
The fourth component of the reform project is tax reform, which lowered
rates on corporations and personal income and reinforced the role of the VAT.
From the distribution perspective, the effect of these changes in the tax system
was to shift the tax burden away from the wealthy and toward the middle
and lower classes. The introduction and later expansion of the value added
tax was a shift away from the taxation of income toward the taxation of
consumption. Since the poor consume a greater fraction of their income than
do the rich, this change must have been regressive, except in certain countries
that exempted basic necessities from the tax. Changes in the income tax
amplified the regressive trend. Top marginal tax rates on personal income
were lowered, and the corporate tax rate was cut by over 20%. While a full
analysis of the incidence of all these changes is beyond the scope of this paper,
it is almost certain that they were regressive.
Another important component of reform in the region was privatization.
State-owned enterprises were a key component of the old development model,
which was dramatically redesigned by the reforms analysed here. The impact
of privatization on distribution depends on three elements. First, if the sales
price of the assets of the State-owned enterprises is less their true market value,
buyers have received a gift from taxpayers. Second, for public utilities like
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electricity, telephone and water companies, the impact depends on what
happens to the price of the services they provide to the public. In many cases
publicly owned utilities subsidized their customers by selling below cost.
Transferring that sort of company to the private sector and eliminating the
subsidy could be either progressive or regressive, depending on who their
customers were. At first sight, the reform appears regressive. However, a study
of gasoline and electricity pricing in Peru and Venezuela came to the opposite
conclusion because those wealthy enough to have electric appliances and cars
came from the top, not the bottom, of the distribution (Hausmann and Rigobón,
1993). The fact is that most of this sort of subsidy probably benefited the middle
class.
Neither of these first two effects are reflected in the distribution data,
because they reflect earnings and not expenditure or wealth. But the third
effect of privatization is reflected in the earnings data, namely, its effect on
labour demand and employment. Labour productivity in the typical State-
owned enterprise was low. For political reasons, many governments seemed
more interested in using these enterprises to create jobs than to provide good
service at the lowest possible cost. This changed when the State-owned
enterprises were sold. Privatizations in places like Argentina and Chile were
blamed for a good deal of the job destruction and rising unemployment that
accompanied reform. The distributional impact of this depends on who the
displaced employees were. There is no good study of this question, but judging
from the profile of the labour force of the typical State-owned enterprise, these
jobs largely came from the middle of the earnings distribution table.
Privatization is thus likely to have mainly hurt the middle class, which
represented both the main users of subsidized services of State-owned
enterprises and also their main employees.
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CHAPTER III
WHY THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN
LATIN AMERICA IS SO UNEQUAL
The comparative figures on equality by region in chapter I make it clear
that high inequality is not a recent phenomenon. It is not just a result of the
recessions of the 1980s or the economic reforms, but comes from conditions
going back far into the past. This chapter addresses the question of why this
is so. What structural factors, environmental conditions or government policies
can explain such high and persistent inequality?
In the short run, the primary distribution of income is determined by the
interaction of three factors: the quantity of factors of production, their ownership
and the interplay of supply and demand for those factors. What is critical to an
understanding of persistent, high inequality is the role played by the supply
and distribution of productive assets in society. There are four assets to consider
here: land, skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital. Two of these, skilled
labour and capital, are scarce in Latin America, which means that their rates of
return are high, and all but unskilled labour are distributed unequally compared
with both the industrialized countries and other developing areas. More than
anything else, this unequal distribution of scarce assets explains Latin America’s
excessive inequality. The situation has no doubt been exacerbated by the
relatively skill- and capital-intensive growth strategy, which raised profit rates
and the return to education. That would not have mattered so much, however,
if the ownership of human and physical capital was more widely dispersed.
A. Education
Education is one of the keys to the distribution puzzle. Latin America
has a highly unequal distribution of education and the highest skill differentials
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in the world. Dozens of studies show that level of education and experience
are the major determinants of an individual’s position on the income
distribution scale (see in particular Birdsall and Londoño, 1997; Londoño and
Székely, 1997). It is therefore reasonable to expect that a large part of the
explanation of earnings inequality must lie in the educational profile of the
population and in the skill differential.
Another puzzle is how to explain Latin America’s high and persistent
education wage differentials. Surprisingly, they cannot be explained by a
relative scarcity of university graduates. Compared to the typical Asian
economy, the proportion of university graduates in the adult population is
actually higher in Latin America. Yet the returns to university education are
higher in Latin America than they are in Asia. Furthermore, the share of
university graduates in the labour force has expanded rapidly in Latin America
since 1970, yet skill differentials have widened. These are critical factors for
explaining why inequality has not decreased in the region, but they do not
explain why the expansion of supply has not driven down education
differentials and rates of return to university education. This is one of the
questions addressed in this section.
Good historical or comparative data on wage differentials between skilled
and unskilled labour or between different education groups are surprisingly
scarce. Lora and Márquez (1998) compare average white- and blue-collar wages
in Latin America and several other regions. Their data show that the white-
collar differential in Latin America in 1982 was twice as high as in the
developed countries and 50% higher than in the four Asian Tigers.10  Since
1982 that differential has fallen everywhere but in Latin America, where it has
actually risen sharply since 1988 despite increases in the share of college and
high school graduates.
Figure III-1 presents simple averages of wages for various occupations.
Such statistics aggregate the effect of experience, education and other factors.
Another way of estimating education wage differentials is to run cross-section
regressions of earnings on education, experience, gender and other relevant
factors and then to use the coefficients on education to calculate rates of return
by educational level. Returns to higher education are high in all developing
countries (at least 20%). In every part of the world they are higher than those
of both secondary and primary education (see IDB, 1998, figure 2.23). This
same pattern holds within most Latin American countries (see IDB, 1998, figure
2.24). From a comparative perspective, the return to higher education in Latin
America is higher than in Asia or the industrialized countries, which is
consistent with the evidence in figure III-1.
10 Hong Kong (China), Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Province of China).
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Figure III-1
RELATIVE WAGES: WHITE COLLAR VERSUS
BLUE COLLAR, 1982-1997
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America,
1998-1999 Report, Washington, D.C. (1998).
Thus, all the evidence points in the direction of a high skill differential in
Latin America. It is high relative to other developing countries, and it rose in
the 1990s in most of the cases for which survey evidence is available.
Efforts to explain these relative skill differentials naturally lead to
questions about demand and supply. The demand for skills is not directly
observable, but the supply is. Barro and Lee (1996) assemble a data set that
gives the educational composition of the adult population for 138 countries.
Using the profile of the adult males in that sample as a proxy for the labour
force as a whole allows for an interesting comparison between Latin America
and Asia. The question to keep in mind is whether differences in the
educational profile between regions or countries help explain differences in
relative wages (see figures III-2 and III-3).
The educational profiles in the two figures highlight the surprisingly large
proportion of university graduates in Latin America and the small number of
adults with no more than a high school education. Every country in the sample
has a higher proportion of college graduates than Indonesia, and thirteen have
more than Singapore. In contrast, no country in Latin America has as high a
proportion of high school graduates as Malaysia, Korea or Taiwan. Thus, if
skilled labour is equated with university graduates, Latin America has a higher
proportion of skilled labour than all but two Asian countries (Korea and
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Figure III-2
LATIN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL PROFILE, MALES OVER 25, 1985
Source: Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International measures of schooling years and schooling
quality”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 86, No. 2 (1996).
Figure III-3
ASIAN EDUCATIONAL PROFILE, MALES, 1985
Source: Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International measures of schooling years and schooling








































































































































graduates is higher in Latin America than it is in Asia. Either demand must be
very skill intensive in Latin America, or some other factor or factors must be
at work.
It is possible that in developing countries, the pool of skilled labour
includes both college and high school graduates. By that definition the four
Tigers plus Malaysia have more skilled labour than most Latin American
countries, which could help explain the white- versus blue-collar wage
differentials. But the puzzle still remains about why the relative rates of return
to university education in Latin America are so high compared to other areas.
The educational structure of the labour force in Latin America has
undergone significant changes since 1970 (see table III-1). Most countries have
succeeded in universalizing primary school education in the young cohorts
entering the labour force. Over time this has reduced fairly sharply the
percentage of the labour force without education, but too many are still
dropping out after completing primary school in order to enter the labour
market. This is particularly true in countries like Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras, where the education level of the 1970 labour force
was relatively poor. In those countries, a good deal of the progress in reducing
the group with no schooling has been offset by an expansion of the group
with no more than primary education. In 1985 more than three-fourths of the
adult males still had no more than primary schooling in eleven countries in
the sample. Only three countries in the Asian sample demonstrate a figure
that high.11
In the period since 1970, the Latin American experience differs most
sharply from that of Asia in the rapid expansion of the university component
relative to secondary education (see table III-2). In Asia both the secondary
school and university component practically doubled between 1970 and 1985.
That is not the pattern in Latin America, where the share of university
graduates expanded twice as fast as high school graduates. Asia put a lot of
its education dollars into eliminating the bottom tail of its educational
distribution and universalizing secondary education. Latin America let most
of its young cohorts leave school after the primary level, using the money
instead to expand university coverage.
11 The data shown in table III-1 for 1995 are projections based on the observed changes in shares between
1960 and 1985, the last year for which Barro and Lee have internationally comparable firm
observations. Thus, comparisons of Latin America with Asia are based on the 1985 observations rather
than the projections.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AVERAGE GROWTH BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION
IN LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA, 1970-1985
NO SCHOOLING PRIMARY SECONDARY UNIVERSITY
Latin America 0.57 1.10 1.61 3.24
Asia 0.64 1.04 1.91 2.25
Source: Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International measures of schooling years and schooling
quality”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 86, No. 2 (1996).
Two aspects of this difference between the two areas are important to
this discussion. First, Latin America has expanded the supply of university
graduates in the labour force faster than Asia. Therefore, rising relative wages
or returns to university education in Latin America cannot be attributed to a
failure to expand supply. Second, the university-intensive education strategy
followed by Latin America has increased the variance in the ownership of
human capital, or what could be called educational inequality. When any
country begins a process of upgrading the education of its population,
educational inequality increases as the educational level of the younger cohorts
improves relative to older cohorts. That tendency is gradually reversed as
older cohorts retire and are replaced by young cohorts who are better and
more equally educated. The Latin American educational strategy has delayed
this turning point. Not only is educational inequality still increasing in the
region, but it is also increasing faster than would be expected compared with
the experience of other countries. Londoño and Székely (1997) show the
standard deviation of education rising along with education levels, from just
over three years in the 1960s to over 4.5 years in the 1990s. That is over twice
the increase in educational inequality that would be predicted from the
increase in average educational level over the same period.
Comparative evidence within Latin America also shows that educational
inequality increased in the 1990s. Table III-3 compares the average years of
education of adults (25 years of age or older) at different income levels in the
most recent household surveys with the same measure for 1989 for those
over 18 years of age. Because of the difference in the definition of adults, the
absolute values for the two years are not strictly comparable, but the ratio of
the average education level of those in the top quintile to those in the bottom
is comparable. This measure rises in every country but Brazil, meaning that
the educational differences between the rich and the poor are rising in Latin
America. So far, trends in educational inequality have not helped to reverse
income inequality in the region.
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Table III-3
EDUCATION BY QUINTILE
AVERAGE EDUCATION IN MOST RECENT YEAR, AVERAGE EDUCATION IN 1989,
25YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER
1ST 5TH RATIO 1ST 5TH RATIO
QUINTILE  QUINTILE QUINTILE  QUINTILE
(1) (2) (2)/(1) (1) (2) (2)/(1)
Argentina 7.26 12.35 1.70 6.6 11.0 1.66
Bolivia 6.20 11.75 1.89 7.0 10.4 1.48
Brazil 2.23 8.98 4.01 2.1 8.7 4.14
Chile 6.56 11.85 1.80 6.1 10.9 1.78
Costa Rica 4.48 10.07 2.24 4.8 9.4 1.95
Ecuador 3.89 10.51 2.70 n.a. n.a. n.a.
El Salvador 1.88 8.69 4.61 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras 2.20 8.22 3.73 2.1 7.5 3.57
Mexico 2.54 10.51 4.12 3.0 9.0 3.00
Panama 4.83 12.22 2.52 5.1 11.7 2.29
Paraguay 3.52 9.30 2.64 6.3 11.2 1.77
Peru 4.02 9.92 2.46 7.1 11.1 1.56
Uruguay 6.17 10.80 1.75 6.1 10.4 1.70
Venezuela 4.80 9.69 2.01 6.3 9.9 1.57
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America,
1998-1999 Report, Washington, D.C. (1998); A. Psacharopoulos and others, “Poverty and Income
Distribution in Latin America: the Story of the 1980s”, Technical Paper, No. 351, Washington,
D.C., World Bank (1997).
Rising educational inequality in the region is partly a result of the Latin
American educational strategy. On the one hand, the group with little or no
education (the left hand tail of the distribution) was substantially reduced;
that was helpful. On the other hand, the number of university graduates(the
right hand tail of the distribution) expanded significantly. This increased
educational inequality, given the relatively small size of the group at the
beginning of the period. To put it another way, in Latin America the expansion
in educational opportunities above the primary school level was limited to a
small minority of new entrants. In contrast, the Asian strategy expanded the
group in the middle –that is, those with high school education– relative to the
top, and of course, a larger share of their labour force was in this group to
start with. In variance terms, Asia reduced the left-hand tail and expanded
the middle of the distribution, thus equalizing education over the labour force;
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Latin America did not. Eventually the educational inequality trends will
reverse in Latin America, as they have in Asia, because intra-cohort inequality
is now falling in almost all the countries in the region. However, the Latin
American strategy of expanding primary and university education at the
expense of secondary education has delayed the point at which overall
educational inequality will begin to decline in the majority of countries in the
region.
Within Latin America, there is a negative relation between the level and
the variance of education.12  Countries such as Argentina, Chile and Uruguay
have the highest average levels of education together with low levels of
educational inequality. They also have the highest percentage of secondary
school graduates in their labour forces. One of the reasons that educational
inequality is still so high in the region is that the late educators, such as Brazil,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, have not followed this
example. They still lose too many potential students before they get to the
high school level.
The relevance of educational inequality to the distribution of income can be
seen in figure III-4. The figure calculates the variance of education level for 14
countries by decile in Latin America using data from IDB (1998) and relates it
to a recent Gini coefficient for each country. The relation between the two is
not particularly close, but it is a clearly positive.
The distribution of income is related to both the return to and the variance
of human capital. Both have increased in the last twenty-five years despite
the sizeable investments in education that have been made in the region. So
far, changes in the educational profile of the labour force in the region have
not succeeded in reducing income inequality, and they may have actually
increased it.
Two factors are at work here: the wage differential earned by better
educated workers and the distribution or variance of education in the labour
force. The two usually move together, that is, if the supply of the educated
expands, the skill differential generally narrows. That did not happen in Latin
America, however. To complicate matters further, it is quite possible for the
wage differential to rise and earnings inequality to fall at the same time if
there is a sufficient expansion in the numbers of the educated or a contraction
in the numbers of the uneducated. The point here is that both of these factors
matter, and they may not move together. Neither the distribution of education
nor the wage differential by itself can sufficiently explain differences between
countries in either the level or the trend of earnings inequality.
12 Using IDB data (1998, appendix table 1.2.3, p.30), a regression between the variance and level of
education shows a significant (at the 10% level) negative relation.
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Figure III-4
EDUCATION VARIANCE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America,
1998-1999 Report, Washington, D.C. (1998).
B. Physical Capital
The effect of physical capital or capital accumulation on distribution is
ambiguous. The direct effect of increasing the stock of capital per worker
should be progressive. Raising the supply of any factor relative to other factors
theoretically should lower its rate of return. Since the ownership of capital is
highly skewed in favour of the top of the distribution table, lowering the rate
of return should reduce the relative income position of the rich.
This progressive direct effect of capital accumulation, however, may well
be offset by the indirect effect on the wage differential. Physical capital can be
either a substitute for or a complement to skilled and unskilled labour. Suppose
it is a complement to skilled labour and a substitute for unskilled labour, as
would be the case with construction machinery or computers. Capital
accumulation will then tend to raise the demand for, and the wages of, skilled
labour while lowering the wages of the unskilled. In this case capital
accumulation raises the skill differential, which is likely to make the
distribution of labour earnings less equal. This has two opposing effects,
namely, the progressive direct effect of lowering the rate of return, and the
regressive indirect effect of widening the skill differential. Which of these two
effects is stronger, or indeed which factors are complementary to and which
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be decided by an examination of the data. The answer may well differ across
countries.
In fact, recent estimates of the capital-labour ratio and the Gini coefficients
for 14 Latin American countries suggest little if any relation between the two
variables (see figure III-5). The regression line shown in the figure has a
negative slope coefficient, but it is insignificant. Indeed, removing the outlier
in the figure (Costa Rica) causes the relation to disappear altogether. This
indicates that capital accumulation is unlikely to be a significant source of
improvement in distribution. That would probably still be the case even if
there were a strong negative relation with the Gini coefficient, because of the
length of time that it takes for investment to significantly change the capital-
labour ratio. Suppose that a country raised its investment ratio from 15% to
20%. If the capital-output ratio is four, which is a reasonable estimate, at most
this change in investment could raise the rate of increase in the capital-labour
ratio by about 1% per year.
Figure III-5
CAPITAL INTENSITY AND DISTRIBUTION
Source: Capital-labour ratios from Robert Summers and Alan Heston, The Penn World Tables:
Version 5.6, diskette version (1995); Gini coefficients from appendix A-1 (this volume).
A comparison of the capital-labour ratios of Latin American and Asian
countries suggests that low capital-labour ratios cannot be the source of Latin
America’s excessive inequality. The average capita-labour ratio for the 14
countries in figure III-5 is 3.5 times that of the Philippines and more than
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The other possible role for capital in explaining excess inequality is if its
rate of return or share of national income is significantly higher in Latin
America than elsewhere. Unfortunately it is extremely difficult to get good
comparable estimates of rates of return, particularly those corrected for risk.
However, theory indicates that the removal of barriers to capital mobility that
has accompanied globalization in recent years should tend to remove
differences. Countries with high rates of return should be receiving capital
inflows and seeing a decline in the profit rate as a result.
As to the share of capital in national income and its relation to capital
intensity, the IDB comes to the optimistic conclusion that capital formation
can be expected to increase the share of labour in national income (see IDB,
1998, figure 4-5). That conclusion, however, is based entirely on a cross-section
which includes developed countries with high levels of capital per worker,
high labour shares and a low level of inequality. Analysed separately, Latin
America does not seem to demonstrate any relation at all between capital
intensity and the labour share (see figure III-6). Nor does the average labour
share in Latin America differ much from those countries in Asia for which
data are available.13
Could Latin America’s high inequality be the result of a higher profit
share in the region? It is well known that the household surveys which serve
as the basis for this project’s measurement of inequality seriously
underestimate total income from profits. Nonetheless, they do contain some
income from that source, and, as would be expected, its distribution is far
more skewed in favour of the rich than is labour income. For the twelve
countries in the IDB study for which data are available in this respect, the
average Gini for non-labour income was .64 compared to .53 for labour income
alone (see IDB, 1998, appendix table 1.2.1). Because of under-reporting,
however, the total amount of income from this source is too small to
significantly change the distribution. The Gini for total income including
distributed profits is less than one percentage point higher than the Gini for
labour income alone. This fact leads to two important conclusions. First, the
high inequality reported in household surveys in Latin America comes mainly
from inequality in labour income, not profits. Second, because the surveys do
not capture profit income, inequality in Latin America must be a good deal
higher than would appear from the surveys.
13 The average labour share for 16 Latin American countries was .41 and for five Asian countries it was




CAPITAL INTENSITY AND LABOUR SHARE
Source: Capital-labour ratios from Robert Summers and Alan Heston, The Penn World Tables:
Version 5.6, diskette version (1995); labour share from Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1998-1999 Report, Washington, D.C. (1998).
C. The Distribution of Land and Unskilled Labour
Latin America has always had the most unequal land distribution in the
world. In a recent study of land distribution in developing countries, four
countries in the region top the list, and 11 of the top 16 countries are in Latin
America. No Latin American country is in the group of low or even medium
inequality (Theisenhusen, 1995, p. 9). FAO estimates that around 1970 the
largest 7% of land holdings in the region (those above 100 hectares) accounted
for 77% of the land. At the other extreme, the smallest 60% had only 4% of the
land. For Asia, holdings over 100 hectares comprised 1.6% of all land, while
96% of farms had less than 10 hectares and accounted for 68% of all land
(Cardoso and Helwege, 1992, appendix D).
At first sight it may seem surprising that the region’s land distribution
should be so unequal, since Latin America, like North America and Australia,
had plenty of unowned land when settlement began. Had that land been
made available to all comers, however, it would have been impossible to
develop a landed aristocracy because the labour necessary to produce an
exploitable surplus would not have been available. Obtaining such a surplus
required workers who were willing or forced to work for less than their
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be less than what the workers could produce on their own farms, since
otherwise they would start such farms. The availability of cheap land puts a
floor under the wage for agricultural labour. Unless production entails
significant economies of scale, it will be unprofitable to hire workers, and the
typical farm will be a small one that can be farmed by a single family. That
was the typical settlement pattern where free land was available in Australia,
Canada and the western United States.
In Latin America the settlement patterns were completely different. In
the first place, land was not made available to settlers, but rather was reserved
by the State or given away in large tracts to a fortunate few. To assure a supply
of labour at wages low enough to guarantee an exploitable surplus, some
countries resorted to slavery, others to a variety of peonage systems which
tied peasants to the land. In Central America, anti-vagrancy laws were passed,
which forced peasants to donate a certain amount of labour to estate owners.
These are examples of how a small group with political power was able to use
the legal powers of the State to maintain its economic position.
The relevance of all this for income distribution is clear. Countries with a
very unequal distribution of land tended to have a low reservation wage for
unskilled labour in the countryside, particularly as population growth
increased in the twentieth century. That condition also meant low wages for
the unskilled in the cities because of rural-urban migration. A number of
countries attempted to change this inequitable situation through land reform.
Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico and Nicaragua are the most extreme examples, but
reforms were also implemented in , Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador Panama, Peru and Venezuela
(Cardoso and Helwege, 1992, p. 261). In most cases these reforms did not
cover a large proportion of landholdings, nor did they significantly equalize
land ownership. The reformed land was either put into collective farms, as in
the ejidos of Mexico, or later sold by the new owners.14
Rather than confronting the powerful landed oligarchs, the more typical
solution was for the rural poor to escape to the cities through migration. The
cities became the safety valve for the poor landless peasants from the
countryside, which is just the opposite of the Turner hypothesis for the United
States. By and large, this avoided violent confrontations, but at the cost of
transferring inequality and low wages for the unskilled to the cities.
Blocking access to land for the unskilled has the same effect as lowering
the supply curve or the reservation wage. This is why relative wages are so
low in economies with a large supply of unskilled labour relative to the
available supply of land. To make matters worse, the growth rate of the
14 A reform will not be effective in redistributing land unless small farms have a productivity advantage
that raises the reservation price above what a large landowner is willing to pay; see Carter and Coles
(1998).
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working age population has risen since 1950 because of the lagged effect of
reductions in the death rate. In earlier periods the population growth rate
was low because the high birth rate was counterbalanced by an equally high
infant mortality rate and a short life span. The low growth equilibrium was
broken first by a reduction in death rates, then later by a reduction in the birth
rate, but there was a lag between the former and the latter. During the interval
which demographers call the transition, population growth rate temporarily
rises. That transition occurred in Latin America in the period between 1950
and about 1980, with differences across countries, such that the rate of growth
of the labour force increased from 1.9% in the 1950s to 2.3% in the 1960s and
3.8% in the 1970s, then fell to 2.9% in the 1980s (Weller, 2000).15  The school-
aged population (0-14) peaked as a share of the total population around 1970
(Duryea and Székely, 1998, figure 1).
This caused a quite large increase in the size of young age cohorts in the
period after 1950. Those cohorts had to be either educated or absorbed into
the labour force. As shown above, for the most part the education system did
not expand enough to absorb them, and most entered the labour force with a
low level of education and skills. The demographic transition thus increased
the growth rate and supply of unskilled labour in a region where lack of access
to land and other productive inputs meant that they would flood the cities
and drive down the wage for unskilled workers.
To make matters worse, during that same transition period most of the
countries in the region were pursuing a development strategy based on import
substitution, which implied a rapid growth in the demand for skilled labour
and capital rather than unskilled labour. The predictable result was a rise in
informalization, stagnation in the real wages of the unskilled and a rise in the
wage differential. Furthermore, a backlog or oversupply of poorly educated
workers was created, which will have regressive effects on distribution until
it is finally eliminated by a combination of more rapid and hopefully more
labour-intensive growth, investments in education and a gradual reduction
in population growth as the transition comes to an end.
D. The Contribution of Inequality at the Top
of the Distribution
Another reason why the distribution of income is so unequal in Latin
America is that the gap between the average incomes of the rich and those
15 Increases in the participation rate, particularly in the 1980s, affected the magnitude of the changes in
the growth rate and moved the peak growth rate back to around 1980; see Weller (2000).
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further down the income pyramid is unusually large. The data show a
segmentation between the rich and everyone else which is far greater than
what exists in other countries. In other words, the rich in Latin America are
much richer relative to the remainder of the population than they are
elsewhere. Researchers at the IDB demonstrate this situation in two ways.
First, they make a comparison of the differences in average income between
adjacent deciles for countries in Latin America and the United States.
Surprisingly, they find no significant difference between the inter-decile
comparisons of Latin America and the United States except at the very top of
the distribution (see IDB, 1998, figure 1.9b). There, however, the differences
are very large. For example, the gap between the ninth and tenth deciles is 2-
3 times as large in a typical Latin American country as it is in the United
States.
The second method the IDB uses to highlight the significance for overall
inequality of the high relative incomes of the rich is by calculating a Gini
coefficient with and without the top decile (IDB, 1998, p.16). Obviously that
results in a dramatic reduction in the Gini in all countries, but the reductions
are much bigger in Latin America than in the United States. Eleven out of 17
countries have a total Gini that is at least twelve points higher than the Gini
for the United States. For the 90% Gini, however, the maximum difference
(that of Paraguay) shrinks to only eight points, and for seven Latin American
countries it is actually lower than the 90% Gini for the United States. The
excessive inequality in the region does not result from large gaps between
those at the bottom and everyone else. Such gaps exist, but the differences
between the typical Latin American country and the United States are not
large in this respect. A search for the answer to excessive inequality should
start with the top of the distribution.
These differences between the top two deciles have a strong positive
relation with the Gini coefficient. Figure III-7 shows the relation between the
relative incomes of the ninth and tenth deciles and the corresponding Gini for
all the countries in the IDB sample; the year is around 1995. The implication
of this positive relation is that high levels of inequality are almost always
associated with high relative incomes at the very top of the distribution. The
same positive relation holds within countries over time. Rising inequality is
closely linked to increases in the relative income of the top decile. It would
thus appear that a search for answers to excessive inequality in the region
should start with a careful look at why those in the top decile are able to earn
so much more in most Latin American countries than they can elsewhere.
If the main determinant of inequality is in fact the amount and distribution
of assets, the sobering implication is that inequality is unlikely to change much
without determined action by governments to change the asset distribution.
Market forces alone, even if accompanied by modest improvements in
education, will not do much. It takes time to create capital, either human or
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coverage of secondary school education will take five to ten years to
significantly upgrade the young cohorts entering the labour market. Since
each cohort of new entrants only comprises 2-3% of the stock of labour, it
takes even longer for educational improvements to make a noticeable dent in
the amount or distribution of skills. More can be done, even in the short run,
to improve the distribution of land or at least to broaden access to land. The
excessive inequality currently found in Latin America is a heritage of past
decisions which have left the region with an unequal distribution of assets.
The most important of these assets is human capital. There is very little that a
society can do in the short run to change that distribution. Latin America
today is forced to live with the results of the inadequate education policies of
the past. The current growth model or any feasible alternative cannot improve
the distribution of earnings unless the quasi-monopoly of the skilled is broken
by massive investments that broaden access to valuable skills and reduce the
size of the unskilled labour pool.
Figure III-7
INCOME DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN NINTH AND TENTH DECILES
AND GINI COEFFICIENTS
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America,












THE EFFECT OF REFORM AND GROWTH
ON DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME
The previous chapters provided a preliminary look at the evidence on
levels and changes in income distribution and proposed some hypotheses
about causal relations with macroeconomic variables such as growth, inflation,
reform policies and the distribution of assets, particularly land and education.
This chapter reports on an econometric attempt to uncover systematic relations
between all of these variables and the distribution of family income, using all
the evidence that could be assembled from a pooled cross-sectional time series
of 16 countries in the region.
Attempting to use pooled cross-sectional time-series evidence to capture
a time-series relation for a single country clearly presents serious econometric
difficulties. Essentially, it entails the assumption that the relation between
distribution and income in today’s high-income countries is similar to what
the less-developed countries can expect when they reach the income level of
the more advanced countries, that is, that unknown country-specific effects
on the distribution are not sufficiently important to offset the effect of income
growth. The analysis addresses this problem, first, by assembling a database
with a relatively large number of time-series observations per country. Second,
it incorporates factors other than income that vary across countries and that
might be expected to have an impact on the distribution or on its
responsiveness to changes in income. Third, a fixed-effects model is used,
with country-specific constants to capture any unknown country-specific
factors affecting the distribution relation.
Many previous studies attempt to econometrically estimate income
distribution models. Most are estimations of the Kuznets relation, using cross-
country distribution and income data (Ahluwalia, 1976; Anand and Kanbur,
1993; Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, 1996; Clarke, 1995; Deininger and Squire,
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1996; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1999; Fields, 1994; Ravallion and Chen, 1997).
All but one of these studies use a worldwide sample of countries. The difficulty
with that approach, as Fields (1994) points out, is that since Latin America is a
middle-income region and has the highest inequality in the world, the simple
choice of the sample can produce an apparent inverse U-shaped Kuznets curve.
Fields finds that including a dummy for the Latin American observations
causes the supposed relationship between income and inequality to disappear.
Deininger and Squire (1996) produce exactly the same result. Bruno, Ravallion
and Squire (1996) use data from 63 surveys covering 44 countries to test the
Kuznets hypothesis for both levels and changes over time. In no case do they
find evidence of an inverted U, and in no case is the relation between the
distribution and income significantly different from zero. Ravallion and Chen
(1997) regress changes in the Gini coefficients against changes in mean real
consumption over 64 periods in 67 countries. They find a negative and
significant relation between the two in the full sample. When they exclude
the observations from Eastern Europe and Central Asia from the sample,
however, the relation disappears.
The purpose in this chapter is somewhat broader than simply estimating
a Kuznets curve. Rather, the goal is to fit a general model for the determinants
of the distribution. Variables other than the level of income which could be
expected to have an influence on the distribution are included in the estimation.
Consequently, the database is much larger than that typically used in Kuznets
curve estimation within the Latin American region. This has been made
possible by pioneering work in data collection at the World Bank, the IDB
and ECLAC, and by reports and analyses of recent household surveys in a
large number of countries in the region. Two different samples are used, one
for levels and the other for changes in the distribution. For the level, the sample
consists of 262 observations in 16 countries from 1960 to 1997. No country is
included in the survey unless it has at least four separate observations. The
change sample comprises 124 observations over the same set of countries.
Each observation in the change sample is based on a consistent set of estimates
by the same researcher using the same methodology. Analysing changes in
the distribution as a function of changes in income and other variables should
reduce the effect of unspecified country-specific variables which may affect
the level of the Gini, but not its responsiveness to changes in income.
Figure IV-1 plots the Ginis and income levels for all the observations in
the sample. Many of the surveys obviously entail serious problems of
comparability, which carry over to the distribution estimates that come from
those surveys. Some of the surveys are based on the distribution of family
income, others on family income per capita. Most of the surveys are based on
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Figure IV-1
GINI COEFFICIENTS VERSUS INCOME LEVEL
Source: Gini coefficients from appendix A-1 (this volume); income from Robert Summers and
Alan Heston, The Penn World Tables: Version 5.6, diskette version (1995).
Another important distinction is between urban and nationwide surveys.
Both Fields (1994) and Deininger and Squire (1996) have argued strongly that
any analysis of the distribution of income should use only nationwide surveys.
However, in many countries (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) urban
surveys were all that were available until very recently, and in another two
(i.e., Argentina and Uruguay) they are still the only surveys available. This
presents the choice of either excluding these countries from any analytical
work or attempting to control for systematic differences between urban and
nationwide surveys by using dummy variables. This paper follows the latter
strategy. Not only does this substantially expand the size of the sample, but it
also permits the observation of any systematic differences in reaction to income
or income growth between the urban sector and the nationwide surveys. The
results for the urban and nationwide samples are displayed separately to verify
the sensitivity of the estimates to this aggregation.
Because the distribution of assets should have an effect on the distribution
of income measures are included for the distribution of land and the
distribution of education. The first is a dummy variable which equals one for
those countries with an unequal distribution of land.16  This variable has two
16 We were forced to use a dummy for this variable rather than a numerical estimate because the
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variants, one which takes a value of one for all observations in the countries
with an unequal land distribution, and the other with a value of one for the
nationwide but not the urban observations. In the second variant, then, all
the observations for Paraguay, for example, have a zero for this variable even
though Paraguay has a very unequal distribution of land, because all the
observations for that country are urban.
Several variables are used to measure the distribution of education, of
which two are mentioned here. One is the ratio of the percentage of the adult
labour force with university education relative to those with no schooling.
This measure reflects the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labour. A
second measure is simply the percentage of adults with university education
or with no schooling. The rationale for this variant is that growth will have a
different effect on inequality in economies in which skilled labour is scarce or
abundant. In the former wage differentials should rise, whereas in the latter
they may well be constant. That should have an effect on the observed relation
between income or income growth and the Gini.
Another important variable which seems to have had a powerful effect
on the distribution is inflation. Labour markets react fairly quickly to moderate
but not to extreme rates of inflation. When the inflation rate is low, nominal
wages adjust and the wage structure may change very little due to price
changes. That does not happen in episodes of hyperinflation. Wage
adjustments –particularly in the minimum wage– may lag behind the inflation
rate. Even if nominal wages are raised by the full amount of inflation, it is still
true that the average level of the real wage over the adjustment period is a
negative function of inflation. This factor is not particularly important when
the inflation rate is low, but it becomes exceedingly important when the rate
is high, which is one of the reasons why the interval between wage adjustments
gets shorter in periods of hyperinflation. The implication is that high inflation
rates may have an impact on distribution. To test for this, the model includes
an inflation dummy. In the level regressions, it takes a value of 1 for any year
in which the annual inflation exceeded 1000%. The change regressions use a
dummy which takes a value of 1 when the inflation rate rises by more than
1000% and a value of -1 when it falls by more than 1000%.
Finally the regressions incorporate a time trend to test whether there have
been systematic changes in the Kuznets curve over time. Both the constant
and the income term include a trend. The former tests whether the Kuznets
curve has shifted up or down over time, and the latter tests whether the slope
of the curve has changed.
A. The Model for the Level of Distribution
The general regression model for the level of distribution can be written
as follows:
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Giniit = Ai + BiYit + Ci1/Yit + DZit + ERit + FSi + GTtYit + HT + error (IV-1)
where i denotes the country and t denotes the year.
A is a regression constant which may vary across countries but, in this
model, not across years. Y is income. Z is a vector of variables such as inflation,
land distribution and education, which are hypothesized to have an effect on
the distribution. R is the index of reform, and S is a vector of dummies which
reflect various sample characteristics (e.g., urban versus national surveys,
household income versus income per capita, expenditure versus income). T
is a trend variable.
If there are no country-specific effects, Ai = A and Bi = B. If in addition
there are no sample characteristics effects, F = 0 and all the countries in the
sample are assumed to be on the same Kuznets curve. If there are no country-
specific effects, but sample characteristics are significant, then F is different
from zero. Here the observed level of the Kuznets curve differs according to
the type of survey, but the slopes are the same. Alternatively, this assumption
can be tested by permitting Bi to differ among countries and testing whether
this alternative specification significantly improves the fit of the regression.
The trend terms test for possible shifts in either the slope or the vertical position
of the Kuznets curve over time.
Equation IV-1 provides a systematic way to determine whether income
and the distribution are related (i.e., whether a Kuznets curve is present),
holding other factors which might influence the distribution constant. At the
same time it tests the supposed relation between education, land distribution,
inflation and the distribution, and –central to the purposes of this book–
examines the effect of reform, holding all these other factors constant.
Tables IV-1, IV-2 and IV-3 estimate the determinants of the distribution of
income. Table IV-1, using all of the available observations (the combined
sample), shows four alternative regressions: three with fixed effects and one
with random effects and a single intercept. The first two regressions use the
exact same model and test whether cross-section weights or pooled least
squares is the preferable specification. The third regression shows the effect
of adding a trend to the constant terms. The fourth points to an explanation of
differences between the constants across countries. Tables IV-2 and IV-3 repeat
the basic regressions for the urban and nationwide samples considered
separately, to see how much the aggregation affects the results. They use a
single-intercept model.
Perhaps the most important result is that the general regression model
fits the data well, explaining anywhere from 85% to 97% of the total variance
in the Gini coefficient over time and across countries. In addition, the estimates
and significance of the coefficient appear to be robust and consistent across
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the alternative fixed-effects regressions. Of the four specifications, those with
fixed effects and cross-section weights (regressions 2 and 3) have the best fit.
A Wald test on the sum of squared residuals of the fixed-effects and common
constant (or single intercept) regressions (compare regressions 3 and 4)
decisively rejects the hypothesis that a single Kuznets curve is common to the
different countries. Unspecified country-specific factors significantly affect
the level of inequality for a given level of income.
(i) Kuznets Curve. What do the results indicate about the existence or shape
of the Kuznets curve? Look at the coefficients on income and the inverse of
income. Both are negative and both are highly significant in all the fixed-
effects specifications. This is also true in the separate regressions for the urban
and nationwide samples shown in tables IV-2 and IV-3, with the exception of
the 1/income term in the urban sample. (This is the term that gives the positive
slope to the curve at low levels of income) and the result suggests that in the
urban sample the curve is downward sloping over the income range observed
in the sample.) This result supports the hypothesis that there is a stable and
identifiable relation between income and inequality in the region (a Kuznets
curve), and that this relation has the same inverted-U shape that Kuznets
found for Britain and the United States. Inequality rises at low levels of income,
but at some income level there is an inflection point after which inequality
begins to decline as income increases.
This is an important result, but it leaves open the question of whether there
really is a single Kuznets curve for all the countries. To test that, I reran the
model, this time permitting the coefficients B and C to differ across countries
(results not shown). This significantly improves the fit of the regression, which
means that the countries differ in the way that inequality reacts to changes in
income. Even in this estimation, however, 12 out of 16 Bi coefficients and 10 out
of 16 Ci coefficients are negative, and only two countries (Bolivia and Paraguay)
have a positive and significant Bi. It thus seems fair to conclude that while there
are significant differences across countries, the average values of B and C shown
in table IV-1 are quite representative of the typical or average relation between
income and inequality in the region. It leaves open the question of whether
there is a single curve representing both the urban and nationwide samples
which is discussed below in the analysis of the urban surveys.
(ii) Education. Education is an important qualifier to this discussion of the
Kuznets curve. The model includes three education variables: the percentage
of the adult population with no schooling, the percentage with no more than
primary schooling and the percentage with university education. A high
percentage of poorly educated workers (the primary school variable) has quite
a large and regressive effect on the distribution.17  According to regression 2 in




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































78 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
table IV-1, this improvement alone should have lowered the Gini coefficient
by about three percentage points (.197*.17). At the same time, the negative
coefficient for university education indicates that increasing the share of
university graduates in the adult population is progressive (it shifts the
Kuznets curve down). Note that the absolute size of the effect of expanding
the proportion of university graduates is much smaller than the effect of
reducing the share of the poorly educated, suggesting that a bigger
distributional impact is obtained by spending money to reduce the size of the
group with primary schooling or less than by expanding the coverage of high
school education and universities. That is exactly the same message elicited
by the comparison of education profiles between Asia and Latin America.
(iii) Inflation. As hypothesized, episodes of high inflation (more than 1000%
per year in the model) are regressive. On average these episodes add about
one percentage point to the Gini. This effect is robust to alternative estimation
methods, but it is not significant in any regressions with an interaction term
between the trend and income.
(iv) Urban-rural differences. In table IV-1 the urban dummy is negative,
significant and robust. On average the Gini can be expected to be about 3
percentage points lower in the urban than in the nationwide surveys.
Comparing the Kuznets curves implied by the regressions reported in table
IV-1 with those for the separate urban and nationwide samples as reported in
tables IV-2 and IV-3 shows that while the general form is the same (all three
have an inverted-U shape), the coefficients and significance on the various
income and trend terms are different. Figure IV-2 plots the curves from the
three estimations.
As expected, the urban curve in figure IV-2 is lower than the nationwide
curve over the relevant income range. It also peaks earlier and is slightly flatter
than the nationwide curve. That is consistent with the rationale that Kuznets
described for the relation. According to his analysis, the distribution changes
with development because people move from the low-income rural sector to
a higher-income urban sector. At low levels of aggregate income, the urban
sector is small, so this change in structure increases inequality (i.e., the
nationwide curve is upward-sloping). After a certain point, when the urban
sector has grown enough, continued rural-urban migration reduces inequality
because it shrinks the size of the group that is poor (i.e., after the inflection
point, the curve turns down). Within the urban sector, however, there is much
less reason to expect income growth to have these effects. The urban sector is
more homogeneous, so the gains from income growth ought to spread through
it more evenly. This implies that the urban Kuznets curve should be quite flat
(flatter than the nationwide curve), which in fact it is.
(v) Other sample characteristics. All of the sample characteristics had a
significant effect on the level of the Kuznets curve. Distribution measures based
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Figure IV-2
URBAN, NATIONWIDE AND COMBINED KUZNETS CURVES
Source: Tables IV-1, IV-2 and IV-3.
lower than those based on income. They also have significantly flatter slopes,
as indicated by the inclusion of an interaction term (not shown) in the
regression. This is to be expected. To the extent that variations in income are
temporary and not permanent, expenditures should reflect the latter more
than the former. That implies that expenditures tend to change by less than
measured income across different levels of income, so that the distribution of
expenditure is more equal than the distribution of measured income.
Another sample characteristic is whether the distribution is based on
family income or family income per capita (the per household dummy).
Surveys based on family income have Ginis which are about one percentage
point below those based on family income per capita, and this difference is
significant. It reflects the fact that poor families tend to have more family
members. Finally, the ECLAC distributions are systematically 5-6 percentage
points more equal than the others because of their treatment of home
consumption and other sources of under-reporting.
(vi) Reforms. This section examines the effects of the average reform index,
deferring consideration of each of the subindexes. As is evident from the three
tables, overall the reforms have a regressive effect on distribution. The
coefficient is positive in all three samples, and it is significant in some of them.
The effect, however, is relatively small. According to the reform coefficient on
regressions 2 and 3 in table IV-1, increasing the average reform index by 10%
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thirds of a percentage point. While this effect is not large, the sign does confirm
the assertions of Berry (1998) and Bulmer-Thomas (1996), who used historical
evidence up to the early 1990s for a small cross-section of countries to show
that inequality had widened after the imposition of the reform package. The
evidence here comes from a much larger cross-section of countries and a far
longer time period, but it points to the same conclusion.
Two notes of caution: first, the effect of reforms is here taken to mean the
direct impact apart from whatever effect the reforms may have had through
inflation or growth in income. If the reforms increase the growth rate, or lead
to lower inflation, as they seem to have done in some countries, the positive
effect of those two factors may outweigh the direct regressive effect on
inequality of the reforms themselves.18  Second, different reforms appear to
have quite dramatically different and offsetting effects on distribution. Quite
different conclusions may follow if the pattern of reform differs from the across-
the-board change measured here.
(vii) Land distribution. Regression 4 of table IV-1 re-estimates the model
with a single intercept and adds a measure of land distribution to see whether
it helps explain why country-specific intercept terms differ. The land
distribution variable is highly significant and positive, adding about 3.6
percentage points to the average Gini, which is a large effect. The change in
model also affects the significance and size of some of the other variables, as
well. Inflation, for example, becomes a larger and more significant factor. So
do differences in the university education variable. All this suggests that
differences in inflation, education profile and land distribution are among the
reasons why income distributions differ across the countries in the region,
but they are not the only differences. If they were, the fit of the model would
not improve significantly with the use of country-specific intercepts.
(viii) Trend. The results indicate that the Kuznets curve shifts over time.
The model captures this by introducing two trend terms, one in the constant
(intercept term) and the other interacting with the income term. Regression 3
in table IV-1 puts the trend in the intercept term. It is negative and significant,
suggesting a gradual reduction of inequality over time, other things being
equal. But the interaction term tells a different story. It is positive and significant
in all the regressions, including the one with the common intercept (regression
4), as well as in the regressions for the urban and nationwide samples
considered separately. This indicates that the slope of the Kuznets curve
changes over time. Since the coefficient is positive, the slope is gradually getting
steeper to the left of the inflection point, where the curve is upward sloping.
To the right of the inflection point, where the slope is negative, the trend makes
18 In a recent paper Escaith and Morley (2000) have estimated the effect of this same package of reforms
on growth. Their results show that the average reform index did not have a significant effect on the

















the slope gradually flatter. Furthermore, the interaction term gradually shifts
the inflection point itself to the right over time, extending the range over
which growth is regressive. Thus the trend terms tell two opposing stories.
The trend term on the intercept is progressive, since it shifts the Kuznets curve
down. But the interaction term is regressive, meaning that growth has become
systematically less progressive than it used to be. To illustrate all this, figure
IV-3 shows the Kuznets curves for Brazil for 1970, 1980 and 1996. For purposes
of comparison, all the relevant variables other than trend are set at their 1996
values. The regression 3 coefficients are used for this calculation.
Figure IV-3
SHIFTING KUZNETS CURVES FOR BRAZIL
Source: Appendix table A-1.
The progressive shift downward in the intercept is increasingly dominated
by the outward shift in the curve and its change of slope. Both of these changes
make growth less progressive than it would otherwise be, for not only is the
interaction reducing the slope of the curve, but the country is moving from
one curve to another. That makes the improvement in inequality per unit of
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B. The Effect of Growth on the Distribution:
An Application of the Estimated Kuznets Curve
One of the central questions regarding trends in distribution is the effect
of future growth on inequality. Supposing that no policy changes occur other
than growth, will Latin America become more equitable? Is high inequality
nothing more than a phase which will be mitigated by growth?
The above regressions shed a good deal of light on this question. First of
all, since the Kuznets curve has an inverted-U shape, some countries are
undoubtedly to the left of the inflection point. For them growth is going to be
inequitable. For the remaining countries, however, growth should improve
distribution. The interaction between trend and income complicates the issue,
because it makes the growth-equity relation steadily less progressive. This is
partly because it moves the inflection point to the right and partly because it
makes the curve itself steeper on the upward portion and flatter on the
downward portion.
To see what the trend term implies for each country, the trend values for
1996 and 1970 were used to solve equation IV-1 (see table IV-4). The first three
columns show how the inflection point moves to a higher income level over
time as a result of the interaction of the trend and income. Columns four and
five give the actual income level and the actual Gini for the most recent year
for which a household survey is available. The sixth column shows the slope
of the Kuznets curve, and the last two columns give the elasticity of the Kuznets
curve at the income level given in column four for the 1970 and 1996 values of
the trend variable.19
In 1996, the inflection point was just under US$4,000 per capita. That
means that all seven of the high-income countries in the region were beyond
the inflection point (i.e., the value for dGini/dY, or the slope of the Kuznets
curve, was negative).20  For them, growth is equalizing. The remaining nine
were on the rising portion of the Kuznets curve. For them, the Gini rises with
growth. The column showing the elasticity of the Gini with regard to income
in 1996 indicates by how much the Gini could be expected to change with
growth. For Argentina, for example, if per capita income grew by 5%, the
Gini should fall by about .6% (5*.117), or from .486 to .483, which is not a large
change. All this assumes, of course, that all the remaining variables stay at
their 1996 levels. For the region as a whole, the simple average of the individual
19 The elasticity is the expected percentage change in the Gini coefficient per one percent change in
income.
20 In the case of Colombia, the actual income listed in the table is for 1995; it is just below the inflection

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































84 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
country elasticities demonstrates that if all countries grow by the same amount,
the average Gini coefficient will rise slightly. Growth is not equalizing because
the weight of the nine countries on the rising portion of the Kuznets curve is
greater than the weight of those on the equalizing part of the curve. Weighting
the elasticities by either population or income would reverse that conclusion,
because all the big and relatively prosperous countries (i.e., Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) are on the falling part of their curves.
Because of the trend term, the Kuznets curves for the high-income
countries are tending to get flatter over time, and the low-income curves are
getting steeper. That implies that growth is getting less and less progressive.
This can be shown by recalculating the elasticities using the parameters of the
1970 Kuznets curve (see column 8 of table IV-4). With those parameters, only
four countries demonstrate rising inequality, instead of the nine that actually
had in 1996. As a result, the average elasticity of the Gini with respect to income
would have been negative, which means that a growth rate that raised average
inequality in 1996 would have lowered it in 1970. This quite strongly suggests
that if nothing else changes, the impact of growth on inequality in the future
is likely to be more regressive than it is today.
Why the progressivity of growth is systematically reduced over time is
not known. Probably it reflects rising skill intensity and the nature of technical
change. Whatever the cause, the impact of growth on inequality is likely to be
even more regressive in the future than it is today unless some deliberate
actions are taken to counteract the trend.
C. Subindexes of Reform
This section disaggregates the average reform index to show the effect
on equality of each of the separate reform components (see table IV-5). The
regressions in table IV-5 use the same combined sample of urban and
nationwide observations used for table IV-1. Table IV-6 summarizes the
evidence from table IV-5 and from the urban and nationwide samples
considered separately (from tables IV-2 and IV-3). The various reforms clearly
have different and offsetting effects. In all the estimates of the Kuznets curve,
some of the reforms have a significant regressive effect and some a significant
progressive effect. That explains why the average reform indexes seem to have
little effect on inequality.
Comparing the combined sample with the separate urban and nationwide
regressions, the results for trade, capital and tax reform are a good deal more
robust than the other two reforms. Trade reform has been regressive, more so
in the nationwide than in the urban regressions. This suggests that the negative
effect on agriculture of the loss of protection and price subsidies was more











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































86 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
theoretical case for trade reform rested on the idea that increased openness
should favour Latin America’s abundant factor, which was expected to be
unskilled labour. That should have improved the distribution, but the
econometric evidence says that it did not work out that way in practice. If
anything, the effect was the opposite.
This evidence is consistent with the findings of Donald Robbins (1996),
who presents evidence that trade liberalization led to a widening of skill
differentials. These results are somewhat stronger than those of Spilimbergo,
Londoño and Székely (1997), who find that “trade openness also has a
negligible effect over income distribution in Latin America,” mainly because
relative factor endowments in Latin America are very close to world averages
weighted by population and openness (p. 30). The evidence presented here is
not consistent with the work of Londoño and Székely (1997), who find a
significant positive relationship between trade reforms in the period 1985-
1995 and the income share of the bottom quintile for a panel of 13 countries in
the region. However, their regressions do not include urban observations such
as those for Argentina and Bolivia. Nor do they include any variables other
than the reform indexes in the regressions. Thus the effects that they assign to
the reforms may well be coming from other policies or variables.
In contrast to trade liberalization, opening the capital account has been
progressive. Reducing barriers to capital mobility attracted a great deal of
foreign capital to Latin America. Theoretically, this should have reduced profit
rates and increased the demand for labour, all of which should be progressive.
These results confirm that assertion. Tax reforms shift the Kuznets curve up
towards more inequality. There are clear theoretical arguments why that might
be the case. Switching from progressive income taxes to a flatter tax structure
and substituting VAT or consumption taxes for income taxes and tariffs shifts
the tax burden away from the rich. As for the other two reforms, the variations
in the signs and significance of the coefficients on privatization and financial
reforms suggest that the data are not good enough to give an unambiguous
answer regarding their effect.
Table IV-6
EFFECTS OF REFORMS ON THE KUZNETS CURVE
COMBINED URBAN NATIONWIDE
Privatization regressive * progressive regressive
Financial reform progressive * regressive * regressive
Tax reform regressive * regressive regressive *
Trade liberalization regressive regressive regressive *
Capital account opening progressive progressive * progressive *
Source: Table IV-5.
* Significant at 1% level
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D. Results for the Model of Changes in Inequality
The robustness of the model results was checked by collecting a pool of
observed changes in Gini coefficients between two points in time and then
rerunning the basic model to see whether the variables that enter into the level
equations explain changes in inequality (table IV-7). The sample is drawn from
the same set of observations used in the level regressions, except that here, in
order to be included, each pair had to be consistent with respect to sample
coverage, income definitions and sample design. That is, urban, household,
expenditure and per capita income observations are paired to ensure that
changes are not coming from a change in definitions. This procedure reduces
the estimation bias that could be present in the level regressions, because those
regressions combine surveys which may have been based on different definitions
of income, different ways of handling under-reporting and so on. Each pair in
this change database is internally consistent. The resulting pool has 122
observations over the same 16 countries used in the level regressions. To
minimize the effect of sudden changes at the end points of periods, the
observations represent two-year averages at end points whenever enough yearly
distribution observations are available to make that possible.
There is a theoretical problem in estimating the change model, due to the
fact that the original Kuznets curve is non-linear. The effect of changes in
income on the distribution will depend entirely on whether the observations
occur in countries to the left or right of the inflection point. To address that
problem, the regression allows different slope coefficients by country (i.e., B
is allowed to vary across countries).21
The model for determinants of changes in inequality is a hybrid in which
the percentage change in the Gini is expressed as a function of changes in
income and the levels of the sample characteristics, land distribution, the
measures of education and the reform indexes. The choice is straightforward
for sample characteristics such as household or urban, but for the education
measures, it could be argued that if the educational profile helps to explain
differences in the level of inequality, then changes in inequality should be
related to changes in the education variables. The same argument could be
made for the reform index. The problem with that reasoning is a practical
one. The amount of change in the education and reform variables over the
time periods for which most of the distributional changes were observed is so
21 In addition the regression incorporates a dummy variable which takes a value of one for those
countries to the left of the inflection point where the relation between income growth and inequality
should be positive. Putting this variable in the model permits the two groups of countries to have
Kuznets curves with different slopes. However, this interaction is insignificant and is not shown in
the table.
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small that it would have been meaningless to include it in the regressions.
Therefore, the education and reform variables reflect the level observed at the
start of the period for which the change is being measured. If education and
reform have an effect in these regressions, it means that they affect the slope
of the Kuznets curve. The same argument can be made for the sample
characteristics (urban, household and expenditure). In the level equations,
the sample variables help to determine the intercept or the degree of inequality.
Here they determine the sensitivity of inequality to changes in income, or in
other words, the slope of the Kuznets curve.
In the level regressions the inflation variable is a dummy which takes a
value of one when the inflation rate for the year in question exceeded 1000%.
For the change regressions, the dummy takes a value of 1 when the increase
in the inflation rate over the period was more than 1000 % and a value of -1
when the inflation rate fell by 1000%.
In addition to the variables that appear in the level regression equation,
the change regression introduces the observed Gini coefficient at the beginning
of the period. This is similar to the concept of convergence in the growth
literature. The idea is that there is a long-run level of inequality. The further
actual inequality is from this level, the bigger the change in inequality in
response to income growth. Another way to think of this is to hypothesize
that the Kuznets curve has a second inflection point on the downward sloping
portion. Rather than have an increasingly negative slope with increasing levels
of income, it has a slope that flattens out as the Gini approaches the long-run
equilibrium or floor level. In the level regressions, the trend-income interaction
term reflects this same idea.
With one significant exception, the results from the change regressions
confirm the patterns uncovered in the level regressions. Variables have the
same sign they had in table IV-1, and the results are quite consistent and robust
to different estimation methods. As before, the model with cross-section
weights appears to be superior to pooled least squares. While the fit of this
model is not as good as the level regressions (as expected), it still explains
quite a bit of the variation in distribution over the last 30 years in Latin America.
On average, changes in inequality are negatively related to changes in
income. Inequality rises in recessions and falls in recovery, a finding that is
consistent with previous work (Morley, 1995; Ravallion and Chen, 1997). The
significance of this relation is questionable, however, because as might be
expected in estimating a non-linear relation in levels, countries display big
differences. When the model incorporates country-specific slope coefficients,
the regression fit improves substantially and the slopes of different countries
take on big differences (see regression 6). Eleven have a negative coefficient
and five are positive. All seven of the countries to the right of the inflection
point are in the negative coefficients group. Only one of the remaining countries
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In the single-coefficient regressions (1-5), the significance of the slope
coefficient is strongly affected by the presence or absence of a dummy variable
(the long-run dummy), which takes a value of one for those changes observed
prior to the debt crisis in the early 1980s. This long-run dummy has a
consistently negative coefficient, suggesting that growth in the 1970s and
before was more equitable than it has been subsequently. This is consistent
with the trend-income interaction term in the level regressions. When the
long-run dummy is in the regression, the Kuznets curve is essentially flat,
which is consistent with the effect of the trend variable in the level regressions.
In those regressions the trend interaction with income shifts the curves up
and outward. Instead of moving down a single Kuznets curve, countries are
moving from one curve to another, which reduces the observed effect of
changing income on inequality.
The change regressions confirm the regressive impact of inflation on
inequality. Here the dummy variable reflects the effect of both rising and falling
inflation. The level regressions only pick up the impact of high rates of
inflation. That equation does not distinguish between observations which
had low and steady rates of inflation from others in which the low rate came
after a high rate. The hypothesis about inflation is that changes in the rate
matter as much as the rate itself. Thus the change model comes closer to testing
this relation than does the level model. It is clear from the results that big
changes in inflation do indeed matter, both positively and negatively. The
poor are less able to defend themselves against very high inflation than are
the rich. Therefore, the stabilizations successfully carried out in Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil and Peru had an important positive effect on equity. That is
true even when those stabilizations were accompanied in the short run by
recession, as was the case in Peru.
The sample characteristics (the per household and urban dummies) are
less significant here than in the level regressions, although they both have the
same negative sign. This indicates that there is not an important interaction
between the sample characteristics and income. Urban income distributions
are systematically more equal than nationwide distributions. They also tend
to have slightly flatter Kuznets curves, but the differences are not significant.
In other words, the distributional effect of income growth on the typical urban
household does not appear to be significantly different from the effect on
households for the country as a whole. The ECLAC observations (all of which
are urban) have a significant negative coefficient in all of the regressions in
table IV-7, as they do in the level regressions. This indicates not only that the
level of inequality is lower in these observations, but that the reaction to income
growth is also more progressive. Finally, as in the level regressions, land
distribution has a significant regressive effect on the Kuznets curve, but only
in a regression with a common intercept (not shown). Otherwise, its effect is
incorporated in the country-specific constants. As in the level regressions,
the effect of reform appears to be regressive, though not significantly different
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from zero. This results from offsetting effects among the different subindexes
of reform (regressions not shown).
The university variable is progressive in these regressions, as in table IV-
1, but that is not the case for the primary school variable. This is the only
variable whose performance is completely different in the level and the change
regressions. The level regressions demonstrate that the fraction with primary
schooling or less has a regressive effect on inequality. Here, the effect of the
variable is progressive. It should be recalled that these change regressions are
measuring an interaction term with income. This result implies, therefore,
that income growth has a more powerful and favourable effect on inequality
in countries with a less educated labour force. In such countries, the Kuznets
curve is higher, but its slope is flatter before the inflection point and steeper
afterwards. This is a somewhat surprising result.
E. Conclusions
The econometric evidence suggests two main conclusions. First, the
relation between the distribution and level of income appears to be robust
and significant. It has the inverted U-shape that Kuznets predicted, but this
relation has been shifting in a regressive direction over time. Growth is now a
good deal less progressive than it used to be. In the aggregate, that means
that further growth in Latin America is unlikely to improve the distribution
much, if at all. Supplementary measures must therefore be taken. Among those
suggested by the regressions are maintaining low inflation rates and investing
in education. Giving new entrants to the labour force more education at any
level is progressive, but countries will get a much bigger reduction in inequality
if they start at the bottom, universalizing the coverage of primary education
and then broadening the coverage of secondary and university education.
Second, in the aggregate the reforms appear to have a regressive effect
on distribution, but this effect is both small and only marginally significant.
The reason is that reforms in different areas have offsetting effects on equity.
Trade reform is regressive in all of the specifications, but it is insignificant in
all but the nationwide sample. Tax reform is unambiguously regressive, and
opening up the capital account is unambiguously progressive. The results for
tax reform and capital account liberalization are the most robust and significant




EVIDENCE FROM COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
Using a sample of nine countries in the region, this chapter draws a more
detailed picture of the impact of the reforms and the main determinants that
change the distribution in growing economies. The first indicator presented
is simply a comparison of the family distribution of income per capita before
and after the reforms. The chapter then moves on to an investigation of the
primary earnings distribution, that is to say, the distribution of nationwide
income among those who produce it. Given data constraints, in many countries
the analysis is limited to the distribution of labour income because the
household surveys have very little information on income from land and
capital, particularly undistributed profits. This shift in focus to the primary
distribution is justified because of its clear and close link with factor markets
and economic processes. Understanding the channels by which the reforms
affect income distribution requires starting with the distribution that depends
directly on factor markets and factor prices. Large differences in trend between
the two distributions would then point to the need to look for demographic
or other explanations. Fortunately, the two distributions are closely related in
most of the countries for which data are available, such that an analysis of
how the reforms affect the primary earnings distribution can help predict
how they affect the family distribution as well.
Two methodological points should be noted here. First, the fact that the
distribution changed after the reforms is no proof that the reforms caused the
change. Many other things that were going on at the same time could be
responsible. Virtually all investigation of causal links in economics is open to
this sort of criticism. The econometric analysis in chapter IV attempted to
deal with the problem by including all the other factors that might be
influencing the distribution. In time-series work, however, it is often difficult
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to separate different factors because of multicollinearity. Another way of
investigating impact is to construct a general equilibrium model containing
factor markets and behavioural equations, which can be used to simulate the
response to reforms. The data requirements of such an exercise are large,
however, and such an application is not attempted here. This leaves a
methodology that makes the best case for causal links on the basis of an
examination of relevant historical evidence, including factor prices, changes
in factor supplies, rates of investment and changes in the composition of
output, that could plausibly be related to reforms.
The second methodological issue involves the choice of dates for before-
and-after comparisons. That sounds fairly easy, but in fact it is quite difficult
because the conclusions can be quite sensitive to these choices. For example,
in the case of Mexico survey data are available for 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994 and
1996. The starting point should be a year prior to the adoption of the reforms,
but the adoption of reforms is a fairly continuous process, with some reforms
being adopted before others. In Mexico trade and financial reforms began
around 1986 and were significantly extended after 1989. Inequality rose sharply
in Mexico, but virtually all of it occurred between 1984 and 1989. Therefore, a
1984 starting point would likely lead to the conclusion that the reforms were
regressive, whereas a 1989 date is more likely to indicate that they had no
direct impact.22
The choice of starting and ending points should also be conditional on
the absence of changes in other factors that are known to have a big impact on
the distribution. Recession and inflation are the most obvious examples. The
two points being compared should be at roughly the same point in the
economic cycle, preferable one near full employment. It is also important to
avoid points with very different rates of inflation. This is relevant in Argentina,
where observations are available for 1974, 1980, 1986 and then yearly
observations from 1989 on. The reform package under Menem, which started
in 1990, was coupled with an orthodox stabilization programme that controlled
hyperinflation. The 1991 observation comes right in the middle of that
programme, so 1986 is taken as the starting point. As in Mexico, however, this
choice has consequences, because the rise in inequality came between 1986
and 1989, and it seems to be due to hyperinflation. In 1991, thanks to the
Menem stabilization programme, inequality was already falling, though it
never recovered the 1986 level. Taking a 1989 observation as a starting point
would undoubtedly lead to completely different conclusions about the impact
of the reforms from those reached by starting in 1986.
22 Clearly, the reforms could have had an effect that was offset by other factors. This case is used simply
to make the general point that whatever the direct or indirect effects are, they will be sensitive to the
choice of starting and ending points.
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Turning now to the historical record, figure V-1 shows two consistent
series of distribution measures: the distribution of family income per capita
and the distribution of primary earnings, or in several cases labour earnings.23
The vertical line in the diagram marks the period when the biggest change in
the reform indexes occurred. Admittedly, this dating is somewhat arbitrary,
since the adoption of reforms was a continuous process. Whenever available,
the Gini coefficients are used for the diagrams. In several cases only the Theil
was available for the primary or earnings distributions.
The first thing to note about the figures is the relatively close
correspondence between the trends in the primary and family distributions.
Altogether there are 266 observed cases in the eight countries for which
comparable estimates of changes in the household and the primary distribution
are available. In all but six cases the direction of change is either the same or
differs by an insignificant amount. Three of those six cases are from Argentina,
where the estimate of the primary distribution is only for those who receive
income. The difference between it and the family distribution undoubtedly
reflects the impact of changes in unemployment, which was a critical feature
of the labour market in Argentina in the 1990s. This evidence suggests that in
most cases movements in the family distribution can be inferred from changes
in the primary distribution. That helps establish an important link in figure
V-1 between what happens in the labour market and the distribution that is
most closely related with social well-being. At the same time, given that most
of the primary distributions (and the family distributions, too) reflect labour
earnings and not profits, this analysis supplements the information from the
household surveys with information on rates of return to capital and on factor
shares from the nationwide accounts.
In three reforming countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico), the
distribution is clearly worse than it was before the reform process began. It
would appear that in the 1990s these three countries reached a new equilibrium
in which the distribution indexes stabilized, but at a much higher level of
inequality than before. That is, the reform process seems to have permanently
shifted the distribution toward higher inequality. In Peru the reverse seems to
be true. Adopting the reform package and stopping hyperinflation shifted
the inequality indexes down between 1985 and 1991, and the improvement
continued at least until the last observation in 1996.24
In three of the remaining countries (Colombia, Costa Rica and Brazil),
the changes between the pre- and post-reform distributions are insignificant.
In one case, however, that conceals important sectoral changes: in Colombia
23 Jamaica has only one estimate because its distribution is based on expenditures, due to severe under-
reporting of income. Expenditures are by family and cannot be assigned to workers.
24 More recent survey data cast some doubt on the accuracy of the 1996 survey in Peru.
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Figure V-1
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the urban distribution deteriorated significantly, but this was offset by
improvements in the rural distribution. That is at least in part a result of
significant rural-urban migration in the 1990s, which is a good argument for
studying nationwide as opposed to urban distributions. In Costa Rica the
overall distribution was remarkably stable after the late 1980s, despite both
the adoption of reforms and a fairly unstable macroeconomic growth
environment. Brazil, too, registered little change in its household distribution
after the mid-1980s, but it is not certain that the country is on a stable, post-
reform growth track. Not only is Brazil one of the most recent of the reformers,
but its distribution record in the 1990s is blurred because of the simultaneous
adoption of reforms and the control of inflation. Nonetheless, as for Costa
Rica, the data for Brazil exhibit a distribution that is very stable, despite big
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The remaining two countries, Bolivia and Jamaica, call for special
comment. Bolivia did not undertake rural surveys until 1996, so it is not
possible to track levels of inequality at the nationwide level. For the urban
economy, the distribution improved significantly after 1985, but it worsened
after 1990. Most of the reform package was adopted between 1985 and 1987,
but at the same time a successful stabilization programme stopped
hyperinflation. Consequently, the big reduction in inequality is not attributable
to the reform package alone; some or all of it may instead be due to the successful
stabilization programme. Bolivia thus has neither data on trends in the
nationwide distribution nor evidence of what the distribution was like in a
low-inflation environment prior to reform. It is clear, however, that after the
reforms, in the most recent period, inequality rose significantly, at least in the
urban economy. Bolivia is one of the only two countries where that has happened
(the other is Colombia). Jamaica is different from the other countries because its
adoption of reforms has been gradual and intermittent and because it did not
grow in the 1990s. To complicate matters, it was forced to adopt contractionary
macroeconomic policies to stop rising inflation. Despite all this, its distribution
improved after 1989, although only in relative terms in an economy in decline.
Six of the countries thus demonstrate rigidity or stability in distribution
in the post-reform period. With the possible exception of Bolivia, there is no
case in which inequality displayed an upward trend in the 1990s, and it
decreased in at least two (Peru and Jamaica). For the rest, the distribution was
virtually unchanged over the decade, despite growth and despite structural
change and reform. In several countries, however, this overall distributional
stability masks important sectoral changes. In Colombia and Mexico, and
possibly also Bolivia, the urban and rural distributions moved in opposite
directions. In Mexico and Chile, changes in the distribution of labour income
were offset by changes in the share of profits. Argentina, Chile and Mexico
experienced a one-time upward shift in inequality, but there, too, the
distributions remained approximately unchanged after the early 1990s.
Here, then, are the puzzles examined in this chapter, using evidence from
factor markets, factor supplies and breakdowns of the inequality indexes of
the primary distribution:
(i) What explains the one-time rise in inequality during the
implementation of reforms in Argentina, Chile and Mexico? What is different
about these three cases? Why did that same shift not happen in other countries
when they adopted reforms?
(ii) Why was the distribution so rigid or stable in the 1990s? The
econometric analysis provides strong evidence that the Kuznets curve is
shifting over time and therefore that growth is systematically less progressive
than it once was. For all the countries to the right of the inflection point, that
would be consistent with moving to higher, flatter Kuznets curves over time
or to a constant Gini coefficient. The econometrics is unable to tell us why the
Kuznets curve is shifting, however.
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(iii) What has been the impact of changes in sectoral growth patterns due
to the reforms? Trade reform, in particular, hurt some sectors and helped others.
Privatization and financial reform presumably encouraged investment, which
also changed patterns of growth. All of this must have affected the relative
demand for factors. The changes may have made growth either more or less
skill intensive, and that should have affected the earnings distribution. What
does the historical evidence suggest in this regard?
(iv) What is the role of changes in unemployment, wage differentials and
job creation in changes in the earnings distribution?
A. Historical Evidence on Factor Prices and
Relative Factor Supplies
The investigation begins with a look at the historical evidence on factor
supplies and factor prices (see table V-1). The first indicator is relative capital
intensity, measured by the capital-labour ratio (K/L). Capital is the non-
residential capital stock measured in constant 1985 purchasing power dollars;
it is taken from the Penn tables, with an upgrade to 1996 from ECLAC data
(see Summers and Heston, 1995). Labour is defined as the employed labour
force. The second indicator is the skill differential, a key element in the analysis.
Countries differ somewhat in how they measure this variable, but it is generally
defined as the ratio of wages of university graduates to those with no more
than primary education. Whenever possible, this information is drawn directly
from the household surveys. The third measure is the Theil index of inequality
for the primary distribution. This measure is used in the breakdowns of
inequality or changes in inequality later in this chapter. Finally, the Gini
coefficient is used to measure the distribution of family income per capita.
This is the distribution used above for the empirical statements about pre-
and post-reform trends.
The income share of better-educated labour rose in every country. In some
countries, the wage differential for the better educated went up as well. Such
countries are here labelled skill intensive, meaning that the increase in demand
for better-educated labour was greater than the increase in supply. On the
basis of that classification scheme, the countries with skill-intensive growth
(i.e., an increase of more than 5% in the skill differential) are Argentina for the
entire period since 1974, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru. In Chile the
differential widened between 1968 and 1987, but then fell back sharply to
below its initial level.25  It is the only country in which the skill differential fell
25 Comparable evidence for the entire period comes only from Greater Santiago. The evidence from the
CASEN surveys from 1987 to 1996 also shows a narrowing of wage differentials, but it is much less
pronounced than the narrowing for Greater Santiago (wage work sheets from Weller, 2000).
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Table V-1
TRENDS IN CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIOS, SKILL DIFFERENTIALS
AND INEQUALITY
COUNTRY AND INDICATOR VALUE
Argentina (urban) 1974 1986 1991 1996
Capital-labour ratio 9060 11869 10953 10617
Skill differential 78 98 94 116.5
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.176 0.293 0.268 0.283
Family distribution (Gini) 0.354 0.407 0.461 0.486
Bolivia (urban) 1985 1989 1996
Capital-labour ratio 6987 5946 5196
Skill differential 100 146.9 202.4
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.668 0.486 0.595
Family distribution (Gini) 0.59 0.43 0.48
Brazil 1976 1985 1990 1997
Capital-labour ratio 10765 16007 17290 17511
Skill differential 100 98.5 93.9 107.8
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.83 0.68 0.7 0.71
Family distribution (Gini) 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.59
Chile 1968 1987 1996
Capital-labour ratio 5840 7527 14269
Skill differential 100 123.8 97.8
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.653 0.636
Family distribution (Gini) 0.56 0.553
Colombia (urban) 1988 1993 1995 1996
Capital-labour ratio 12919 12554 12343 12180
Skill differential 71.5 73.3 75.2 76.6
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.432 0.522 0.457
Family distribution (Theil) 0.582 0.596 0.625
Costa Rica 1988 1995
Capital-labour ratio 29777 34547
Skill differential 88.9 86
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.49 0.478
Family distribution (Gini) 0.387 0.377
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significantly in the 1990s. In Colombia the differential narrowed from 1976 to
about 1990, and then increased slightly. In the two remaining countries (Costa
Rica and Jamaica) the post-reform skill differential was roughly equal to what
it was in the pre-reform observations.
As for capital intensity, only three countries (Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico)
demonstrate a significant increase in the capital-labour ratio, whether pre-
and post-reform or in the 1990s. In Brazil, Colombia and Jamaica, the ratio
was roughly constant, while in Argentina, Bolivia and Peru it clearly fell. In
short, the skill differential was either constant or growing in eight out of nine
countries, but capital intensity rose in only three out of nine.
A relation between changes in capital intensity and the skill differential
might be expected, since skilled labour and capital are generally considered
to be complementary, but the table does not demonstrate that pattern. For the
five countries with widening skill differentials, capital intensity increased
significantly in only one, namely, Mexico. Actually the proportion of rising
COUNTRY AND INDICATOR VALUE
Jamaica 1989 1993 1996
Capital-labour ratio 3424 3505 3682
Skill differential 100 101.9 102
Family distribution (Theil) 0.313 0.258 0.252
Family distribution (Gini) 0.436 0.382 0.369
Mexico 1984 1989 1994 1996
Capital-labour ratio 14357 12963 14304 14849
Skill differential 100 122.1 138.7
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.30
Family distribution (Gini) 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.45
Peru 1985-86 1991 1996
Capital-labour ratio 9480 8651 8151
Skill differential 100 94.8 142.9
Primary distribution (Theil) 0.579 0.502 0.485
Family distribution (Gini) 0.519 0.467 0.435
Source: Consultant reports.
Note: All family distributions are family income per capita, except for Mexico, which is family
income, and Jamaica, which is family expenditure per capita. The last Theil observation for
Argentina is 1997. The Chilean relative wages are averages over groups of years: 1968=1964-1969,
1987=1987-1990, and 1996=1991-1996. For Jamaica under-reporting of income makes the household
surveys unreliable as a source of average wages; a proxy is therefore used, namely, the average
wage of the financial sector relative to construction as reported by the establishment surveys.
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capital intensity is larger in the four countries without an increase in the skill
differential. Costa Rica and Chile, in particular, need to be examined further
because they combine a rapid increase in capital intensity with constant or
declining wage differentials.
B. Factor Shares and the Rate of Return to Capital
As is well known, the household surveys on which the distribution
statistics are based do not adequately reflect the income from capital. To some
extent that is simply because of conscious under-reporting, but in addition a
large part of that income is not distributed as profits and thus never appears
in the surveys. It is possible to correct for the under-reporting of profit income
by inflating whatever profits and interest income is reported, using the
differences between the reported total and the nationwide accounts. ECLAC
attempts to do this in its analysis of the surveys. However, the distribution
statistics in table V-1 do not include that sort of correction. The survey
distribution evidence must therefore be supplemented with information on
factor shares as estimated and reported in the national accounts. Unfortunately,
the breakdowns by factor incomes in the national accounts are unable to
attribute to labour or capital the income that is generated in the informal sector
or by self-employed workers. In table V-2, that component of national income
is combined with capital.26  The table thus presents the income from salaries
and wages as a fraction of total income at factor cost.
The surplus clearly fell between the pre- and post-reform periods in
Bolivia, Colombia and Costa Rica, and it increased in Peru. It also rose during
the first stage of reforms in Mexico (1984-1989), Chile (1970-1987) and
Argentina (1974-1986), which corresponds exactly with the one-time shift up
in inequality. Subsequently, the labour share recovered in all three countries,
but only in Chile did it return to its pre-reform level. Thus, a shift from labour
to capital in the distribution would appear to be an important component of
the one-time upward shift in inequality between the pre- and post-reform
periods in these three countries.
Information on the rate of return is only available for five of the countries,
and it is sketchy even there. Each nationwide series is constructed with a
different definition and is therefore useful only for intra-country comparisons
over time. Note, in particular, that for Costa Rica the figures listed are an
index of the rate of return. The available data indicate that the rate of return
was either constant or declining over the period of the reforms. It was constant
26 The exception is Argentina, where the labour component of the informal sector was separately
estimated and added to wage income.
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Table V-2
FACTOR SHARES AND RATE OF RETURN TO CAPITAL
Argentina 1974 1980 1986 1991 1997
Labour/GDP 45 34.3 28 33.3 32
Surplus/GDP 55 65.7 72 66.6 68
Rate of return n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bolivia 1985 1989 1996
Labour/GDP 35.6 39.4 39.8
Surplus/GDP 64.4 60.6 60.2
Rate of return 13.7 13.4 14.6
Chile 1970 1987 1996
Labour/GDP 47.8 42.9 48.0
Surplus/GDP 52.2 57.1 52.0
Rate of return n.a. 15.1 15.4
Colombia 1988 1993 1995
Labour/GDP 42.7 45.0 46.3
Surplus/GDP 57.3 55.0 53.7
Rate of return 31 22.1 23.3
Costa Rica 1988 1995
Labour/GDP 56.3 60.1
Surplus/GDP 43.7 39.9
Rate of return 101.9 91.2
Jamaica 1989 1993 1996
Labour/GDP 51.2 50.9 50.6
Surplus/GDP 48.8 49.1 49.4
Rate of return n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mexico 1982-87 1989 1994 1995 1996
Labour/GDP 46.6 35.3 42.6 37.4 35.7
Surplus/GDP 53.4 64.7 57.4 62.6 64.3
Rate of return 14.5 12 10 7.5 7.5
Peru 1985 1991 1994 1996
Labour/GDP 30.5 24.9 24.4 23.0
Surplus/GDP 69.5 75.1 75.6 77.0
Rate of return n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: Consultant reports.
Note: The 1974 observation for Argentina is taken from Luis Beccaria, “Distribución del ingreso
en la Argentina: explorando lo sucedido desde mediados de los setenta”, Desarrollo económico,
vol. 31, No. 123, (October-December 1991, table 1). That source gives a value for the labour share
for 1980 of 35%, which is comparable to the remainder of the series.
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in Bolivia and Chile after 1987, while it fell in Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.
At the very least, there is no evidence of any increase in the return to capital.
Taken together, the available evidence from the factor markets indicates
that growth has been more skill intensive during the post-reform period, but
not necessarily more capital intensive. In fact, trends in capital intensity and
the skill differential show very little relation. Furthermore, the rate of return
to capital and possibly the share of capital in national income appear to have
fallen, although the evidence is incomplete and unsatisfactory. If true, that
pattern is consistent with the clear message of the previous chapter on the
progressive effect of capital account liberalization. It is also consistent with
trade reform having reduced monopoly profits in protected sectors, as pointed
out by Londoño and Székely (1997).
C. The Link between Labour Market Performance
and Inequality
Public discussions of performance under the new economic model
repeatedly cite low rates of employment creation and a mismatch between
jobs and skills as two of the main culprits for rising inequality in the region.
The argument is that because of skill-intensive growth, not enough jobs are
being created in most countries, and what jobs there are require too much
skill. Unemployment has therefore risen, putting downward pressure on
wages for the least skilled, while strong demand for skills has pushed up
wages for the more educated. This hypothetical description is logically
consistent, but it does not adequately reflect what has actually been happening
in many, if not most, of the nine countries in the sample.
This section presents a number of indicators of labour market
performance, and then looks for a relation between changes in those indicators
in the post-reform period and changes in the primary distribution of earnings.
This analysis is based on the distribution across those who earn income (the
primary distribution) rather than the household distribution (see table V-1).
How should labour market performance be measured? One indicator is
the growth in the total number of jobs, but that measure suffers from differences
across countries and over time in the growth rate of the labour force. It is
possible to correct for that by calculating the occupation rate, which is the
percentage of those of working age who actually hold jobs. That is surely a
better indicator of performance than the growth rate of jobs, but it is affected
by changes in the participation rate. In several of the countries in the sample
(Argentina being the most obvious example), job growth was faster than the
growth of the working-aged population, so that the occupation rate increased.
That would appear to be positive, but large increases in the participation rate,
particularly for women, caused the unemployment rate to rise at the same
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time, since job creation was not fast enough to keep pace with the growth rate
of the labour force. An economy should get positive marks if it can raise its
occupation rate. For those interested in the distribution of earnings, however,
unemployment is also relevant, since a rise in the unemployment rate will
probably exert downward pressure on the wages of unskilled and hence
upward pressure on the skill differential. Countries in which the
unemployment rate rises should get a negative mark, even if they have rapid
job creation at the same time. Finally, a measure of the skill intensity of the
jobs being created would be valuable. Possibilities include the percentage of
professionals among the new jobs, jobs in the so-called informal sector, the
proportion of salaried jobs among the new jobs and the wage differential itself.
Each of these may have some relation to wage inequality.
Table V-3 gathers together some of these indicators for the post-reform
period. Whenever possible, the starting and ending dates for the tables below
coincide with the observed data on the primary earnings distribution shown
in table V-1.
Judging by the growth rate of employment, the unemployment rate and
the occupation rate, Bolivia, Chile and Peru are the clear leaders in labour
market performance, while Brazil, Colombia and Jamaica are the clear laggards.
In all three of the leaders, the growth rate of jobs exceeded by a wide margin
the growth rate of both the working-aged population and the labour force.
Economic growth was translated into falling unemployment and rising real
wages. The three lagging countries had exactly the opposite situation. They
had low growth in jobs, rising unemployment and, except for Colombia, falling
participation rates. However, these three countries also enjoyed healthy
increases in the average real wage –not as large as the leaders, but not
insignificant either.
Clearly, differences in overall economic growth rates are the main reason
for the difference in performance between the leaders and laggards. In the
three leaders, GDP grew by an average of 6.2%, while in the laggards it grew
by only 3.3%. This does not mean that the leaders’ success derived from labour-
intensive growth. That is true for Bolivia where, if the numbers are reliable,
employment grew 50% faster than output, but it is not true for either Chile or
Peru. Job growth was rapid because economic growth was rapid. In the
laggards, low overall economic growth was complicated by the lowest
employment-output elasticities in the sample. In Brazil and Colombia, what
little growth occurred was labour saving.
The remaining three countries are harder to classify. Argentina, Costa
Rica and Mexico all had employment growth rates close to the growth rate in
their working-aged populations. The difference between them and the leaders
or laggards hinges more on their participation rates than on the growth rate
of employment. Argentina, for example, experienced a serious rise in
unemployment during the 1990s, but that does not reflect a lack of job creation.
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Table V-3
INDICATORS OF LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE
COUNTRY PERIOD INITIAL YEAR FINAL YEAR
Argentina
Occupation rate 1991-97 59.8 62.6
Unemployment rate 1990-97 7.5 16.1
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 1.7
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 100.2
Primary distribution 1991-96 .268 .283
Bolivia
Occupation rate 1989-96 52.8 56.4
Unemployment rate 1989-96 9.5 4.2
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 6.6
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 123.0
Primary distribution (urban) 1989-96 .486 .595
Brazil
Occupation rate 1992-97 61.5 60.1
Unemployment rate 1990-97 4.3 5.8
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 1.2
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 106.0
Primary distribution 1990-97 .700 .710
Chile
Occupation rate 1990-96 51.6 54.4
Unemployment rate 1987-97 11.9 7.2
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 2.5
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 132.0
Primary distribution 1987-96 .653 .636
Colombia
Occupation rate 1988-95 56.8 58.1
Unemployment rate 1990-97 10.3 13.2
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 1.4
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 110.0
Primary distribution (urban) 1988-96 .432 .457
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COUNTRY PERIOD INITIAL YEAR FINAL YEAR
Costa Rica
Occupation rate 1990-96 53.5 52.2
Unemployment rate 1988-96 6.3 6.6
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 2.7
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 110.0
Primary distribution 1988-95 .490 .478
Jamaica
Occupation rate 1989-96 69.8 68.4
Unemployment rate see note
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 1.2
Average real wage 1990-97 see note
Family distribution 1989-96 .313 .252
Mexico
Occupation rate 1991-96 53.6 55.4
Unemployment rate 1989-96 2.9 5.5
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 2.9
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 101.0
Primary distribution 1989-96 .270 .290
Peru
Occupation rate 1991-97 58.0 67.8
Unemployment rate 1990-96 8.3 7.9
Growth rate of jobs 1990-97 3.8
Average real wage 1990-97 100.0 110.0
Primary distribution 1991-96 .502 .485
Sources: Unemployment from ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, Santiago, Chile (various
years); primary distribution from table V-1; other data from Jürgen Weller, Reformas económicas,
crecimiento y empleo: los mercados de trabajo en América Latina, Santiago, Chile, ECLAC and Fondo
de Cultura Económica (2000).
Note: Exact numerical estimates are not available for unemployment and the real wage for Jamaica,
but Weller notes that the real wage rose in the 1990s and unemployment was constant.
The growth rate of jobs was just about equal to the growth rate of the working-
aged population (1.7% compared to 1.8%). Instead, it reflects a significant
increase in the participation rate, particularly among women. Despite rapid
growth, the Argentine economy was unable to create enough jobs to absorb
these new entrants into the labour force. Costa Rica and Mexico display a
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similar situation. They both had good growth rates of employment, higher in
fact than Chile’s. However, a combination of rising participation rates and
relatively rapid growth rates of the working-aged population increased the
unemployment rate in both countries.
Which countries had relatively skill-intensive growth? Weller (2000) compares
the change in the share of each education group in total employment to the change
in the share of the same education group in the potential labour force. If growth is
skill intensive, the change in the share of the more educated in employment should
exceed the change in the potential labour force. The opposite should be observed
for the less educated. That is exactly the pattern Weller observes for Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, where employment growth was relatively
skill intensive. The opposite was true, however, for two of the three successes –
namely, Bolivia and Peru. In both of those countries, employment growth for the
less educated exceeded the growth of the potential labour force, and yet these
two countries display the most rapid growth in the skill differential (see table V-
1). For some reason, skill intensity does not seem to be closely associated with
changes in the skill differential.
Weller’s approach is also useful for investigating the relation between
the labour market data and the primary earnings distribution, by grading the
performance of the labour market according to four characteristics that ought
to have an impact on the distribution. Weller assigns a value of one to
favourable changes over the period of analysis, zero to an insignificant change
and minus one to an unfavourable change. The four characteristics chosen
here are the changes in the unemployment rate, the occupation rate, the growth
in real wages and the growth in salaried employment (a proxy for good jobs).
The overall ranking is the simple sum of the four. This is admittedly a
somewhat arbitrary selection and weighting, but it gives a rough quantification
of the performance of the labour market (see table V-4).
Figure V-2 graphically represents the relation between the “totals listed
in table V-4 and the change in the primary distribution shown in table V-3.
Clearly there is not a particularly close relation between the performance
index and changes in the primary distribution. In particular, there are two
outliers: Bolivia and Jamaica. In the case of Jamaica, the data are not really
comparable with that of the other countries for two reasons: first, it is based
on per capita expenditure distribution rather than the primary earnings
distribution, which is not available, and it is the only economy in which per
capita income was declining. The Jamaican economy did not have a positive
reaction to the reform package. In the case of Bolivia, very rapid employment
growth –the fastest in the sample– was coupled with falling unemployment
and rising real wages. In terms of distribution, however, this favourable climate
was offset by a very rapidly rising wage differential in favour of skilled labour,
in spite of the fact that growth was not particularly skill intensive. It seems
that the very rapid overall employment growth raised the wage differential
for skilled labour, even in the absence of rising skill intensity, perhaps because
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Figure V-2
LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE AND PRIMARY DISTRIBUTION
Source: Tables V-3 and V-4.
Table V-4
INDICATORS OF LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE IN THE 1990s
COUNTRY UNEMPLOYMENT OCCUPATION SALARIED REAL WAGES TOTAL
RATE  EMPLOYMENT
Argentina -1 1 1 0 1
Bolivia 1 1 -1 1 2
Brazil -1 -1 0 1 -1
Chile 1 1 1 1 4
Colombia -1 1 -1 1 0
Costa Rica -1 -1 0 1 -1
Jamaica 0 -1 1 1 1
Mexico -1 1 1 0 1
Peru 1 1 -1 1 2
Source: Author’s calculations based on methodology in Jürgen Weller, Reformas económicas,
crecimiento y empleo: los mercados de trabajo en América Latina, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and Fondo de Cultura Económica (2000). There
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of the rising premium paid to the combination of education and experience in
buoyant labour market conditions.
The remaining seven countries seem to demonstrate a roughly negative
relation between labour market performance and inequality. The more jobs
are created, the more unemployment declines, and the more real wages go
up, the more likely it is that earnings inequality will decline. Obviously many
factors other than labour market conditions influence the earnings distribution,
but the evidence here suggests that adequate employment growth and rising
real wages have an important levelling effect.
D. Patterns of Sectoral Growth in the 1970s and 1990s
One of the ways by which the reforms could be expected to affect the
earnings distribution would be if they particularly favoured those sectors that
are big users of either skilled or unskilled labour. That is, reforms could affect
the sectoral composition of demand, and that, in turn, could affect the relative
skill intensity of labour demand. The evidence does not support that
hypothesis, however. For the most part, the same sectors that were leaders in
the 1970s before the reforms were still the leaders in the 1990s, and the same is
true of lagging sectors.
To demonstrate this, the sector growth rates at the one-digit level were
collected for the 1970s and 1990s in eight of the countries. Table V-5 classifies
all these sectors into four groups: those that led in both periods (leaders),
those that lagged in both periods (laggards), those that led in the 1970s but
lagged in the 19990s (losers) and those that lagged in the 1970s but led in the
1990s (winners).
It seems clear from the table that the reforms have not led to dramatic
changes in the sectoral characteristics of growth. Those sectors that had above
or below average growth rates in the 1970s tended to continue the same pattern
in the 1990s. The finance, electricity, transportation and communications
sectors were generally leaders in both periods, while agriculture and housing
were laggards. Altogether, sectors switched position in only 27 cases, compared
to 49 cases in which the sector kept the same classification.
After the reforms, countries were more open, but for the most part they
did not switch towards the tradable goods sectors (i.e., agriculture, mining
and manufacturing). Indeed, looking at the winners and losers columns, more
of the losers than the winners come from these three sectors. That becomes
even more obvious on considering that agriculture in Brazil and Mexico, which
accounts for two of the winners in column four, actually switched positions
because the overall growth rate fell sharply in both countries between the
1970s and the 1990s, not because agriculture itself grew more rapidly. Indeed,
its growth rate fell in both cases, but not as much as the growth rate of the
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Table V-5
LEADING AND LAGGING SECTORS IN THE 1970s AND 1990s
LAGGARDS a LEADERS a LOSERS a WINNERS a
ARGENTINA AGRICULTURE, FINANCE, ELECTRICITY, SERVICES MANUFACTURING,
GOVERNMENT COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION  TRANSPORT
BOLIVIA MINING, COMMERCE FINANCE, TRANSPORT, GOVERNMENT, SERVICES, CONSTRUCTION
MANUFACTURING, AGRICULTURE
ELECTRICITY
BRAZIL — TRANSPORT, MINING, CONSTRUCTION AGRICULTURE,
MANUFACTURING, COMMERCE
ELECTRICITY
CHILE MANUFACTURING, ELECTRICITY, CONSTRUCTION, AGRICULTURE, MINING, —
GOVERNMENT COMMERCE, TRANSPORT,  SERVICES
FINANCE
COLOMBIA AGRICULTURE, MINING, COMMERCE, TRANSPORT, MANUFACTURING, CONSTRUCTION, FINANCE
FINANCE, HOUSING  GOVERNMENT, SERVICES  ELECTRICITY
COSTA RICA AGRICULTURE, FINANCE, TRANSPORT, CONSTRUCTION, GOVERNMENT, COMMERCE
HOUSING  ELECTRICITY, SERVICES
MANUFACTURING
MEXICO — MINING, MANUFACTURING, — AGRICULTURE
ELECTRICITY, COMMERCE,
TRANSPORT, CONSTRUCTION
PERU AGRICULTURE, FINANCE, TRANSPORT, GOVERNMENT, MANUFACTURING
HOUSING COMMERCE, CONSTRUCTION, SERVICES,
ELECTRICITY  MINING
TOTAL 14 35 17 10
Source: ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile (various years).
a See text for definitions.
whole economy. The only clear switches among the tradable goods sectors
are the post-reform gains in manufacturing in Peru and Argentina and the
loss in Colombia. The government sector provides another example of the
effect of the adoption of reforms. Of the six countries for which data are
available, government is a clear loser in three reforming countries and a laggard
in two others. Only in Colombia is government a leading sector in both periods.
The relative stability in patterns of growth implied in table V-5 may seem
surprising, but in fact it illustrates an important feature of any growth process.
Most of the demand for sectoral output is induced through the multiplier
effects of exogenous spending, which could come from exports, government
spending, the replacement of imports or investment. Whatever the source,
differences in sectoral income elasticities and backward linkages to
intermediate products almost guarantee that manufacturing, finance,
transportation and some services will be leaders, that agriculture will be a
laggard and that commerce and services will reflect the overall growth rate of
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the economy. In other words, the effects of any change in exogenous conditions
will be less marked by the time they work their way though a country’s input-
output table and its demand system. Even when the reform process triggers
rapid growth in some export commodities, the factors that produce those
exports are likely to spend their income in about the same way as the factors
in some previous leading sector. The result of all this is a relatively stable
pattern of sectoral growth rates. This, in turn, implies a relatively stable pattern
of growth rates in the demand for skilled and unskilled labour.
Generally speaking, growth was relatively skill intensive: the wage
differential in favour of university graduates widened in every case but Chile.
However, that could not have been caused by changes in sectoral growth rates
due to the reforms. It is more likely to have been the result of the pressures of
competition in the more open economy, overall trends in the nature of
technology and the effects of restructuring during privatization. These
regressive trends raised the skill differential, but they were not sufficiently
abrupt to offset the beneficial effects of reducing the share of unskilled labour.
As a result, the overall earnings distribution in most countries did not change
much over the course of the 1990s.
E. What Explains the Big Increases in Inequality in Chile,
Argentina and Mexico?
Obviously, none of the above discussion implies that income distributions
are always constant. Rapid changes have frequently occurred over quite short
periods. Three episodes, in particular, demand an explanation because they
are not cyclic: Chile in 1970-1987, Argentina in 1974-1986 and Mexico in 1984-
1989. These significant, one-time upward shifts in inequality have never been
reversed. If distributions tend to be constant apart from variations over income
cycles, what factors explain these three exceptions, and are they linked to the
adoption of reforms?
Both Argentina and Chile implemented a significant part of their reform
programmes prior to the mid-1980s. Chile’s aggregate reform index rose from
.32 in 1973 to .72 in 1987, making Chile the second most reformed country in
the region. Argentina did less, but its index rose from .41 in 1976, when the
reforms started, to .61 in 1986 and to .81 in 1990 (Morley, Machado and
Pettinato, 1999). In both countries, commercial, financial and tax reforms were
the central components of the early reform programme. Mexico, in contrast,
began its trade and financial reforms in the 1985-1987 period by eliminating
quantitative import restrictions and narrowing tariff differentials. The changes
it implemented were far less dramatic than those in the Southern Cone, partly
because Mexico had always had lower tariffs than Argentina and Chile (Ros,
1999). The policy change took place during the long downturn that followed
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the 1982 debt crisis in Mexico, a period in which real wages contracted, the
skill differential widened and the factor distribution shifted towards profits
(Székely, 1998, pp. 64-67; Ros, 1999, table 5).27
All three countries suffered macroeconomic instability and inflation
during the relevant periods. Chile went through two severe recessions between
1973 and 1987, and Argentina had three between 1976 and 1990, though none
were quite as severe as the 1982-1983 downturn in Chile. Mexico also
experienced recession or stagnation conditions in the 1984-1989 period, with
output per capita 6% lower in 1989 than it had been five years earlier.
Another factor that characterizes Chile and Argentina, but not Mexico, is
a change in the treatment of labour accompanying a change of political regime.
The two reforming military governments effectively curtailed unions,
increased labour market flexibility and generally reduced the bargaining
power of labour vis-à-vis management.28  In Chile the military government
reduced the coverage of the minimum wage, relaxed conditions for dismissal
of workers, suspended labour unions, closed the labour courts, limited the
permissible activities of labour unions and encouraged the organization of
competing labour unions within enterprises (Ffrench-Davis and Raczynski,
1990, p. 8.). In Argentina under the military regimes between 1976 and 1983,
union activities were prohibited and wage increases were set by the
government. This new labour market regime, combined with rising inflation
and the drastic recession after 1982, led to a sharp decline in real wages between
1976 and 1983 (Beccaria, 1991; Altimir and Beccaria, 1999a).
It is impossible to determine what role each of these three factors played
in rising inequality, but the combination of recurrent recession, commercial
liberalization and a change in the treatment of labour best explains the one-
time upward shift in inequality in these three countries.
Why didn’t the other countries in the region have the same experience
that Chile and Argentina did with reforms? First of all, all the other countries
adopted the reforms in the 1990s, a period that was relatively free of the violent
fluctuations observed in the 1980s. This helped avoid significant increases in
inequality, because recessions typically have a strong negative impact on the
distribution of income (Morley, 1995; Ravallion and Chen, 1997). Colombia
and Costa Rica carried out their reforms gradually and without serious
recessions. In that environment, the reforms had little effect on distribution.
Bolivia and Peru made sudden, quite drastic reforms, but they both did so as
27 In addition, the guaranteed price for maize and beans declined sharply, and the per hectare yield fell
by 25% between 1984 and 1989 (Székely, 1998, p. 69).
28 These two cases seem somewhat similar to Brazil in the 1963-1980 period. Brazil had a reforming
military government that sharply curtailed labour bargaining power in the context of a successful
inflation control programme and a first round of tariff reductions. The result was a long period of
rapid growth, wage stagnation and a one-time upward shift in inequality, which has so far not been
reversed.
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part of a broad stabilization package that stopped hyperinflation. Any
regressive impacts of reforms were more than offset by the favourable impact
of stopping hyperinflation.
Whenever there were large shifts in distribution, they accompanied big
changes in wage differentials or real wages and in the share of profits, which
took place during periods of high inflation, recession, very rapid growth or
changes in regime. But the 1990s were not marked by very rapid growth,
except perhaps in the case of Chile. Nor were there cases of hyperinflation or
deep recessions (up to 1998) of the sort that would cause the sudden sharp
swings in wage differentials or the profit share that would swamp the long-
run effects of changes in the education structure. And in these changes, the




THE COMPONENTS OF INCOME INEQUALITY
So far, this book has examined the determinants of inequality and the
impact of reform by constructing an econometric model of the distribution of
family income and by comparing inequality before and after the reforms.
Another way to better understand the determinants of inequality is to look
more closely at the inequality indexes themselves, searching for clues as to
what is making them change as they do, or in some cases not change in spite
of events that might be expected to cause changes. This chapter and the next
conduct an exercise of this sort. While such an exercise does not directly
measure the impact of growth or reform on inequality, it highlights the role of
education, skill, experience, sector and gender as contributors to both the level
and the type of change in inequality.
The exercise starts by separating the total population into a number of
groups, by education, location, sector, occupation, age and gender, and then
calculating an inequality index and average income for each group. These
inequality indexes are indicators of how much of overall inequality is due to
differences in the mean income between the various groups and how much
comes from inequality within the groups. The greater the proportion of
inequality explained by the differences in mean income between the groups,
the more significant is this particular characteristic of the population as a source
of inequality.
This sort of decomposition is particularly useful for understanding
changes in the level of inequality. By carrying out the decomposition at different
points in time, it is possible to measure how much of the change in inequality
comes from changes in average income between the groups and how much
from change in inequality within the groups. This methodology is used here
to measure how far changes in wage differentials between education classes
115
116 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
have contributed to changes in inequality during the post-reform period. The
next chapter uses the same technique to study those at the top of the income
distribution as a source of inequality.
The decomposition of inequality has been slowed down by the
widespread use of the Gini coefficient, which does not decompose easily. An
alternative measure that does is the Theil index shown in equation VI-1. The
Theil index is defined as the weighted average of the log of the relative income
of each member of a population, where the weights are in the income share of
each individual.
T = ∑i yiln(yi/pi)            (VI-1)
yi is the income share of the ith individual
pi is the population share of the ith individual
The Theil index varies between zero, for perfect equality, and the log of
the number of individuals in the population, for perfect inequality. It may
seem odd that the index is sensitive to the size of the sample, but this
characteristic reflects the idea that the amount of inequality should be higher
when there are more individuals with no income relative to those with income.
Following Theil (1972), imagine a society with two individuals, one of whom
has all the money. The Theil in this case is log2. If 999,998 individuals are
added to the group without income, there are now one million individuals in
all, one of whom has all the money. Inequality is surely greater in the second
society than the first, and this is reflected in the value of the Theil, which rises
from log2 to log106.
Equation VI-1 can be rewritten to show how the overall index can be
decomposed or expressed as a sum of two individual components, one
expressing differences in average incomes between subgroups, and the other
differences of income or inequality within each subgroup. After first dividing
the population into the groups of interest, equation VI-1 can be rewritten as
follows:
T = ∑i yi ln(yi/pi) + ∑iyiTi            (VI-2)
yi is the income share of the ith group
pi is the population share of the ith group
Ti is the Theil index for the ith group
The first term on the right hand side of the equation is a weighted average
of the differences in average incomes among the various subgroups. It is
natural to call this component the “between groups” component of total
inequality. The second term on the right hand side is a weighted average of
the Theil index for each subgroup, where the weight is the share of the group
in total income. It measures the amount of inequality within each of the
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29 In the case of Jamaica, the contribution of education is less, but this survey refers to family expenditure
per capita and is therefore not really comparable to the primary distributions of the other eight
surveys.
subgroups and is therefore called the “within group” component. This
breakdown is used in the following tables to help identify sources of inequality
and changes in inequality.
A. Decompositions of Inequality
The decomposition shown in equation VI-2 were performed on the sample
of nine countries, using sub-groups based on education, occupation, age,
gender and location. The results are displayed in tables VI-1 to VI-4.
The left-hand columns are the indexes themselves. In most cases they are
the same values shown earlier in table V-1. The columns labelled “variation
within groups” show the proportion of inequality coming from differences in
income among the members of each of the groups. The “variation between
groups” columns show the fraction due to differences in average incomes
between the different groups. With that as an introduction, what do the tables
suggest about the sources of inequality in the nine-country sample?
Differences between mean incomes across different education levels are
the single most important determinant of inequality. According to table VI-1,
variation between groups explains anywhere from a fifth to a third of inequality
in the primary distribution.29  Furthermore, that proportion increased in every
country except Brazil and Chile. In some cases, such as Bolivia and Peru, the
differences between the pre- and post-reform surveys are very large. This
evidence is consistent with the evidence on trends in the skill differential, except
for Jamaica and Costa Rica (see table V-1). It suggests that differences in
education, which have always been an important factor in the distribution, have
become even more important in recent years. As for Costa Rica, the measure of
the skill differential is dominated by the relative income of university graduates.
A separate decomposition for Costa Rica shows an almost constant between-
group contribution to total inequality for university graduates alone.
Differences in average income across occupations are the second largest
source of inequality after education, accounting for anywhere from 20% to
38% of the total (see table VI-2). Each survey features a different breakdown
of occupations, but the typical one includes employees, informal sector or
self-employed, owner or employer and in some cases government and
agriculture. In the nationwide surveys, a good part of the inequality must
have come from the low wages of agricultural labourers. As in the case of
education, the proportion of total inequality accounted for by interoccupational
differences in average incomes generally increased.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































122 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
Neither age nor gender appears to be important sources of inequality.
Breaking down the population into age groups shows that differences in
average incomes between cohorts constitute no more than 5-10% of total
inequality, and no significant change occurred between the pre- and post-
reform situations, except possibly in the case of Bolivia (see table VI-3). The
case of gender, which is not shown in the tables, requires explanation.
According to the decompositions, the between-group contribution of gender
never reaches more than 5% of total inequality, although that does not mean
that there is no inequality in earnings between men and women. According to
IDB cross-country data the gender earnings differential varied from 5% in
Paraguay to 35% in Brazil (IDB, 1998, table 2.5). That is only one of the factors
determining the between-group Theil index, however. In the Theil formula, the
between-group component is the sum of the logs of relative incomes weighted
by the relevant income share. Consequently, the smaller the proportion of women
to men in the labour force, the smaller is the between-group Theil, holding
relative average incomes constant. One of the reasons gender differences do
not generally contribute much to overall inequality is that the size of the female
labour force is small relative to the male. To put it another way, most of the
income is earned by males, partly because they earn more, but mainly because
there are so many more of them in the labour force. Therefore, inequality within
the male group is the main contributor to total inequality.
Finally table VI-4 shows a rural-urban disaggregation. Rural-urban
income differentials are large, so it is somewhat surprising to see that they
have such a small effect on national inequality. As in the case of gender, the
reason is not that income differences do not exist, but rather that the population
classified as living in the rural sector is not very large. In Brazil (the only
study for which detailed information is available), the rural population was
only 23% of the total (in 1997). Thus, even though rural average income was
less than half the corresponding urban figure, the smallness of the rural
population reduces the impact of these differences to only 7.5% of total
inequality. Indeed, eliminating the difference between the rural and national
average income would only reduce inequality by 2.3 percentage points, or
about 4%. In other words, to reduce inequality in Brazil, or almost anywhere
else in Latin America, efforts must focus on the areas that encompass most of
the people and income, and these are in the urban sector.
Another interesting result arises from the comparison of the rural-urban
differential before and after the reforms. There is a good deal of evidence that
the rural sector did not do as well as the urban sector in the 1990s. The data
here do not show that, except for Mexico in 1994. In all the other countries,
the between-group contribution of rural-urban differentials fell in the 1990s.
This first look at the decomposition data points to two conclusions. First,
education and occupation are the only two characteristics for which between-
group differences in average income really matter. Second, most of the
inequality comes from within the groups, not between them. Even for
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education and occupation, the between-group fraction of total inequality is
less than one-third in all but a few cases. Personal characteristics other than
level of education or position held are still the main sources of inequality in
the region, despite the rise in the skill or occupation income differentials in
the post-reform period.
B. The Effect of Changes in Education and Skill Differentials
One of the puzzles that requires an explanation is why the overall
distribution is so rigid in so many countries despite rising wage differentials
and skill-intensive growth. Wage differentials increased in eight of the nine
countries, yet in four of these (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Jamaica) the
distribution hardly moved at all in the 1990s. In Chile, the distribution was
similarly constant, but the wage differential decreased slightly. Only Peru
demonstrates an unambiguous trend, and it is progressive in spite of a
significant rise in the skill differential. Mexico and Colombia are special cases
in that the aggregate distribution data conceal significant shifts among the
component parts (a fall in the profit share offsetting rising wage inequality in
Mexico and a fall in rural inequality offsetting rising urban inequality in
Colombia). In Bolivia, inequality is lower now than it was in 1985, but it is
higher than in 1989. Why doesn’t earnings inequality follow the trend of wage
inequality?
A number of different factors affect the education decomposition in any
analysis over time. These include changes in relative incomes between groups,
changes in inequality within groups and, most important, changes in the sizes
of the groups. Some of these factors are equalizing and some are disequalizing.
Their various effects seem to be largely mutually offsetting in the nine countries
studied here. The important implication is that rising wage differentials do
not necessarily imply rising earnings inequality. More often than not,
reductions in within-group income variance and changes in population
weights offset the disequalizing effect of widening skill differentials.
Since the proportion of between-group inequality increased in every case
but Brazil, it follows that within-group inequality must have fallen either
relatively or even absolutely in those cases where overall inequality declined.
A closer look at the countries for which detailed information is available
indicates that the reduction in within-group inequality occurred among those
with primary education or less. Those at the top of the education pyramid
saw an increase in within-group inequality, but it did not offset the reduction
in inequality among those at the bottom. For example, in Costa Rica the within-
group contribution of those with incomplete primary schooling fell by five
points between 1988 and 1995, while it rose by two points for the university
graduates (Trejos, 1999, table B-11). In Colombia the within-group Theil for
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those with less than five years’ schooling fell 3.4 points, just about offsetting a
rise of 2.6 points for university graduates (Cárdenas and Bernal, 1999, table
1). That suggests that the post-reform economies have either equalized incomes
for workers at the bottom or reduced the size of the group while creating
special earnings opportunities for an expanding sub-group of winners at the
top. In most cases, the gains in equity among the poor are bigger than the
losses of equity among the rich, such that overall within-group inequality has
declined, either relatively or absolutely.
On balance, it seems that in most countries (even those with rising wage
inequality) these various effects just about cancel each other out and the
distribution appears to be roughly stable. To show how this process works
numerically, tables VI-5, VI-6 and VI-7 present detailed country cases using
actual data from Brazil, Argentina and Peru. In all three cases, the aggregate
inequality indexes are roughly constant or declining (except for Argentina
between 1976 and 1980), yet their wage differentials and between-group
inequality are generally rising.
Table VI-5
BRAZIL: EFFECT OF CHANGES IN EDUCATION STRUCTURE
LEVEL OF SCHOOLING POPULATION INCOME THEIL CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION TOTAL




0 years 0.2458 0.0997 0.4600 0.0459 -0.0900
1-4 years 0.4377 0.3215 0.5700 0.1833 -0.0992
5-8 years 0.1824 0.1940 0.6700 0.1300 0.0119
9-12 years 0.0892 0.1612 0.5500 0.0887 0.0954
13-16 years 0.0417 0.1964 0.3500 0.0687 0.3045
>16 years 0.0032 0.0272 0.3600 0.0098 0.0585
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.5263 0.2811 0.8074
1997
0 years 0.1339 0.0490 0.4900 0.0240 -0.0493
1-4 years 0.3365 0.1999 0.5700 0.1140 -0.1041
5-8 years 0.2445 0.1812 0.5400 0.0978 -0.0543
9-12 years 0.1978 0.2460 0.5400 0.1328 0.0536
13-16 years 0.0789 0.2672 0.5000 0.1336 0.3258
>16 years 0.0083 0.0567 0.4100 0.0232 0.1086
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.5255 0.2803 0.8058
Simulations
76p97y 0.5250 0.2379 0.7629
76y97p 0.5083 0.3020 0.8104
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Table VI-6
ARGENTINA: EFFECT OF CHANGES IN EDUCATION STRUCTURE
LEVEL OF SCHOOLING POPULATION INCOME THEIL CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION TOTAL




Less than primary 0.2682 0.2047 0.1248 0.0256 -0.0552
Primary and
incomplete secondary 0.5322 0.5065 0.1548 0.0784 -0.0251
Secondary and
incomplete university 0.1706 0.2226 0.1315 0.0293 0.0593
University 0.0290 0.0661 0.1774 0.0117 0.0545
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.1450 0.0334 0.1784
1980
Less than primary 0.1969 0.1335 0.1339  0.0179 -0.0519
Primary and
incomplete secondary 0.5728 0.4868 0.1926 0.0938 -0.0792
Secondary and
incomplete university 0.1862 0.2600 0.1975 0.0513 0.0867
University 0.0444 0.1201 0.1972 0.0237 0.1194
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.1867 0.0750 0.2617
1997
Less than primary 0.0698 0.0406 0.1207  0.0049 -0.0220
Primary and
incomplete secondary 0.4920 0.3459 0.1433  0.1496 -0.1219
Secondary and
incomplete university 0.3287 0.3670 0.1996 0.0733 0.0405
University 0.1096 0.2465 0.2427 0.0598 0.1999
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.1876 0.0965 0.2841
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Table VI-7
PERU: EFFECT OF CHANGES IN EDUCATION STRUCTURE
LEVEL OF SCHOOLING POPULATION INCOME THEIL CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION TOTAL




No schooling 0.0435 0.0210 0.4732 0.0100 -0.0153
Primary 0.3213 0.2285 0.5257 0.1201 -0.0778
Incomplete secondary 0.1704 0.1352 0.5106 0.0690 -0.0313
Complete secondary 0.2646 0.2819 0.5076 0.1431 0.0179
Non-univ. higher
 education 0.0548 0.0771 0.3167 0.0244 0.0263
University 0.1455 0.2562 0.4127 0.1058 0.1451
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.4724 0.0649 0.5372
1996
No schooling 0.0197 0.0093 0.1203 0.0011 -0.0070
Primary 0.2103 0.1477 0.3316 0.0490 -0.0522
Incomplete secondary 0.1587 0.1169 0.2686 0.0314 -0.0357
Complete secondary 0.3075 0.2548 0.2699 0.0688 -0.0479
Non-univ. higher
education 0.1259 0.1343 0.2691 0.0361 0.0087
University 0.1779 0.3369 0.3505 0.1181 0.2151
Total 1.0000 1.0000 0.3045 0.0810 0.3855
The left-hand columns of the tables show the population and income
shares and the within-group Theil for each year in each country. The right
hand columns, namely, the contribution of inequality within and between
groups, show the components of equation VI-2. Those components sum to
the within and between figures for the entire sample that are shown in the
total. In Argentina in 1974, for example, the group with less than primary
education comprised 27% of the labour force and earned 20% of total income.
Their Theil was .1248. According to the formula, the within-group component
of total inequality is the income share times the group’s Theil, or
.205*.1248=.0256. The level of detail in these tables is perhaps tedious, but it is
only by looking at the details that one can really understand at a statistical
level what is changing the distribution. In particular, the stastistics can trace
the impact of changes in education structure and inequality within each group
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to changes in aggregate inequality.
A word of caution is in order with regard to the entries for the contribution
of inequality between groups. Those entries are defined as the income share
of the group multiplied by the log of the relative income share of the group
(yi/pi). As for within-group contribution, these components sum to the
between-group Theil. However, unlike the within-group components, one
cannot read any significance into the individual elements in the table. In
particular, they do not represent the contribution of the sub-group to between-
group inequality.
All three countries feature a significant upgrading of the educational
profile of the labour force. For Peru the population share of the group with
primary education or less fell from 36% to 22% between 1985 and 1996, while
for Argentina it fell from 27% to 7% between 1974 and 1997. Since the skill
differential also increased in those two countries, the between-group Theil
went up too (from .145 to .187 in Argentina and from .065 to .081 in Peru). In
Brazil the between-group Theil also fell, reflecting a reduction in the gap
between the earnings of the two bottom income groups.
Together, the trends in inequality within each group and the relative level
of inequality between groups drive the distribution over time. In Brazil and
Peru intra-group inequality is higher for the less educated. Other things being
equal, in these two countries upgrading the education structure of the labour
force tends to reduce within-group inequality because it expands the groups
with relatively lower intra-group inequality. That factor, however, may be offset
or augmented by the trends in intra-group inequality themselves. In Peru the
two effects are complementary. Not only did the change in structure move people
into lower-variance education classifications, but the variance itself was falling.
The net effect was a very large reduction in within-group inequality (from .47
to .30), which overshadowed the two-point rise in the between-group Theil
due to rising wage differentials. Contrast that with Brazil. There, the progressive
effect of the move into lower-variance education classes was completely offset
by the rise in the intra-group inequality of the better educated.
In contrast to Brazil and Peru, the Theils in Argentina are higher for the
educated. That means that changes over time in education structure tend to
increase within-group inequality. In particular, the trend was for inequality to
increase among those with secondary or university education. Total within-
group inequality rose both because more people were in the high-variance
education groups and because the income variance in those groups rose.
The next step is to use the disaggregated data to look more closely at the
three cases. For Brazil, the question is how the distribution could have been
so stable over so long a period of time despite a big change in educational
structure and a rise in the wage differential. Brazil’s Theil was essentially
constant between 1976 and 1997. How did that happen?
First, the educational structure changed considerably over the period (see
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table VI-5). The proportion with four or fewer years of education fell from
68% of the labour force to 47%, while the group with more than high school
rose from 4.4% to 8.6%. As mentioned above, however, the within-group Theils
show that in both years the variance for the poorly educated was greater than
for the university and high school groups. Finally, the variance at the top
increased sharply over the period. This last point is crucial to understanding
why the distribution stayed constant.
Two simple simulations are displayed at the bottom of table VI-5. The
row labelled 76p97y calculates what the distribution would have been if the
1976 population had had the 1997 income structure, holding the within-group
Theils constant. A comparison of this simulated distribution with the actual
1976 distribution shows that the changes in relative incomes was progressive
(i.e., the 1976 Theil of .807 falls to .763 in the simulation). That is mainly because
the between-group Theil falls in the simulation. This may seem odd, given
that Brazil showed a rising wage differential between university and primary
school graduates in table V-1, but that is because the wage differential narrowed
between those with primary schooling and those with no education. This
simulation demonstrates that overall, the trend in wage differentials was
progressive in Brazil between 1976 and 1997 even though the wage ratio of
university graduates relative to workers with only primary schooling rose
from 8 to 9 over the period.
The second simulation (76y97p) shows the effect of raising the educational
level of the labour force between 1976 and 1997 while holding relative incomes
constant at their 1976 levels. In this case, the distribution is slightly less equal
(the Theil rises from .807 to .810). The between-group Theil rises a bit, but that
is offset by a fall in the within-group Theil. Keep in mind that the intra-group
Theils have not changed in this simulation. Rather the reduction comes from
reducing the share of the low-education groups which have the highest intra-
group income variance. In particular, the bottom two groups had high within-
group Theils in 1976, and the simulation dramatically lowers the weight of
these two groups in the total. Indeed, this shift is big enough to offset the
regressive effect of population shifts on the between-group Theil.
Gains at the bottom should have been enough to reduce inequality in
Brazil. That did not happen because of the interaction of improvements in
education with increasing variance for the top two education groups. The
high school graduates’ within-group Theil rose from .35 to .50, and for college
graduates it rose from .36 to .41. When that increase is combined with the rise
in the proportion of the labour force in those two groups, the regressive
interaction is just sufficient to offset the positive effect of changes in income
and educational structure considered separately. This interaction is consistent
with the shifts in the Kuznets curve due to the trend term in the chapter IV
regressions.
Tables VI-6 and VI-7 present details of the education breakdowns for
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Argentina and Peru. Each gives the income and population shares plus the
within-group Theils for each education group. That information pinpoints
why the distribution has or has not changed over time. For Argentina,
inequality rose sharply between 1974 and 1980, and remained roughly constant
since that time despite rising skill differentials. For Peru, the distribution
improved in spite of rising wage differentials.
Consider first the case of Argentina between 1974 and 1980, when the
country experienced a big jump in inequality that has never been reversed
(the Theil rose by 8.4 points or almost 50%, according to the last column in
table VI-6). Exactly half of that rise came from the between-group component
and the other half from the within-group element. The skill differential rose
sharply (see Table V-1), which increased the between-group Theil by 4.2 points
(from 3.3 to 7.5). At the same time, the variance of income increased in all of
the education groups and the population shifted toward the university and
secondary groups, which have a higher variance. That increased the within-
group Theil by 4.2 points. Both rising wage differentials and increasing
differences in income within all educational groups contributed to the big
jump in inequality.
Between 1980 and 1997, inequality increased further; virtually all of this
rise was attributable to the between-group component. Inequality also
widened for the two highest education classes, but this is just offset by
reductions at the bottom. Most of the increase in the between-group Theil
came from growth of the population in the high-income group, and not from
a widening of wage differentials, which actually fell over the period.
For Peru, table VI-7 indicates how the distribution improved between
1985 and 1996 in spite of a big increase in the skill differential. All of the
improvement was generated by a very big reduction in the variance in all
income classes, particularly the least educated. The rise in wage differentials
is reflected in a rise in the between-group component from 6.5 to 8.1, but that
is swamped by the fall in the within-groups component by 16.8 points.
C. Conclusions
The cross movements can be summarized as follows. Improvements in
education have moved people up the distribution, which is progressive
because a smaller fraction of the labour force is in the left-hand tail. This is
reinforced by the fact that the variance of income among the less educated is
often bigger than it is for the more educated. Thus reducing the size, or more
accurately the proportion, of the labour force with low education reduces total
within-group variance in the Theil decompositions at the same time that it
reduces between-group variance. Both of these effects are progressive. For
example, in Peru the reduction in the relative size of the group with no more
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than primary education between 1988 and 1995 reduced the within-group
Theil by 8 points, more than offsetting the regressive effect of rising wage
inequality (Saavedra and Diaz, 1999, p. 69). In Costa Rica the weighted within-
group Theil fell by 3.5 points, which was almost enough to offset all the other
factors that were pushing up inequality (Trejos, 1999, table B-10).
Offsetting this progressive change, however, is the fact that improving
education increases the right-hand tail of the distribution at the same time
that it reduces the left-hand tail. That tends to make the distribution less equal.
In addition, skill-intensive growth in the 1990s increased the variance of
incomes among the educated. That is, post-reform growth created
opportunities that were primarily open to the best educated, which increased
within-group variance at the top of the education pyramid. When this is
combined with the expansion in the fraction of the labour force at the top, the
result is increased overall inequality. That is what happened in Argentina.
The Kuznets curve estimations in the previous chapter uncovered this same
interaction effect.
Observed changes in wage differentials were almost never big enough to
cause a significant change in inequality. This is partly because of offsetting
changes at the top and the bottom of the education pyramid, but another
reason is simply that almost two-thirds of total variance is explained by intra-
group inequality (within-group Theil) and not by average wage differentials
(between-group Theil). Within-group inequality either dampened, or in some
cases (such as Peru) even offset, the effect of widening wage differentials.
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CHAPTER VII
THE RICH AND THE POOR
IN THE POST-REFORM PERIOD
The previous chapters use aggregate indexes to measure and analyse
changes in the distribution of income. The discussion now turns to two key
groups: those at the very top and those at the very bottom of the distribution.
The relative position of those at the top is one of the principal reasons why
the Latin American income distributions are so unequal compared to other
countries. This chapter examines who the members of this favoured group
are, where they work, and how much the group has contributed to changes in
inequality during the post-reform period.
Evidence on relative wages and the decompositions in the last chapter
suggest that another key group in determining trends in inequality is university
graduates. In this chapter, the labour force is divided into university and non-
university groups in order to measure the contribution of the university group
to the level and changes in inequality. If skill-intensive growth is an important
reason why inequality is not generally falling in the region, this decomposition
should reflect that.
At the other end of the distribution are the poor, another group of interest
to anyone concerned with equity. There was little significant change in income
distribution in the post-reform period, but the reduction in poverty was
significant. Any evaluation of the impact of the reforms on social welfare
should take that into account. Since poverty generally responds to growth, it
is useful to compare the reductions in poverty with reductions during previous
growth periods. In other words, holding growth constant, has poverty
performance under the new economic model been better or worse than it was
before?
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A. A Profile of the Rich
This section opens the discussion with a closer look at the characteristics
of those in the top income-earning classes. Most of the surveys used for this
analysis capture labour earnings, not the full return to capital. Consequently,
no matter how skewed the measured distributions might be, the total
distribution including profits would be far more skewed. For simplicity this
group is labelled as the rich, but this is a misnomer. The group that is here
called the rich is in reality the group with the highest earnings from their own
labour. That group may be far from the richest in the country; it just happens
to be the only group for which any information is available.
Table VII-1 summarizes the available information. The data in the table
come both from a number of special country studies and from the worksheets
of a forthcoming IDB study.30  The individual country papers for this project
track changes in the profile of the rich over time, whereas the IDB study gives
the most recent profile only. For the most part, the data refer to the
characteristics of the head of household or the individual who receives the
bulk of income in the household.
The biggest educational group among the rich is the most educated, yet it
is surprising how small the proportion is. University and high school graduates
might be expected to constitute at least 75% of rich heads of households, but
this is not the case in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica or Peru. One-third of the
rich in Argentina and almost half in Peru have less than secondary education.
This reinforces the point made in the previous chapter that education is not the
only determinant of earnings. In fact, the data in the table show why income
varies so much among the poorly educated in many countries: the economy
creates opportunities and winners in all education groups.
The intertemporal evidence is somewhat fragmentary, but it suggests that
growth in the post-reform period was not necessarily biased in favour of the
better educated. In Costa Rica and Mexico, the share of secondary and
university graduates among the rich rose considerably, but that was not the
case in Brazil or Chile. Growth may have been skill intensive, but that did not
mean that increased wealth was confined to the top of the education pyramid.
Another interesting question is where the rich work. According to the
table, between 50% and 60% are formal-sector employees, and those numbers
appear to be quite stable over time. A surprisingly high number are in the
informal sector (from one-fourth in most countries to 46% in Peru). That reflects
the heterogeneity of the sector. In the table the informal sector includes all


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































independent (self-employed) workers, such that it covers consultants as well
as street sellers. In any case, owners or employers comprise a relatively small
proportion of the group, which mainly reflects the fact that the surveys do
not capture very much of the income from capital. Finally, it is somewhat
surprising to find a significant number of public-sector employees in this
favoured group for the few countries for which we have this information (see
in particular Costa Rica).
As to sector of activity, the bulk of the rich work in the services sector,
broadly defined, rather than in manufacturing and agriculture. That mainly
reflects the employment patterns of the labour force as a whole, which is also
concentrated in services. Finance is the one sector with a disproportionate
number of the rich compared with its share in the overall labour force. In
Argentina, for example, 12% of all household heads are in finance, but 29% of
the rich are in that sector. The comparable figures for Colombia are 5% overall
compared to 13% of the rich. Most other countries have equally large
differences. The only significant trend over time in sector shares is a fall in the
share of social services in the majority of countries for which data are available.
A surprisingly high proportion of the rich are in female-headed
households, although only in Argentina, Mexico and Peru is this percentage
higher than the proportion of female-headed households in the entire
population. The proportion has, however, increased over time in every country
with corresponding data, except Costa Rica.
B. Contribution of the Rich to Total Inequality
Recent work at the IDB highlights the special importance of the rich in
inequality in Latin America. In an analysis of the distribution of the bottom
90% of the population for 17 Latin American countries, seven are lower than
the same distribution in the United States (IDB, 1998, p. 16). This section
expands on this analysis by using the Theil index in place of the Gini. As
mentioned above, the great advantage of the Theil is that it is decomposable,
which allows the researcher to calculate exactly how much of total inequality
comes from income differences between the top 10% and everyone else, as
well as how much comes from income differences within the top 10%. In
addition, for those countries with the necessary data, the Theil can be used to
calculate how much of the change in inequality between pre-reform and post-
reform periods comes from changes at the top of the distribution.
Table VII-2 shows a breakdown of earners into two groups: the top 10%
and the bottom 90%. In the case of Mexico the top group is that earning more
than 2.5 times the mean income (around 7% of the population). Where
available, each table shows the population and income shares and the within-
group Theil coefficients. These three components can be used to break the
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overall Theil down into its within-group and between-group elements, as in
the previous chapter. Column 7 in the table shows the percentage contribution
of the top 10% to total inequality; this is defined as the total between-group
Theil plus the within-group Theil for the rich, expressed as a percentage of
the total Theil index. Thus, for example, for Chile in 1996, the percentage
contribution of the top 10% is (.402+.121)/.63 = 82.8%. Where the within-group
Theils are not available (Argentina, Jamaica and Peru), the contribution is just
the between-group Theil. Finally, column 8 in the table shows the income of
the top 10% relative to the remaining 90% of the population. Comparisons of
these relative incomes between countries give a pretty good indicator of
relative levels of inequality. Within each country the calculation across years
gives a rough measure of how favourable to the rich the post-reform period
has been.
What is immediately apparent is the very large proportion of total
inequality explained by the top 10%, varying between 60% and 90% for all
the countries in our sample except Jamaica, where the inequality indexes are
based on expenditure rather than income. This strongly confirms the evidence
on the 90% Ginis analysed in IDB (1998). An analysis of inequality in Latin
America must start with the rich, asking how it is that the group is able to
capture such a large share of total income. The high share of this group is
particularly puzzling given that most of the data in the surveys refer to labour
income, not profits.
Both differences in average income between the rich and everyone else
(the between-group component) and differences in income within the top
group are important sources of inequality. Of the two, the between-group
component is far and away the most important. For example, in Brazil in
1997, 65% of total inequality came from this source and only 17% from
inequality within the top 10%. Percentages are similar in other countries, with
the notable exception of Uruguay, which has the lowest differential in the
region. These very high income differentials between the top 10% and the rest
of the population are the main source of Latin America’s high income
inequality.
While the absolute contribution of the rich to total inequality is extremely
high, it did not increase over the period of the reforms, with the significant
exception of Argentina and Mexico. In Chile the within-group Theil rose
slightly, but it is offset by a reduction in the relative income of the rich (the
between-group Theil fell by about the same amount that the within-group
Theil of the rich increased). Roughly the same pattern can be seen in Costa
Rica for receivers of income from production. In Peru and Brazil both
components fell over time.
A glance at the trend in income differentials in Argentina and Mexico
shows why the share of between-group inequality rose in these two countries.
The gap between the top 10% and everyone else widened in exactly the same
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Table VII-2
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INEQUALITY DUE TO THE RICH
POPULATION INCOME THEIL CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SHARE OF INCOME OF TOP
SHARE SHARE SHARE OF INEQUALITY INEQUALITY THEIL TOTAL 10% RELATIVE
WITHIN GROUPS BETWEEN INEQUALITY TO BOTTOM
GROUPS FROM TOP 10% 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Argentina Occupied labour force
1974
Top 10% 0.1 0.28 0.2883
90% 0.9 0.72 -0.1607
Total 0.1276 0.18 0.717 3.500
1986
Top 10% 0.1 0.343 0.4228
90% 0.9 0.657 -0.2068
Total 0.2160 0.29 0.737 4.699
1997
Top 10% 0.1 0.353 0.4452
90% 0.9 0.647 -0.2135
Total 0.2317 0.28 0.819 4.910
Bolivia Occupied labour force
1996
Top 10% 0.1 0.44 0.2636 0.1160 0.6520
90% 0.9 0.56 0.3286 0.1840 -0.2640
Total 0.3000 0.3880 0.69 0.733 7.071
Brazil Economically active population, all income sources
1976
Top 10% 0.1890 0.8120
90% 0.1200 -0.2970
Total 0.3090 0.5150 0.83 0.853
1990
Top 10% 0.1190 0.7630
90% 0.1530 -0.2880
Total 0.2730 0.4750 0.75 0.794
1997
Top 10% 0.1180 0.7400
90% 0.1280 -0.2870
Total 0.2460 0.4530 0.70 0.817
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POPULATION INCOME THEIL CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SHARE OF INCOME OF TOP
SHARE SHARE SHARE OF INEQUALITY INEQUALITY THEIL TOTAL 10% RELATIVE
WITHIN GROUPS BETWEEN INEQUALITY TO BOTTOM
GROUPS FROM TOP 10% 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Chile Occupied labour force
1987
Top 10% 0.1 0.46 0.234 0.1076 0.7020
90% 0.9 0.54 0.209 0.1129 -0.2758
Total 0.2205 0.4261 0.65 0.825 7.667
1996
Top 10% 0.1 0.448 0.269 0.1205 0.6718
90% 0.9 0.552 0.196 0.1082 -0.2698
Total . 0.2287 0.4020 0.63 0.828 7.304
Costa Rica Receivers of income from production
1988
Top 10% 0.1 0.3654 0.1281 0.0468 0.4738
90% 0.9 0.6346 0.2850 0.1809 -0.2218
Total 0.2277 0.2520 0.48 0.623 5.182
1995
Top 10% 0.1 0.3597 0.1906 0.0685 0.4634
90% 0.9 0.6403 0.2650 0.1697 -0.2186
Total 0.2383 0.2448 0.48 0.649 5.056
Jamaica Household expenditure per capita
1989
Top 10% 0.1 0.3228 0.3783
90% 0.9 0.6772 -0.1926
Total 0.1857 0.34 0.544 4.290
1996
Top 10% 0.1 0.2917 0.3123
90% 0.9 0.7083 -0.1697
Total 0.1426 0.25 0.568 3.706
Mexico Rich defined as 2.5 times mean income. Distribution among receivers of income
1984
2.5*mean 0.0601 0.2722 0.06 0.0163 0.1786
<2.5* mean 0.9399 0.7278 0.11 0.0801 -0.0808
Total 0.0964 0.0977 0.19 0.588 5.849
1989
2.5* mean 0.0636 0.3306 0.17 0.0562 0.2367
<2.5* mean 0.9364 0.6694 0.11 0.0736 -0.0976
Total 0.1298 0.1391 0.27 0.726 7.271
1994
2.5* mean 0.069 0.3721 0.11 0.0409 0.2723
<2.5* mean 0.931 0.6279 0.13 0.0816 -0.1074
Total 0.1226 0.1649 0.29 0.716 7.996
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POPULATION INCOME THEIL CONTRIBUTION CONTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SHARE OF INCOME OF TOP
SHARE SHARE SHARE OF INEQUALITY INEQUALITY THEIL TOTAL 10% RELATIVE
WITHIN GROUPS BETWEEN INEQUALITY TO BOTTOM
GROUPS FROM TOP 10% 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1996
2.5* mean 0.0718 0.3717 0.13 0.0483 0.2654
<2.5* mean 0.9282 0.6283 0.13 0.0817 -0.1065
Total 0.1300 0.1589 0.29 0.717 7.648
Peru Urban labour income per hour
1985-86
Top 10% 0.1 0.4115
90% 0.9 0.5885
Total 0.2060 0.3320 0.54 0.618 6.293
1991
Top 10% 0.1 0.379
90% 0.9 0.621
Total 0.1610 0.2740 0.44 0.630 5.493
1996
Top 10% 0.1 0.3632
90% 0.9 0.6368
Total 0.1380 0.2480 0.39 0.642 5.133
Source: Consultant reports.
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period when both of these countries suffered their big one-time rises in
inequality.
The data can also be used to examine whether inequality within the top
10% increased significantly during the reforms, which would indicate whether
the reforms opened up special earnings opportunities for a favoured few at
the top. The answer seems to be yes for all three countries for which the top
10% Theil is available (Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico). In those three cases, the
figure increased between the early and the most recent observation. It is worth
noting that all of the increase in Mexico comes in the 1984-89 period. In Brazil
or Peru, in contrast, the total Theils indicate a very sharp decline in within-
group inequality.
C. The Role of University Graduates in
Explaining Inequality
This section examines two sub-groups –workers with and without
university education– to see how much the university group has contributed
to the level and trend of earnings inequality during the reform period.31  The
evidence presented in previous chapters indicates that growth is increasingly
skill intensive and that many countries have experienced a rise in the skill
differential between the university group and the rest of the labour force. The
current task is to investigate how much this increased differential has
contributed to changes in inequality over the period and whether the new
economic model has created a sub-group of winners within the university (or
non-university) group. If the latter occurred, it will be reflected in a rise in the
within-group Theils.
The contribution of the university group to total inequality is a good deal
less than that of the top 10% of the population. Not all university graduates
are in the top 10%, and their wage differential relative to the rest of the
population is considerably lower than that of the top 10% in every case but
Brazil. With regard to skill-intensive growth, however, in every case the amount
of inequality explained or contributed by university graduates increased. In
cases like Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, these increases are very
large. In Argentina, for example, the inequality component due to university
graduates rose from 17% to 47% of total inequality between 1976 and 1997.
The rise in the university group’s contribution to overall inequality was so
great that it completely offset favourable trends in the remainder of the
population. This is a striking confirmation that growth was increasingly skill
31 This section reports on decompositions carried out on the basis of consultant reports for the nine
sample countries.
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intensive in the 1990s. The data do not show whether that is the result of the
opening of the economy or whether it simply reflects changes in the nature of
technology. Similarly, this analysis cannot determine whether the pattern
observed in the sample is representative of the other countries in the region.
The university contribution to total inequality rose between the beginning
and the end of the period. In every country in the sample, the absolute change
for the university component is higher than the absolute overall change in
inequality. This means that rising inequality within the university group is
responsible for all the increase in inequality in cases in which inequality
increased and that it offset progressive trends in the non-university group in
cases in which inequality was constant. To put it another way, earnings
inequality would have declined in the region in every country, with the possible
exception of Argentina, had it not been for widening inequality within the
university group and between it and everyone else. Skill-intensive growth in
the new economic model strongly favoured those few in the labour force with
university education.
The increase in the university contribution to inequality results from three
processes: the increase in the skill differential, the change in the size of the
university group, and increased variance within the university group itself.
In other words, the university component of inequality rises because growth
increases the return of university graduates relative to everyone else, because
the size of the group increases or because the new economic model has created
a sub-group of big winners within the university group. Which of these is the
dominant cause depends on the case. For example, in Argentina between 1974
and 1997, the within-group Theil for university graduates rose by 6.5 points.
When combined with the 8 percent rise in the proportion of university
graduates in the total, that translates into a 4.8 point increase in the within-
group Theil for university graduates (from 1.2 to 6.0). Over the same period,
the between-group Theil rose by 5.6 points (from 1.8 to 7.4). Overall, the
university group raised the Theil by 10.4 points, and that accounts for over
99% of the overall increase that was actually observed between 1974 and 1997.
Of that increase, 46% (4.8/10.4) comes from rising variance within the
university group, while the rest is explained by rising wage differentials. Except
for Costa Rica, the within-group contribution is generally smaller in the other
countries in the sample, varying from 20% in Mexico to 33% in Brazil, Bolivia
and Colombia. Most of the increase in university inequality thus comes from
rising relative wages for university graduates, not from a rise in inequality
within the university group.
Brazil offers a curious contrast to the other countries in the sample. In
Brazil the contribution of university graduates to total inequality is far lower
than elsewhere in spite of the fact that its skill differential is by far the highest
in the region. The reason is that the fraction of the labour force with university
education is so small that it simply does not carry much weight in inequality
computations.
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This illustrates an important point, as well as a serious problem for those
wishing to reduce inequality. As Brazil gradually improves its educational
profile, the percentage of university graduates in the labour force is going to
rise. If nothing else changes, that improvement is going to increase inequality.
For example, in 1976, university graduates made up only 0.3% of the adult
population and earned 8.8 times as much as the non-university group. The
total Theil was .81. Suppose that over time the university group were to expand
until it accounted for 5% of the labour force. If the wage differential stayed at
8.8, the group would have about 31.5% of total income. Holding the within-
group Theils constant at their 1976 levels, the hypothetical distribution within
this better-educated labour force would be a full twenty points higher than
the actual 1976 distribution. That means that for countries like Brazil with a
very small university-educated population, raising the proportion of university
graduates in the labour force would be regressive for a very long time unless
it were accompanied by a significant decline in the skill differential. In the
case of Brazil, if the university-educated population were to expand from 0.3%
to 5% of the labour force, Brazil would have to cut its skill differential in half
(from 8.8 to 4.2) in order to hold the overall Theil constant at its 1976 level.
When a small favoured group (university graduates) expands relative to the
rest of the population, the result is regressive until the group gets big enough
to be more representative of the population as a whole.32  Brazil is thus on the
rising portion of an educational Kuznets curve.
D. The Poor
An investigation of what happened to poverty and the poor during the
reform period represents an important change of focus. Whereas the rest of
the study examines changes in relative position, this section introduces
absolute changes into the picture. There is an important theoretical reason for
doing this, in addition to the perfectly natural one of concern for the poor. In
order to evaluate distributions in terms of well-being as opposed to simply
measuring degrees of inequality, that is, if the goal is to rank one distribution
as better than another rather than just less or more equal, the analysis must
account for absolute as well as relative changes in income. Suppose a country
has a rising level of inequality, but grows rapidly and significantly reduces
poverty. That is likely to be preferable to a situation in which high levels of
inequality are combined with stagnation and no poverty reduction.
32 This situation reflects an educational Kuznets effect in which a small, high-income component is
expanding. Until that group gets so large that the poorly educated group is the minority, the change
will be regressive, if the relative incomes of the two groups remain constant.
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From the political perspective, people do make value judgements about
income distribution, and the distribution becomes a political issue when it
differs significantly from what people think is reasonable or fair. Many factors
might enter into such an evaluation, but one that is surely important is the
degree of mobility and poverty reduction. During the process of growth, if
those at the bottom of the income pyramid are able to move up out of poverty,
then even a high degree of inequality may be regarded as reasonable or at
least acceptable. If growth is accompanied by significant upward mobility,
poverty reduction and improvements in absolute income, while at the same
time leading to increased inequality, society may well accept the one as the
price for improving the other. Consequently, no study of distribution is
complete without some accounting for income growth and poverty reduction.
Data published by ECLAC (1999) show that poverty was reduced
significantly in the 1990s. Indeed, according to ECLAC, by 1997 the overall
incidence of poverty in the region had finally fallen back to its 1980 level after a
rapid increase during the 1980s and early 1990s. Growth under the new economic
model may not have lowered inequality, but it definitely lowered poverty. Table
VII-3 summarizes the most recent estimates and adds income growth rates and
poverty growth elasticities for use in the subsequent discussion.
The data in table VII-3 present several important limitations. First, the series
marked with an asterisk come from recently published poverty studies for
individual countries. They use different poverty lines and different
methodologies from the ECLAC estimates. Each row in the table is internally
consistent, but the asterisk series are not necessarily comparable with the ECLAC
series or with each other. Consequently, the estimates should not be used for
inter-country comparisons, but instead only to establish poverty trends within
each country. Because the estimates are not fully comparable across countries,
they do not add up to the absolute number of persons in a state of poverty and
thus do not represent a regional poverty estimate. However, the trends in each
country do offer a pretty good guess on trends in regional poverty incidence
and the poverty population for the region as a whole.
Keeping all these data problems in mind, the table points to several
conclusions. First, and most important, after a decade of rising poverty in the
1980s, Latin America finally began to make significant progress in reducing
poverty in the 1990s. During the 1980s the incidence of poverty rose in all but
three or four countries in the region (Morley, 1995), and the absolute number
of poor people rose by around 40%. Several researchers have expressed doubts
that the new reform model is capable of reversing these trends (Berry, 1998;
Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). However, the evidence in the table makes it quite clear
that poverty trends finally turned more positive in many countries, although
these observations were taken before the downturns in 1998 and 1999 sparked
by the Asian crisis. Poverty incidence between 1990 and 1997 (measured as
the percentage below the poverty line) has fallen in 13 out of the 18 countries
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for which data are available. Unfortunately, the reductions in incidence are
often less than the increase in the population, which is why only 9 out of 18
cases show a decline in the absolute number of the poor (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Peru and Uruguay). In
absolute numbers, however, the total reductions in poverty in Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Peru appear to be much bigger than the increases
in the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela. Thus
it is almost certain that the absolute number of the poor in these eighteen
Table VII-3
CHANGES IN POVERTY IN THE 1990s
COUNTRY (YEARS) POVERTY INCOME PER CAPITA PERCENT CHANGE POVERTY
EARLIEST LATEST EARLIEST LATEST INCOME POVERTY ELASTICITYa
Argentina/Buenos Aires (1990-97) 0.16 0.13 4710 6512 38.26 -18.75 -0.4901
Bolivia (1990-97) 0.47 0.44 840 942 12.14 -6.38 -0.5257
Brazil (1990-96) 0.41 0.29 2942 3185 8.26 -29.27 -3.5435
Chile (1990-96) 0.39 0.20 2534 3748 47.91 -48.72 -1.0169
Colombia (1988-95)* 0.23 0.15 1445 1705 17.99 -34.78 -1.9331
Costa Rica (1990-97) 0.24 0.20 1924 2081 8.16 -16.67 -2.0425
Dom. Republic (1986-92)* 0.33 0.34 817 870 6.49 3.03 0.4671
Ecuador (1990-97) 0.56 0.50 1264 1392 10.13 -10.71 -1.0580
El Salvador (1991/92-96)* 0.60 0.52 1049 1257 19.83 -13.33 -0.6724
Honduras (1990-97) 0.75 0.74 633 670 5.85 -1.33 -0.2281
Jamaica (1989-95*) 0.25 0.22 1632 1709 4.72 -12.00 -2.5434
Mexico (1989-96) 0.39 0.43 3113 3173 1.93 10.26 5.3214
Nicaragua (1985-93) 0.73 0.76 771 512 -33.59 4.11 -0.1223
Panama (1991-97) 0.36 0.27 2369 2702 14.06 -25.00 -1.7785
Paraguay/Asuncion (1990-96) 0.37 0.40 1487 1490 0.20 8.11 40.1892
Paraguay rural (1992-95)* 0.53 0.60 1446 1494 3.32 13.21 3.9788
Peru (1991-96) 0.55 0.46 1728 2093 21.12 -16.36 -0.7747
Uruguay (1990-97) 0.12 0.06 2700 3437 27.30 -50.00 -1.8318
Venezuela (1990-97) 0.34 0.42 3043 3267 7.36 23.53 3.1964
Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 1998, Santiago, Chile (May 1999). Note: Data
for countries marked with an asterisk are taken from Samuel Morley, “La pobreza en tiempos de
recuperación económica y reforma en América Latina: 1985-1995”, Política macroeconómica y pobreza
en América Latina y el Caribe, Enrique Ganuza, Lance Taylor and Samuel Morley (eds.), Madrid,
Grupo Mundi-Prensa, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1998). Data for Peru
are taken from Javier Escobal D’Angelo, Jaime Saavedra Chanduví and Máximo Torero Cullen,
“Los activos de los pobres en el Perú”, Documento de trabajo, No. 26, Lima, Study Group for
Development (GRADE) (1998).
a Poverty elasticity is percent change in poverty divided by percent change in income.
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countries declined between 1990 and 1997, even granting the methodological
difficulties of adding together poverty estimates from different countries with
different poverty lines and periods of coverage.
Poverty trends improved for two main reasons: the resumption of more
stable, more rapid growth in many countries, particularly Argentina, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, El Salvador and Uruguay, and the successful
control of inflation in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru. In Argentina poverty
fell by more than half between 1989 and 1991 when the Menem government
stopped hyperinflation (Márquez and Morley, 1997). For Bolivia and Peru,
the available data do not exactly correspond to the period when inflation was
stopped, so it is not possible to know how important stabilization was.
Brazil represents the most important case. There, virtually the entire
reduction in poverty occurred during the period 1993-95, when the Plano Real
successfully stopped hyperinflation. Some controversy has arisen over poverty
estimates for Brazil during this period. If the overall consumer price index is
used to adjust the poverty line, the estimated reductions in poverty incidence
are far lower than those shown in the table. ECLAC used the actual observed
cost of the market basket of goods upon which the poverty line is based. That
price index went up far less than the overall consumer price index, which
implies that relative prices changed significantly in favour of the poor. Such a
change causes a big reduction in poverty levels, because it lowers the poverty
line in real terms relative to what it would be using the national price index as
a deflator. That is the reason for the big discrepancy in the estimates. This
measurement issue is important because of Brazil’s size. If poverty incidence
only fell by 10%, as estimated by the IDB, rather than 29% as estimated by
ECLAC, the absolute numbers in poverty in 1996 would be almost 13 million
higher. That is enough to raise the overall incidence in the region from ECLAC’s
estimated 36% to 38.6%. In my view, the ECLAC procedure is the correct one.33
While the news that poverty declined is gratifying, it should be tempered
by the realization that poverty is still increasing in far too many countries.
Even in many of the countries where it has started to decline, both the incidence
and the absolute level are still higher than they were in 1980. Furthermore,
some of the biggest gains have come from one-time reductions in inflation.
Such big changes do not signal the beginning of a trend. They are one-time
events, and the improvements will be hard to maintain when economies fall
back into recession, as many did in 1998-99.
33 Ricardo Paes de Barros, the Brazilian expert most familiar with this question, agrees with the ECLAC
procedure.
146 THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM
The main reason for the decline in poverty in the region is the economic
recovery, not improvements in the distribution of income.34  It is now widely
accepted that poverty declines when countries grow, even when that growth
makes the distribution of income more unequal. This close relation between
the level of poverty and the level of economic activity means that the poor
will continue to be adversely affected by the volatility and economic cycles
that plagued the region in the 1990s.
Figure VII-1 relates the observed changes in poverty shown in table VII-
3 to the percentage changes in per capita real income for the same period. The
straight line in the figure is the simple regression of changes in poverty on
changes in income. The fit is not particularly close, but the regression confirms
(albeit weakly) that countries which grew also reduced poverty. Excluding
Nicaragua, the average poverty-growth elasticity (that is, the percentage
reduction in poverty per percent growth in per capita income) is about –1.
That is a low number compared to the rest of the world, which is consistent
with the high degree of income inequality in the region. It suggests that the
trickle-down benefits of growth are smaller in Latin America than elsewhere.
The elasticity column in table VII-3 gives a quick guide to the countries in
which growth has a lesser or greater impact on poverty.35
Additional evidence confirms the positive developments that have
occurred for the least skilled workers. For the nine countries in the sample
discussed in chapter VI, direct evidence is available on changes in income
variance for workers with primary education or less. That evidence is
complemented by average incomes by education level for eight of the same
countries. Constructing a relative income series comparing the lowest with
the next to lowest education group shows that in every country the least
educated closed the income gap between them and the next group. That is
consistent with the significant reduction in the within-group Theil
contributions of the bottom education groups that occurred in all nine countries
in the sample.
Growth under the new economic model has been skill-intensive. It raised
the relative incomes of the better educated, and it both extended and expanded
the right-hand tail of the income distribution. At the same time, however, it
seems to have been shrinking and pulling in the left-hand tail. Partly, of course,
that is the result of the reduction in the relative size of the least educated
group because of retirement and the higher educational level of new entrants.
But from the relative wage data, it seems also to be the result of growth rates
34 Bulmer-Thomas (1996) was right when he argued the new reform model would only improve well-
being if it raised the growth rate, since it was unlikely to improve distribution in itself. The growth
rate has accelerated enough to bring about a modest reduction in the overall level of poverty in spite
of lack of progress on equity in most countries.
35 This elasticity measures the percentage change in poverty per percentage change in income.
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Figure VII-1
INCOME GROWTH AND CHANGES IN POVERTY
Source: Table VII-3.
rapid enough to put upward pressure on the relative wages of the least skilled.
These gains at the bottom of the distribution just about offset the gains for the
educated at the top. The overall distribution did not change much, but that
does not mean that there were not significant gains for those at the bottom.
E. Reforms and Poverty Reduction
One of the principal reasons that poverty fell after 1990 is simply that
most Latin American countries began growing again. The better growth
performance may or may not have resulted from the reforms, but it is
interesting to ask whether, after controlling for growth, the reforms had a
positive or negative effect on poverty reduction. That is equivalent to asking
whether the countries with a higher reform index are above or below the line
in figure VII-1. One method for examining this question more systematically
is to regress the changes in poverty after 1990 on changes in income for the
countries shown in table VII-3. The regression includes the value of the reform
index for the year 1990 and an inflation control dummy for Brazil.36  The results
are displayed as equation 1 in table VII-4.
36 The regressions do not include dummies for Argentina or Peru because the first observations in the
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Table VII-4
ESTIMATIONS OF CHANGES IN POVERTY
(1) (2)
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T STATISTIC COEFFICIENT T STATISTIC
Constant 0.298608 1.455078 0.409457 1.496337
Change in income -0.985624 -3.533736
Inflation dummy (Brazil) -0.221562 -1.533985 -0.144593 -0.750532
Average reform index 1990 -0.398230 -1.281619 -0.770092 -1.952196
Adjusted R squared 0.528728 0.142039
Standard error of regression 0.138045 0.186260
Sum of squared residual 0.247734 0.485698
F statistic 6.983552 2.324435
Probability (F statistic) 0.004843 0.134378
Growth is the main determinant of poverty reduction, and the best
estimate of the poverty elasticity is –1, but controlling inflation helped, too.
Its coefficient is negative, though not significant. As to the reforms, they
reduced poverty, but their effect is insignificant, although the weak effect could
be because the main impact of the reforms is through their effect on growth.
To test this, the regression is rerun without the income growth variable (see
equation 2 in table VII-4), and in this case the reforms had a significant negative
effect on poverty. For the most part, then, their effect must be through growth
rather than in addition to growth. Reforms help the poor, but they do so
indirectly through their apparently positive effect on the growth rate.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The distribution problem is one of the most intractable facing Latin
America and the Caribbean. Most countries in the region have very high levels
of inequality compared with countries elsewhere in the world, and there is
little evidence that those levels are falling. Inequality rose during the
adjustments and recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, and in most cases it did
not go back down despite economic recovery in the 1990s.
A. Why is Inequality So High in Latin America
and the Caribbean?
As argued above, three contributing factors help explain Latin America’s
high level of inequality. First, Latin America and the Caribbean have a highly
unequal distribution of education and the highest skill differentials for university
graduates in the world. The region has made heavy investments in education,
but the pattern of these investments has further increased the concentration of
human capital ownership in the population. Asia put most of its education
dollars into universalizing primary and secondary school coverage, but Latin
America let most of its young cohorts drop out after primary school, using the
money saved at the secondary school level to expand university education.
Since it is mainly the poor who drop out of school, educational inequality rose
in the 1990s in every country in the region except Brazil.
Second, the combination of a highly skewed distribution of land and an
increase in the growth rate of the labour force in recent decades has driven
down the relative wage of the unskilled. Latin America has the most unequal
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distribution of land in the world. The relation of this to the skewed distribution
of income is not accidental. Limiting access to land in regions where land is
abundant artificially lowers the reservation wage of the landless, particularly
when it is accompanied, as it was, by various arrangements which increased
the supply of low-wage labour to landowners. Rural-urban migration in the
twentieth century reduced the pressure in the countryside, but at the cost of
transferring inequality and low wages for the unskilled to the urban sector.
That problem was exacerbated in recent decades by increased rates of growth
of the labour force as economies passed through the demographic transition.
The combination of an unequal distribution of land, rising population growth
rates and a failure of the education system to absorb and educate the young
has left the region with an oversupply of poorly educated workers. This has
had –and will continue to have– significant regressive effects on the
distribution of income until it is eliminated by more rapid growth and
investments in education, particularly at the secondary level.
Third, the unusually large gap between the average incomes of the rich
and those further down the income pyramid adds to inequality. The data show
that the segmentation between the rich and everyone else is far greater in the
region than in other countries. That is, the rich in Latin America are much
richer relative to the remainder of the population than they are elsewhere. In
a decomposition of the nine-country sample, the top 10% of the population
accounted for two-thirds to three-fourths of total inequality in the majority of
countries. High inequality in the region is not the result of the large gaps
between those at the bottom and everyone else. Such gaps exist, but the
differences between the typical Latin country and countries elsewhere is not
large. What is large is the gap at the top of the distribution.
A complementary factor is the group of university graduates. So far, this
group contributes less to overall inequality than the rich because many in the
group are not rich. Unlike the rich, however, the contribution of the group to
inequality has risen sharply in the post-reform period. In part this reflects the
rise in the skill differential for university graduates that has occurred in most
countries. But it also reflects a rise in variance within the university group as
well. In the nine-country sample, inequality would have fallen in every country
had it not been for the rising relative incomes and size of the university group.
Skill-intensive growth has favoured this small group of the population, and
this has played a significant part in maintaining Latin American inequality at
a high level.
B. Inertia in the Distribution
Unfortunately, it does not appear that growth will improve the distribution
statistics very much, if at all. One of the reasons is that growth is more skill-
151ECLAC
intensive now than it used to be. This may be simply a Latin American
phenomenon, but it more likely reflects changes in technology that are being
felt all over the world. The skill differential or wage premium paid to high
school and college graduates has risen in almost every country for which data
are available. Consistent with this phenomenon, there is strong evidence that
the relation between income and equity is becoming less progressive. Growth
that could have been expected to reduce inequality in the 1970s no longer did
so in the production conditions of the 1990s. Rather than countries moving
down a Kuznets curve towards lower levels of inequality, the Kuznets curves
themselves appear to be shifting in a regressive direction.
The rise in the skill differential is mainly a result of the nature of labour
demand and the pattern of growth of labour supply. Growth is going to
increase the relative demand for skilled labour, while the education system
will send better-prepared graduates out into the labour market, increasing
the supply of skilled or potentially skilled workers. Whether the skill
differential rises or falls depends on which of the two grows most rapidly.
Even in the most progressive scenario imaginable, however, the reduction in
the wage differential is unlikely to be a large enough to make a significant
difference in the overall distribution of earnings. The case of Chile is instructive.
The country grew very rapidly after 1987, and it had a small reduction in its
skill differential (it is the only country in the sample where that happened),
but that narrowing was not sufficient to cause a significant reduction in
inequality. Barring sudden drastic shifts in external conditions or
macroeconomic shocks, the earnings distribution is mainly determined by
the structure of the labour force, and that changes slowly. Because Latin
America did not broaden the coverage of high school education in the past,
the adult labour force now comprises far too many undereducated workers
who are ill-equipped to work in an increasingly information-based workplace.
Until the region eliminates that imbalance, growth is likely to cause rising
wage differentials in favour of those with high school or university education.
Correcting that imbalance is one of the priority tasks facing the region.
Paradoxically, improving the educational structure of the labour force
could worsen rather than improve the distribution in the short run. As shown
in the case of Brazil, countries with a very small fraction of high-school or
university graduates in their labour forces will find that inequality increases
when they raise that fraction unless they are able to significantly lower the
skill differential at the same time. Of course, reducing the proportion of poorly
educated workers helps to offset this perverse effect, but it does not eliminate
it altogether. This change in educational structure improves the position of
the upper and lower tails of the distribution. At the top, both the number and
the income share increase; that is regressive. At the bottom, the number and
size shrinks, which is progressive. These progressive and regressive effects
seem to just about offset each other. This is one of the principal reasons why
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the overall distribution has not changed much despite substantial growth and
structural change.
Another reason why distributions have not improved with growth is
because of the very nature of the growth process and the structure of the
economy. In some cases growth is more skill intensive than it need be, which
exacerbates the tendency toward rising wage differentials. In other cases
economies themselves are heterogeneous. Growth starts in a dynamic sector
or region, but has low regional or sectoral multiplier effects elsewhere. Latin
America features many examples of such heterogeneity, including
underdeveloped regions, groups of indigenous people or concentrations of
unskilled workers who are unable to perform the tasks needed in the dynamic
sector. In all those cases growth is relatively disequalizing. Its trickle-down or
spread effect is small.
C. The Impact of the Reforms
The evidence on the impact of reforms is mixed. In Argentina, Chile and
Mexico, the initial adoption of the reform package coincided with a big one-
time upward shift in inequality. In the other countries of the sample, the
distribution either stayed constant (e.g., Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica) or
improved (e.g., Bolivia, Jamaica and Peru). In Argentina and Chile the rise in
inequality took place during a severe change in institutional arrangements in
the labour market under military regimes in the 1970s.37  It is unclear whether
this step was necessary to quite radically reform economic policy in a short
period. Those changes in the labour market did not happen in the other
countries in the sample, and none of them, with the exception of Mexico
between 1984 and 1989, experienced any dramatic change in inequality as
they adopted the reforms. In Bolivia and Peru, the improvement in the
distribution must have resulted mainly from controlling inflation rather than
from the structural reforms, since the post-reform distributions deteriorated
in both countries.
The pre- and post-reform evidence suffers from the unavoidable problem
that it is impossible to isolate the effect of the reforms from all the other things
that were going on at the same time. Econometric analysis is one way of dealing
with this problem. The econometric evidence on the effect of the reforms is
roughly consistent with the nine country case studies. In the aggregate, the
reforms appear to have had a regressive effect on distribution, but that effect
is small and only marginally significant. The reason is that reforms in different
37 The same thing happened in Uruguay in the early 1970s and Brazil in the 1960s. In both of these cases
the intervention was more related to inflation control than it was to the imposition of reforms.
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areas had offsetting effects on equity. Trade reform was regressive in all of the
specifications, but it was insignificant in all but the nationwide sample. Tax
reform was unambiguously regressive, and opening up the capital account
was unambiguously progressive. The results for tax reform and capital account
liberalization are the most robust and significant of the set. For the other two
reforms, the data are not good enough to give a clear answer. The reforms,
taken together, were thus mildly regressive, but their effect on distribution
was relatively small compared to other factors like growth, inflation and
changes in education structure.
D. Policies that Can Help
The most important single policy that a government can adopt is a growth
strategy that produces the highest, most stable growth rate possible. It must
not rely excessively on borrowing, since that will affect future growth. Nor
can it trigger a significant increase in inflation. Experience teaches that high
but unstable growth rates do as much harm as good, while high growth rates
that lead to outbreaks of inflation are sure to have a regressive effect. No other
task facing government is as important as this one. Rapid, stable growth is a
necessary (though not sufficient) condition for reducing poverty and
unemployment and for increasing wages for the least qualified.
A complementary goal is for the growth strategy to enable the economy
to absorb as much unskilled labour as possible, as long as that does not entail
an undue sacrifice in the overall growth rate. The basic distribution problem
facing Latin America is to reduce the supply of and increase the demand for
unskilled labour. A growth strategy that creates a lot of jobs for unskilled
labour takes care of the demand side of that problem, while investments in
education will help with the supply part. Two sectors are especially large
users of unskilled labour: construction and agriculture. These two should play
an important part in an equitable growth strategy. Similarly, the production
of tradable goods makes relatively intensive use of unskilled labour.
Another element of an equity-increasing growth strategy is support for
underdeveloped regions. Growth is almost always sparked by something that
happens in a specific sector or region. The more heterogeneous and separated
the various parts of the economy or country are, the less of a multiplier effect
the initial impetus will have in other sectors or regions. Governments should
aim to increase the spread or linkage effects of growth, for example by
improving transportation and communications links in underdeveloped
regions or by making a special effort to upgrade worker training and education
in such regions.
A very large part of Latin America’s distribution problem comes from
the large stock of unskilled labour relative to the demand for the sort of services
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such labour can provide. Many years of high population growth rates and
inadequate education have saddled the region with too much unskilled labour.
Until that backlog is eliminated, wage differentials are unlikely to narrow
and the region will not make much progress in terms of equity. Latin America
is hostage to past policy failures that are going to take a long time to correct. A
labour-intensive growth strategy will help, but educational strategy is even
more important in the long run. The goal should be to bring the percentage of
those entering the labour market who have at least a high school education as
close as possible to 100%. In the course of a few years that will significantly
lower the growth rate of unskilled labour and raise the growth rate of skilled
labour. Sooner or later skill differentials will begin to fall, and equity will
increase. As discussed in chapter III, the big difference between East Asia and
Latin America is that the East Asian countries followed just such a policy.
They invested in secondary and primary education, whereas Latin America
invested in universities and primary schools. The Asian strategy reduced
education variance and narrowed wage differentials, but the Latin American
strategy did not. That pattern can and should be reversed.
There are two additional reasons why education should play an important
part in an equity-increasing growth strategy. First, raising the educational
level of the young reduces the colossal waste of human potential represented
by the vast numbers of undereducated citizens. How many potential
entrepreneurs or scientists are working in agriculture or the informal sector
simply because they never got enough education to unlock that potential? In
the modern world, human capital is increasingly the key ingredient for growth,
which makes education as important as investments in machinery. In a word,
expanding education is likely to raise the potential growth rate.
The second reason why universalizing education makes sense is more
subjective. Rich or poor, parents are concerned about the future of their
children. If the poor perceive that the State provides a good education through
high school for all their children, they are likely to accept unequal income
distribution for themselves more readily, since they will see that
intergenerational inequality is falling, even if the statistics do not capture it.
Intergenerational mobility matters, and education is the key to increasing it.
Lowering measured inequality is difficult for practical, political and
statistical reasons. Providing education is a promising alternative way of
dealing with the inequality problem. It does not directly redistribute income,
which is politically difficult, but instead it distributes something that may
well be more precious to the poor than income, namely, an opportunity for
their children to escape poverty. That is something which is very hard for
anyone to oppose.
In recent years, the countries of the region have made significant progress
in both reducing poverty and expanding educational coverage for the younger
age cohorts, but the distribution indexes do not reflect that progress. It is
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important to understand why this can happen and how it follows from the
definitions of inequality that underlie the indexes. Latin America and the
Caribbean needs to keep going down the road of more rapid, more labour-
intensive growth, coupled with continued broadening of the coverage of high
school education. That strategy may not be immediately reflected in lower
Gini coefficients, but it will lower poverty levels and it will raise real wages
for the unskilled. Eventually it will also bear fruit in the form of falling indexes
of inequality, although that probably will not happen right away.
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O
ca
m
po
 =
 O
ca
m
po
 a
nd
 o
th
er
s 
(1
99
8)
; N
er
i =
 N
er
i a
nd
 C
am
ar
go
 (1
99
9)
.
T
he
 r
em
ai
ni
ng
 a
ut
ho
r 
re
fe
re
nc
es
 c
an
 b
e 
fo
un
d
 in
 th
e 
bi
bl
io
gr
ap
hy
.
N
ot
es
: H
yp
c 
is
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 in
co
m
e 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
; H
hl
d
 is
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 in
co
m
e 
pe
r 
fa
m
ily
; E
xp
 is
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 e
xp
en
d
it
ur
e 
ra
th
er
 th
an
in
co
m
e;
 U
rb
 is
 u
rb
an
; N
at
l i
s 
na
ti
on
al
; P
ri
m
ar
y 
is
 t
he
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
am
on
g 
th
e 
in
d
iv
id
ua
ls
 w
ho
 e
ar
n 
or
 r
ec
ei
ve
 t
he
 in
co
m
e.
 I
n 
C
ol
om
bi
a,
 t
he
 s
ta
rr
ed
ob
se
rv
at
io
n 
fo
r 1
98
8 
w
as
 re
m
ov
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
pu
bl
is
he
d
 v
er
si
on
 o
f t
he
 O
ca
m
po
 a
nd
 o
th
er
s 
pa
pe
r b
ec
au
se
 o
f p
ro
bl
em
s 
of
 c
om
pa
ra
bi
lit
y.
 U
nl
es
s 
no
te
d
, a
ll
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 a
re
 G
in
i c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s.

